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Abstract
The dissertation consists of four independent but related studies on jump risk and the
systemic risk of Indian banking stocks. Jumps are defined as abnormal stock price move-
ments in terms of a local volatility. We provide evidence of the existence of jumps in the
Indian market and banking sector and show that jump systematic risks (or jump betas)
are priced differently from continuous systematic risks (or continuous betas). These
jump occurrences can be explained partly by market liquidity conditions in addition to
news arrivals. We finally show that banks with higher jump and continuous betas are
also more active in propagating systemic risk.
In the first study, we use high-frequency stock returns of 41 Indian banks and find
that the beta on jump movements of these stocks substantially exceeds that on the
continuous components, and that the majority of the information content for returns
lies with the jump beta. The predictability of stock returns from the traditional CAPM
beta mainly comes from the jump beta. In this study, we contribute to the debate on
strategies to decrease systematic risk, showing that increased bank capital and reduced
leverage reduce both jump and continuous beta – with slightly stronger effects for capital
on continuous beta and stronger effects for leverage on jump beta. However, changes in
these firm characteristics need to be large to create an economically meaningful change
in beta.
The second study examines the jump risks for banking sector represented by 41 bank-
ing stocks and non-banking financial sector comprises 55 financial Institutions (FI) all
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listed on the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE). Using intra-day high frequency
data we apply several widely-used jump tests to the price series of the financial insti-
tutions of India. We observe wide variation in jump detection rates across different
methods. Our test results show that the banking industry is associated with a higher
degree of jump risk compared with the market whereas the result is opposite for the FI
industry. Results from a probit regression indicate that jumps in the market increase the
likelihood of jump occurrence in the financial sectors in the next period. The intra-day
jump test results of Indian financial stocks reveal the existence of intra-day and weekly
seasonality in jump patterns in contrast with the general description of jump occurrences
in early literature as a Poisson distribution.
The third study seeks to understand the relationship of liquidity variables with jump
movements based on emerging market stocks. We use 15-minute return data from ten of
the largest Indian banking stocks and implement an event study method to examine the
behaviour of liquidity variables around the jump times. We find notable variations in the
liquidity measures around the jump occurrences in the stocks. Liquidity characterized
by market spread, trading quantity and immediacy do improve around jumps. The
results indicate that the demand of immediacy of traders may cause jumps in stock
returns. The Mann-Whitney test results also confirm the significant changes in the
liquidity variable during the jump intervals from the non-jump intervals. Our probit
and logit estimations show that the liquidity variables have more explanatory power in
determining the probability of negative jump occurrences than that of positive ones. We
do not observe substantial changes in the results by dividing our sample into pre-crisis,
v
crisis and post crisis periods, indicating that the effects of liquidity variables are general
on jump occurrences. Finally, several liquidity variables are shown to contribute to price
discovery although the post jump price discovery process does not seem strongly related
with these variables.
In the fourth paper we measure the Indian banks’ systemic risk which can be defined as
the likelihood of propagating financial adversity such as illiquidity. We use stock returns
of 40 listed commercial banks of India for the period of 2011 to 2015. First we apply
a multivariate Granger causality test to establish statistically significant connections
between each pair of banks. To measure the strength of each of the links we measure
the weight of the link by applying a variance decomposition method. Finally, we derive
the network of banks where only the statistically significant links with their respective
weights are retained and from this network matrix we identify the most systemically
active banks in India. An analysis on the daily rolling window of the network measures
shows that the overall network strength increases during our sample period. Our analysis
shows that market liquidity and volatility are related to the network connectivities.
Decrease in liquidity and increase in volatility heighten the connectivity of networks. In
addition, the systematically risky banks in terms of both jump and continuous beta are
found also to be the more active banks in strengthening network connectivities.
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1 Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The asset price process is known to be a combination of drift, continuous movement
and jumps. While asset and derivative pricing models have been formed primarily on
the basis of a continuous-time diffusion process, practical implications of those models
become limited as these models do not fit well with the discrete nature of financial
data. Recent literature incorporates random walk behaviour, market microstructure
effects, stochastic volatility and jumps into asset pricing models which can be classified
as arbitrage free Itô semi-martingale (Merton (1976),Andersen et al., 2007b and Evans,
2011). These processes are combinations of a continuous diffusive Brownian component
and a discontinuous jump component in addition to drifts. Decomposing these different
parts is important as they represent fundamentally different risks for the investors (Aït-
Sahalia, 2004). Investors can improve decisions on option pricing (Cox and Ross, 1976;
Duffie and Pan, 2001; Merton, 1976), risk management (Bakshi and Panayotov, 2010;
Duffie and Pan, 2001), and asset allocation (Jarrow and Rosenfeld, 1984; Liu et al.,
2003) by acknowledging both the continuous and jump parts. In portfolio allocation one
1
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can optimize the demand for assets subject to both types to risks; in risk management,
we can manage continuous risk using Gaussian tools and the jump risks, focusing only
on large fluctuations; in option pricing, we can consider different hedging requirements
conditioning on the existence of both components(Aït-Sahalia, 2004). This dissertation
examines the impacts of jumps on the market, the influence of market factors on jump
occurrences and individual stocks’ reaction to market jumps.
We observe an increasing interest in dealing with jump processes in recent literature.
Aït-Sahalia (2004) divided these studies into three broad directions: estimating financial
models incorporating jumps, testing for the detection of jumps from discrete data and
examining the characteristics of different variables such as quadratic variation in the
presence of jumps. A number of studies attempt to identify what causes the jumps
in asset returns such as news arrival and market liquidity. However, these studies are
largely concentrated on the U.S. and other developed economies. We do not know
whether the findings of these studies hold for emerging economies which are heading
towards becoming the driving forces of world economy in near future. Our effort is
to bolster the jump literature by extending different branches of jump studies to an
important emerging market, India.
The availability of high-frequency observations is one of the factors contributing to
the expansion of the jump literature (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009) The use of high-frequency
data in the research of financial economics has become popular in recent years. The
rapid development and automation of financial markets and transactions around the
world contribute to this development. It is hypothesized that the use of high-frequency
2
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data can increase the accuracy of various financial estimates such as volatility (Fleming
et al., 2003) and covariances (Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2005). By not using
high-frequency data we discard a vast amount data and lose important information (Aït-
Sahalia et al., 2005). The use of high and ultra-high frequency data in empirical studies
enables us to adhere more closely to the models developed based on continuous time series
data. We use intra-day stock price and market index data to detect jumps in the market
and individual stocks. This dissertation concentrates on the banking and financial sector
of India. The banking stocks are large capitalized stocks which are followed by a large
number of individual and institutional investors ensuring high frequency trading of these
stocks. As a result, these stocks, in a setting of emerging market where capital markets
are not yet as liquid as the developed markets, are suited to study in high frequency
data. The other reason for choosing the banking sector is its vulnerability towards shocks
(for example see Laeven and Valencia, 2013) and propensity for propagating shocks to
other sectors of the economy (for example see Jermann and Quadrini, 2012 and Meh and
Moran, 2010). Thus it is important to examine how sensitive the banking stocks are to
shocks in the market reflected by market jumps and also how strong is the network of
bank in spreading idiosyncratic shocks from one bank to others. This dissertation has
four main chapters each covering an independent study on the Indian banking sector
related to different aspects of jump detection and/or systemic risk.
3
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1.2. Research questions and outline of this thesis
It is now documented in the literature, based mainly on developed economies, that
markets and individual stocks experience infrequent jumps. Following Christensen et al.
(2014), the effort of separating the jump components can be divided into three phases.
The first phase noticeably begins after the work of Press (1967) in his jump diffusion
models. After that, a number of authors up to Jorion (1988) used different jump-diffusion
models and reported over 20% jump variations in total returns. The jump diffusion
models used in this phase tend to overestimate jump occurrences as it does not account
for the contribution of stochastic volatility in fat tail measures of return distribution
(Christensen et al., 2014). After 1990, the jump diffusion papers such as Andersen
et al. (2002) and Bollerslev and Zhou (2002) include one or more stochastic volatility
factors and report that the jump components constitute 5% - 10% of the whole process.
The most recent trend is to apply non-parametric models based on high-frequency data
inspired by the work of Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) and strengthened by
Lee and Mykland (2008) Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009), Andersen et al. (2012), Corsi et al.
(2010). Studies based on these model free methods report around 10% jump on stock
returns in USA and confirm that the non-trivial jump proportions deserve consideration
in relevant decision makings.
Because of the dearth of studies on the emerging markets we do not know the extent
of jump existence in these markets and how they behave. Among these markets only
China has attracted the attention of a few researchers, however, another fast growing
4
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Asian economy, India is still largely under-researched. A recent study, Sen and Mehrotra
(2016) shows that jumps exist in the Indian market but does not report the intensity and
other dynamics of jump occurrences in this market. The Indian market which is broker
dominated, may not be as efficient as the US and other developed and liquid markets.
Thus our first research question is:
Research Question 1: Do jumps exist in emerging market like India? If they do, to
what extent, and what are the characteristics of those jump occurrences?
We examine these questions partly in Chapter 2 and more thoroughly in Chapter 3.
Given that jumps exist, how do investors react to those jumps? From the Capital Asset
Pricing model (CAPM) proposed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) we know that
individual stocks react when the whole market moves. This co-movement of individual
stocks with the market, known as beta is an important measure of systematic risk and the
highly cited study of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and subsequent plethora of studies show
that investors price beta. If the movements of the market comprises irregular jumps,
which may result from news arrival, along with regular continuous movements then
investors may react differently to those jumps (Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010, Bollerslev
et al., 2016,Alexeev et al., 2017) . Thus our second research question is:
Research Question 2: Do investors price jump risk differently than non jump market
movements?
We address this research question in Chapter 2. Since the recent global financial crisis
another risk has drawn the attention of researchers as well as regulators. Systemic risk
is loosely defined as the likelihood of propagating shocks from individual entities to the
5
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greater market. If there is any relationship between the systematic risk and systemic
risk, then understanding the relationship will enable us to formulate an comprehensive
strategy to mitigate these risks. Firms with higher beta or systematic risk are clearly
the firms which are more active against market shocks and news arrivals. It is thus more
likely that these banks will also be active in propagating systemic risks. Therefore, a
related research question is
Research Question 2a: Are the banks with higher systematic jump and continuous risk
also active in propagating risks in systemic nature?
We address this question in Chapter 5 of our thesis. A network analysis of banks
enable us determining the systemic risk of Indian banks and examine the relationship
between systemic and systematic risks.
Arrival of news has been attributed as the single most important factor causing jumps
in stocks and the overall market (Dungey et al., 2009b, Lahaye et al., 2011, Patton and
Verardo, 2012). However, not all the jumps are related to news - Boudt and Petitjean
(2014) report that a one third of the jumps are related to macroeconomic news and 5%
from firm specific news. Not many studies are directed in exploring the non-news related
instigators of jumps. Two studies, Jiang et al. (2011) and Boudt and Petitjean (2014),
examine the interaction between liquidity and jumps and found significant relationships
between these variables. Findings of these papers are again based on markets with high
liquidity and efficiency where news spread in the market rapidly. In a market like India
where news may not spread as fast as the US market, liquidity and market conditions
may pay a higher role in jump occurrences as opposed to news arrival. Thus our third
6
1 Introduction
research question is:
Research question 3: What liquidity and market condition variables cause jumps other
than news arrival?
Chapter 4 is dedicated to examining this question where the dynamics between liquid-
ity and jumps of the the ten largest Indian banks are analysed.
1.3. Key contributions
In examining the research questions outlined in Section 1.2, this thesis contributes by
exploring the jump risk of the Indian financial market by using high frequency data.
The specific contributions are as follows:
1) Based on recently developed methods, we confirm the existence of jumps in the
Indian market and show that the sensitivities of individual stocks towards the market
jump are substantially different from continuous market movements. The difference
in such sensitivities are higher than what is reported in literature for the developed
markets. Our results show that the price discovery of beta is mainly derived from its
jump component rather than the continuous component. This finding underpins the
importance of considering the jump beta in investment and portfolio decisions.
2) We show a wide variation of results from different jump detection methods in an
emerging market setting. While doing the analysis, we show the optimal frequency of
intra-day return we may use for a country like India. We find seasonality and clus-
tering behaviour of jumps in our results, corroborating with recent findings that jump
occurrences do not follow a Poisson distribution as described in the early literature.
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3) The relationship between the liquidity and jumps has rarely been studied before
in an emerging market context. Our paper is the first attempt in this direction. Our
work provides the narration of similarities and differences of the interaction of liquidity
variables around the jump with the US based findings reported in Jiang et al. (2011)
and Boudt and Petitjean (2014).
4) We apply a recently developed network model to the Indian market in assessing
systemic risk using stock returns. Our results show that systematic risk and systemic
risk have a relationship that is not properly investigated in the literature so far. An-
other important result from our study is that we find significant effects of liquidity and
volatility on the different aspect of network connectivity measures that may provide a
new perspective to the systemic risk researchers and regulators.
1.4. A brief history of the Indian banking sector
All of the individual papers incorporated in this thesis are conducted on the Indian
banking sector. A short history of Indian banking sector is presented below.
India has a long history of banking and finance although there is lack of coherent
commentaries of historical sequence in the literature. For instance, there is lack of
consensus regarding the first Indian bank and its year of establishment. However, there
is consensus among authors (Gauba, 2012; Ratti, 2012) that an indigenous banking
system existed in India from the ancient past. Although the formal banking system was
established in the hands of British traders in the 18th century an indigenous payment
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and lending system existed in India from the ancient past (RBI, 19981).
After the invasion of India, English traders began banking businesses to facilitate
their trading business. Although an indigenous banking system was in existence in
India language difference motivated English traders to start their own banking institutes
established by the English agency houses. The first few banks were set up in Calcutta and
Bombay. These agency houses were mainly established by people who were retired from
civil and military services and worked as managing agencies for establishing business
houses. They were involved in financing movement of crops, issuing paper money and
establishing joint stock banks. The such recorded first bank in India was Hindoostan
Bank which started operation in 1770. However, some authors claim that, the General
bank of India, established in 1786, was the first bank of India. Both these banks are
defunct now. The oldest bank in existence is the State Bank of India which originated as
the Bank of Calcutta in 1806 and later converted into Bank of Bengal. This bank along
with two other banks, Bank of Bombay and Bank of Madras, known as the Presidency
banks were established under charter from the British East India Company. These three
banks worked as quasi-central banks and subsequently merged into one bank named the
Imperial Bank of India in 1925. After the independence of India the same bank became
the State Bank of India which is the biggest bank still today. Few foreign banks opened
branches in Calcutta in the 1860s. The Comptoire d’ Escompte de Paris and HSBC are
the first two foreign banks with a presence in India, more particularly Calcutta which
became the banking centre being the most active trading port of the country.
1RBI. (1998). Evolution of Payment Systems in India. Retrieved from
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=155.
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The first local bank was Union Bank of India, established by Indian merchants in
1839 but this institution failed during the financial crisis of 1848-49. Allahabad Bank
established in 1865 is the oldest bank to be still functioning in India today. It was
established amid a boom of local joint stock companies. The boom was instigated by
the civil war of USA that cut off supply of cotton in England causing an uprise of India’s
cotton trade in England. The first joint stock bank was Bank of Upper India (1863) and
the first entirely Indian joint stock bank was the Oudh Commercial Bank established in
1881. None of these banks survive but the next bank, Punjab National Bank established
in 1895 still exists and is now one of the largest banks in the country. At the beginning
of the 20th century when Indian economic conditions were stabilizing, small banks were
established by Indians which served particular ethnic and religious communities. But
it was the presidency banks which dominated the industry. Some joint stock banks
were established in this period by mostly the Europeans and were involved mainly in
financing foreign trade. The period of between 1906 to 1911 is denoted as Swadeshi (Self
independent) movement in India led by Mahatma Gandhi. A number of banks were
established by local businessmen and politicians who were inspired by this movement.
Some of the surviving banks today such as Bank of India, Corporation Bank, Indian
Bank, Bank of Baroda, Canara Bank and Central Bank of India were established at that
time.
The period from 1914 to 1945 (From first world war to the second world war) Indian
banks faced a turbulent period. A total of 94 banks collapsed during only the First
World War (1914 - 1918) as a result of war-related economic downturn. However, the
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Indian economy as whole was boosted after the war by the recovery activities.
The independence of India in 1947 was coupled with dividing it into two independent
countries, India and Pakistan. The impact of partition adversely impacted the economy
of India and its banking sector. The government of India adopted a policy of having
a greater role in economy ending the laissez – fair era for Indian Banking sector. The
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which was established in 1935, was nationalized on January
1, 1949 according to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1948. The RBI was empowered to
approve new banks or branches of an existing bank, regulate, control and inspect the
banks in India under the Banking Regulation Act enacted in 1949. The act also prohibits
any two banks having common directors.
The banking sector still owned and managed by the private sector gained strength
to facilitate economic development. The government led by Indira Gandhi decided to
nationalize the banking sector and issued an ordinance known as Banking Compan-
ies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969. Under this ordinance
the government nationalized the 14 largest commercial banks representing 85% of the
country’s bank deposits, on 19 July 1969.
Through the second phase of nationalization, which took place in 1980, the government
took control of 91% of the banking business of the country. The number of nationalized
banks grew to 20. However, after a merger of ‘New Bank of India’ with ‘Punjab National
Bank’ the number was reduced to 19, a number which remains the same until the current
period.
The government of India decided to liberalize the economy in the early 1990s and
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undertook a number of steps – reducing required regulatory reserve on deposits, relaxing
rules for entry and exit of private sector banks, allowing public sector banks to collect
capital from the capital market, liberalizing fixed interest rate system, easing up branch
licensing policies, strengthening bank supervision by RBI etc. Thus there has been a
structural change in Indian Banking sector reform after 1990 (Mor et al., 2006). The
sector which was under state ownership was opened to a large extent by allowing entry
of a number of private banks. These banks include Trust bank which later amalgamated
with Oriental Bank of Commerce, UTI bank which is renamed as Axis Bank, ICICI
Bank and HDFC Bank. These banks are known as new generation of tech savvy banks.
The entry requirement of foreign banks was also liberalized, and the ownership of the
public banks was made diversified. As a result of these developments the banking sector
of India has become more competitive (Prasad et al., 2007).
The government also relaxed the restriction on foreign direct investment by with-
drawing voting rights of foreign investors in banks. Adoption of IT infrastructure had
modernized the banking service to a great extent. Most of the banks both in private
and public sector are now using online banking to differing degrees. The liberalization of
policy and modernization of banking operation led a boom in retail banking, mortgage
and investment services. The high growth of Indian economy coupled with the policy
reform has reinvigorated the banking sector which is experiencing a rapid growth rate
in last two decades.
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Indian Banking Stocks
2.1. Introduction
The risk of an investment is typically divided into two parts: idiosyncratic risk and
systematic risk which results from exposure to overall market shocks and is often repre-
sented as beta in a CAPM framework. CAPM typically quantifies the co-movement of
returns in an individual asset (or portfolio) with the market. However, the price process
is also known to be a combination of continuous and jump components; see Merton
(1976) and plentiful references since. Jumps are a means by which new information may
be incorporated into the market, and there is an emerging literature hypothesising that
the CAPM beta for the jump and continuous components of the price process may differ.
For example, Patton and Verardo (2012) provide a learning argument and empirical evi-
dence for increased beta around the release of earnings information on individual stocks,
and Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) provide evidence for 40 US stocks.
This chapter estimates continuous and jump betas for equities in the Indian banking
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sector using recent developments in high frequency financial econometrics by Todorov
and Bollerslev (2010). The application to individual stock prices in emerging market
equities is novel, there is little literature on the high frequency behaviour of emerging
markets (the exceptions are for market indices in Chinese markets (Liao et al., 2010; Zhou
and Zhu, 2012), and in Eastern European markets in Hanousek and Novotný (2012))
and nothing on individual stocks in the financial sector. Yet the emerging markets
are critically important to the future of the world economy, and their financial sectors
drive that development. Emerging economies, termed "the world economy’s 21st century
sprinters" by "The Economist" leapt to producing over half of world output in the first
decade of this century. India is one of the major drivers of this growth, with a large
aggregate output, a vast young population and underutilized resources. The market
for the Indian rupee has grown from 0.1% of global turnover in 1998 to 1% in 2013
(BIS, 2013), and in 2012 was amongst the top 10 global equity markets by market
capitalisation. Indian markets have a number of important advantages over those of
other BRIC economies with strong institutional structure, unburdened with the non-
performing assets and ageing population structure of China, the Russian exposure to
the Chinese slowdown, or the high inflation of Brazil.
The Indian banking sector follows the British structure of banking, India is one of the
English common law countries (Buchanan et al., 2011), and listed banks are not only
under the purview of the Reserve Bank of India but also the Securities and Exchange
Board of India which ensures strong information disclosure to investors. Rathinam and
Raja (2010) attribute the phenomenal growth in the Indian financial sector to legal de-
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velopment, improvements in property rights protection and contract enforcement and
positive changes in the regulatory environment. The banking sector (commercial banks,
regional rural banks, rural and urban co-operative banks) accounted for 63% of India’s
financial assets in the 2012-13 financial year, with the remainder shared between insur-
ance companies (19%), non banking financial institutions (8%), mutual funds (6%) and
provident and pension funds (4%). The 89 commercial banks operating in India in 2012-
13, consisted of 43 foreign banks, 20 local privately-owned banks and 26 nationalised
banks. The market is distinguished by significant government ownership in a number
of banks, exposing 73% of total banking sector assets to some degree of government
investment. However, the sector is well dispersed with a 5 bank concentration ratio of
38% in 2012-13 and only one bank, the State Bank of India, with a significant dominance
(17% of 2012-13). The total deposit of the banking sector was 74.29 trillion Indian rupee
representing 73.46% of GDP at the end of 2012-13 financial year, employing over one
million employees across 92 thousand bank branches/offices1.
We initially confirm the existence of jumps in the 5-minute stock returns for 41 banks
listed on the National Stock Exchange of India over 2004 to 2015, providing the motiva-
tion for our estimation of separate continuous and jump betas. The estimated jump beta
is generally higher than the corresponding continuous beta, supporting the hypothesis
that stocks behave differently in response to jumps than continuous market movements.
When testing the validity of the disentangled betas against the CAPM standard beta,
we find that it is the jump beta rather than the continuous beta which has explanatory
1The exchange rate was US$1=59.5260 Indian rupee as of 30/06/2013.
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power over the variation in stock returns, leading to the conclusion that the predictive
power of CAPM beta comes mainly from the jump component.
We relate the variation in betas to firm characteristics and find that financial lever-
age, capital adequacy, and firm size have significant impacts on each of the jump and
continuous beta estimates. These relationships are informative for the debate about re-
ducing systemic risk via options to constrain leverage or increase the capital base of the
banking sector. We show that financial leverage has a positive effect on beta, indicating
that a more heavily leveraged firm is more exposed to market movements, although we
demonstrate that the impact of changes in leverage are economically very small. Greater
capital adequacy reduces both jump and continuous beta, but again requires relatively
large changes to have a substantial economic effect. Thus, our results support the di-
rection of the impact of policies to decrease leverage and increase the capital base on
reducing systematic risk, but throw some doubt on the size of the changes needed to
obtain an effective impact in reducing risk in the financial sector.
Competing hypotheses on firm size suggest that either larger firms are more stable
and able to weather market shocks more easily, or that as they are a substantial part of
the market they are more exposed to market shocks. Our results support the hypothesis
that larger firms are more exposed with higher beta, but this effect is more evident for
continuous movements; the effects for jump beta are statistically significant but smaller.
Our estimates also find that price volatility is a contributing factor for higher continuous
beta, but not jump beta, and that more profitable firms have lower continuous and
jump beta although the relationships are not statistically significant in contrast with the
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hypothesis that these firms may be taking more risk to achieve these profits.
The paper has two major contributions. First of all, it is the first paper to extend the
exercise of decomposing CAPM beta to an emerging market where market characteristics
differ from the US market in terms of liquidity and information efficiency. Second, it
is in our knowledge one of the the first papers to show that the price discovery of
systematic risk is derived mainly from the jump beta rather than the continuous beta.
Thus, it underpin the importance of detecting and incorporating jumps for the market
participants.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature
related to the decomposition of CAPM and Section 2.3 elaborates the methodology
employed for jump detection and beta estimation. We outline data collection and the
cleaning process along with choices of calibrated parameter value in Section 2.4. Section
2.5 discusses the results of the empirical analysis and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2. The CAPM and decomposition of beta
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964 and Lintner, 1965), models the
return on an asset (or portfolio of assets) as a linear combination of return on the risk
free asset and a market risk premium multiplied by the associated beta. The CAPM
beta itself is estimated as the covariance between the asset return and market return,
standardized by the variance of market return. A subsequent large literature of empirical
studies shows mixed results on the effectiveness of beta in explaining the variation of
stock returns. A number of alternatives have been proposed to improve empirical CAPM
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including multi-factor models, such as the three factor model of Fama and French (1993),
arbitrage pricing theory by Ross (1976), incorporating higher order co-moments (Kraus
and Litzenberger, 1976; Friend and Westerfield, 1980; Faff et al., 1998; Harvey and
Siddique, 2000) , CAPM conditional on market conditions (such as Fabozzi and Francis,
1978), and CAPM with time varying beta (such as Bollerslev et al., 1988; Fraser et al.,
2000).
This study takes the approach of decomposing the price process into a continuous and
jump component consistent with recent evidence (see Andersen et al., 2007a; Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard, 2004b, 2006; Huang and Tauchen, 2005; Dungey et al., 2009b;
Aït-Sahalia and Jacod, 2012), and consequently estimating betas on the two components
using the method developed in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010).
The standard one factor CAPM relates the return of individual stocks to the return
of the benchmark market portfolio as follows:
ri = αi + βir0 + εi, for i = 1, . . . , N, (2.1)
where ri is the return of the ith asset, and r0 denotes the return of the market portfolio
which represents the systematic risk factor. The βi coefficient quantifies the sensitivity
of the asset return to the movement of the market return.
Decomposing the market return into continuous and jump components suggests the
following form:
ri = αi + βci rc0 + βdi rd0 + εi, for i = 1, . . . , N, (2.2)
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where the market return r0 is decomposed into the continuous market return, rc0, and
the discontinuous (or jump) market return, rd0 . Correspondingly, the systematic risk also
comprises two components, continuous beta βci , and jump beta βdi , which represent the
sensitivities of the ith asset return to rc0 and rd0 , respectively. Using high frequency data,
which has already been shown to increase the predictive power of estimates of beta
(Andersen et al., 2005; Bollerslev and Zhang, 2003; Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard,
2004a; Patton and Verardo, 2012), allows estimation of βci , and jump beta βdi using the
methods proposed in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010).
2.3. Jump detection and beta estimation
The calculation of jump beta is motivated by the fact that the price process of any asset
is a combination of a Brownian semi-martingale plus jumps. Denoting the return of an
asset as dpt, where pt is the log-price series, the continuous-time model for the asset
return is
dpt = µtdt+ σtdWt + κtdqt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.3)
where µt is the drift term, σt represents the spot volatility, andWt is a standard Brownian
motion. The third term, κtdqt captures the jumps in the price process, where qt is a
counting process with dqt = 1 if there is a jump occurred at time t, and 0 otherwise.
κt is the size of the jump at time t. The quadratic variation for the process in (2.3) is
defined as
QV [0,T ] =
ˆ T
0
σ2sds+
∑
0<s≤T
κ2s. (2.4)
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In practice, we can only observe the asset price at discrete time intervals, say, ev-
ery ∆n interval. Hence, the observed return series becomes ∆nj p = pj − pj−1, j =
1, 2, . . . , [T/∆n]. As ∆n → 0, a consistent estimator of QV [0,T ] is the realized variation
popularized by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998),
RV [0,T ] =
[T/∆n]∑
j=1
|∆nj p|2 p−→ QV [0,T ] as ∆n → 0. (2.5)
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004b) introduce an alternative measure, realized bi-
power variation, defined as
BV [0,T ] = µ−2
[T/∆n−1]∑
j=2
|∆nj p||∆nj+1p|, (2.6)
where µ =
√
2/pi = E(|Z|) represents the mean of absolute value of a standard normal
random variable Z. As ∆n → 0, BV [0,T ] converges to the contribution to QV [0,T ] from
the Brownian component,
´ T
0 σ
2
sds in probability, even in the presence of jumps. Hence,
the contribution from the jump component to QV [0,T ] can be estimated consistently by
taking the difference of RV [0,T ] and BV [0,T ], that is,
RV [0,T ] −BV [0,T ] p−→
∑
0<s≤T
κ2s as ∆n → 0. (2.7)
As first proposed by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) (BNS henceforth), the
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discrepancy between RV [0,T ] and BV [0,T ] is utilized to detect the presence of jumps. We
apply their adjusted ratio test statistic. The feasible test statistic of jump detection is
given by
Jˆ = 1√
∆n
· 1√
θ ·max(1/T,DV [0,T ]/(BV [0,T ])2)
·
(
BV [0,T ]
RV [0,T ]
− 1
)
, (2.8)
where DV [0,T ] = ∑[T/∆n−3]j=1 |∆nj p||∆nj+1p||∆nj+2p||∆nj+3p| and θ = pi24 + pi − 5. In the
absence of jumps, the test statistic Jˆ given in (2.8) follows a standard normal distribution
asymptotically. Therefore, under the null of no jumps,
Jˆ L−→ N (0, 1) as ∆n → 0. (2.9)
We reject the null hypothesis of no jumps if the test statistic is significantly negative.
The detection of jumps paves the way to separately estimate continuous and jump
beta. Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) derive the nonparametric estimates of both βci and
βdi in (2.2). By expressing the co-variation between the continuous components of pi
and p0 as [pci , pc0](0,T ] = βci
´ T
0 σ
2
0,sds, and the variance of the continuous component of p0
as [pc0, pc0](0,T ] =
´ T
0 σ
2
0,sds in the continuous-time model, they show that the continuous
beta of the ith asset, βci can be expressed as
βci =
[pci , pc0](0,T ]
[pc0, pc0](0,T ]
, i = 1, . . . , N. (2.10)
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In reality observing price data on continuous basis is not possible. Therefore, the
estimator βˆci takes the following form in the discrete-time setting
βˆci =
∑[T/∆n]
j=1 ∆nj pi∆nj p01{|∆nj p|≤un}∑[T/∆n]
j=1 (∆nj p0)21{|∆nj p|≤un}
, i = 1, . . . , N, (2.11)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Here, we require a truncation threshold that will
identify the continuous price movement from the whole price process. In our empirical
analysis, the continuous price movement corresponds to those observations that satisfy
|∆nj p| ≤ un. The truncation threshold, un is set to be an (N + 1) × 1 vector, where
N is the number of assets, and un = (α0∆ωn , α1∆ωn , . . . , αn∆ωN )′, where ω ∈ (0, 12), and
αi ≥ 0, i = 0, . . . , N . Therefore, values of the truncation thresholds across different
assets depend on the different values of αi.
For the discontinuous price movement, Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) show that the
jump beta of the ith asset, βdi based on a continuous-time basis is
βdi = sign
∑
s≤T
sign{∆pi∆p0,s}|∆pi,s∆p0,s|τ

×
( |∑s≤T sign{∆pi,s∆p0,s}|∆pi,s∆pi,s|τ |∑
s≤T |∆p0,s|2τ
) 1
τ
. (2.12)
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The discrete time estimator βˆdi as derived by Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) is
βˆdi = sign

[T/∆n]∑
j=1
sign{∆nj pi∆nj p0}|∆nj pi∆nj p0|τ

×
 |∑[T/∆n]j=1 sign{∆nj pi,s∆nj p0}|∆nj pi∆nj p0|τ |∑[T/∆n]
j=1 |∆nj p0|2τ
 1τ , (2.13)
where i = 1, . . . , N , and the power τ is restricted to be τ ≥ 2, so that the presence of
continuous price movements becomes negligible asymptotically, and only the discontinu-
ous movements matter. Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) show that βˆci
p−→ βci as ∆n → 0,
and βˆdi
p−→ βdi on Ω(0), when Ω(0) is the set where there is at least one systematic jump
on [0, T ]. Further, they show that both beta estimates have an asymptotic normal
distribution, and provide consistent estimators for the variances of βˆci and βˆdi .
2.4. Data and parameter values
The high frequency stock price data are extracted from the Thompson Reuters Tick
History (TRTH) database provided by SIRCA for the sample period from January 1,
2004 to December 31, 2015. The quality of data before 2004 is not satisfactory as it
contains excessive missing observations that may bias the jump-robust volatility esti-
mates. Thus, our sample period does not include any period before January 1, 2004.
We collate data on 5-minute stock returns for 41 commercial banks listed on the National
Stock Exchange of India (NSE) shown in Table 2.1. The NSE was established in 1990
and soon became an important exchange by providing a fully automated screen-based
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trading system. It is now the largest stock exchange in India in terms of daily turnover
and number of trades, and ranks second in terms of total market turnover, behind the
Bombay Stock Exchange, with turnover in July 2013 of USD $0.99 billion.
The sampling frequency of 5 minutes is relatively standard in the high frequency
literature. It provides a reasonable compromise between the need to sample at very high
frequencies in order to resemble the continuous price process (Andersen et al., 2001), and
possible contamination from micro-structure noise. The literature developing optimal
sampling frequency for the analysis of multiple assets, with or without noise, is ongoing2.
We use the last price recorded in each of the 5-minute intervals from 9:15am to 3:30pm.
Missing data are filled with the price of the previous interval which assumes that the
price remains unchanged during a non-trading interval. We drop the first 15 minutes
of each day to avoid noise associated with market opening. Hence, the first 5-minute
intervals is 9.30 am to 9.35 am and we capture 72 price observations on each trading
day. We use the CNX500 index as the benchmark market portfolio, which represents
96.76% of the free float market capitalization of stocks listed on the NSE. Among the
indexes of NSE available in TRTH database CNX500 offers the broadest coverage of the
stocks listed on the exchange, hence we choose this index to represent the market.
We apply the calibrated parameter values implemented by Todorov and Bollerslev
(2010) and Alexeev et al. (2017). Following those authors we estimate both daily and
2In the third chapter, we conducted the signature plot analysis showing that 15-minute data is opti-
mal for this market and all of our subsequent high-frequency analyses are conducted based on this
sampling interval.
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monthly betas, so that T = 1 represents one day in the first case and one month in the
second. As ∆n is the reciprocal of the number of observations during a given period,
it equals 1/72 for daily estimation but varies from month to month; for example, ∆n
equals to 1/1584 in a month with 22 trading days. The threshold values, un are chosen
by taking ω = 0.49. We implement αci = 3
√
BV [0,T ] for βˆci , and αdi =
√
BV
[0,T ]
i for
βˆdi , where BV
[0,T ]
i is the bi-power variation of the ith stock over the time interval [0, T ]
,i = 0, . . . , N . The value of τ = 2 in equation (2.12) follows Todorov and Bollerslev
(2010).
2.5. Empirical analysis
The first step in the empirical analysis is to determine the existence of jumps in the
Indian market. Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the two daily volatility
measures RV and BV of the CNX500 and Figure 2.1 depicts the occurrence of jump
days detected using the BNS test in the market index throughout the sample period
2004 – 2015.
Within our sample period from 2004 to 2015, we find 136 jump days out of 2,904
trading days in the market index, that is in 4.68% of our sampled trading days. This
percentage is lower than the percentage reported by Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) for
the US market using a test statistic based on the difference between RV and BV (106 out
of 1241 days or 8.54%). However, our percentage is higher than the reported proportion
of Alexeev et al. (2017) who apply the same test statistic in (2.8) to the US market. We
cannot verify our results with any literature on Indian market as this is the first study of
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jump detection for this market. However, the proportion of jump days reported by Zhou
and Zhu (2012) for China, is similar to our results. Applying the same methodology,
they report 2.25% jump days for the SSE A Share Index, and 5.75% jump days for the
SSE B Share Index. Of the 144 months in our sample, 87 months have at least one jump
day.
The number of jump days in the CNX500 index decreases gradually from 2004 (22
days) to 2008 (4 days), then increases in 2009 (13 days), and remains stable afterwards;
see Figure 2.1 for a depiction. During the global financial crisis (GFC), there is no
evidence of a notable increase in the number of jump days. In fact, during 2008, when
the GFC was at its nadir, the Indian market experiences a lower number of jumps than
the adjacent years. This result may indicate the resilience of Indian market against
global shocks, although Bianconi et al. (2011) and Mensi et al. (2014) show that the
US and global crisis spread through the BRIC countries including India. However, a
number of studies show similar reductions in the number of jumps detected during the
crisis period compared with the prior tranquil period; Barada and Yasuda (2012) and
Chowdhury (2014) for the Japanese market, Novotný et al. (2013) for six mature and
three emerging stock market indices, Black et al. (2012) and Alexeev et al. (2017) for
the US stock market. An alternative explanation, supported by these studies, is that
during the crisis period the threshold of jump identification increases with the overall
market volatility and some price discontinuities that may be classified as jumps during
the tranquil period may be classified as continuous movements during the crisis period.
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2.5.1. Betas for the Indian banks
The summary statistics of monthly continuous and jump betas of the sample banking
stocks are reported in Table 2.3. The mean values of jump betas (1.42) are 89.33 per
cent larger than the mean values of continuous betas. That indicates that the sensitivity
of banking stocks towards the market is much higher against the market jumps than
the calm market conditions. The lower standard deviation of jump average jump betas
shows that the behaviour across banking stocks behave more homogeneously in the
face of market jumps or shocks. Table 2.4 shows reiterates that for each of the banks
the monthly average estimated jump beta, βˆdi , is higher than the average estimated
continuous beta, βˆci , indicating that banks respond more strongly to systematic risk
via the discontinuous market movements (or jumps).3 The average continuous beta is
generally smaller than one, which implies that in response to the continuous market
movements, the returns of banking stocks move less than the market return for the
wider variety of stocks contained in the CNX500 index. Only 16 banks, ALBK, AXBK,
BOB, BOI, CNBK, DCBA, DENA, ICBK, IDBI, ORBC, PNBK, SBI, SBNK, UCBK,
UNBK and YESB have an average estimated continuous beta that is higher than one.
These banks do not exhibit any obvious uniform firm characteristics with respect to
ownership, market capitalization, profitability or leverage. None of the banks have
a negative average βˆci , and the lowest sensitivity to continuous market movement is
evident for Standard Chartered Bank (STNCy) with an average continuous beta of 0.04.
3Although we have calculated both daily and monthly time varying betas, in common with Todorov
and Bollerslev (2010) and Alexeev et al. (2017) we find that the volatility in the daily beta estimates
favours the use of the monthly betas for analysis.
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Standard Chartered Bank is the only foreign bank in our data set, which may be why it
is more resilient to movements in the domestic Indian market.4
Of the 41 banks in our sample, 38 have an average jump beta larger than one. This
indicates that the returns of banking stocks move more than the return of the market
itself when the market experiences jumps. DCBA is the bank with highest average jump
beta (1.92) followed by IDBI (1.74). The bank with lowest average jump beta is STNCy
(0.63), consistent with its very low continuous beta, followed by KARU (0.81).
The jump betas of all banks are on average 159% percent higher than their continuous
betas, and the columns of average confidence intervals of continuous and jump betas in
Table 2.4 show that there is no overlap between the confidence intervals of βˆci and βˆi
d
for any bank. This supports the hypothesis that the continuous and jump betas in the
augmented CAPM specification of equation (2.2) differ, and that a single factor CAPM
model may miss information which is important for effective portfolio diversification and
pricing. As an example, consider the confidence intervals for the average continuous and
jump beta for all banks depicted in Figure 2.2, and for the State Bank of India, the
largest Indian bank, in Figure 2.3. The figures show a volatile pattern of average betas
for all banks and a stable level of continuous beta from January 2004 to December 2015
for SBI, while the jump beta has both higher values and relatively higher variability
than the continuous beta in both figures.
We may expect changes in the beta estimates caused by the GFC since 2008. Hence
4Unfortunately access to the firm characteristic data for STNCy is limited, restricting subsequent
analysis. Of the 108 months in our sample period, we have data for STNCy in 31 months, and hence
estimate βˆc for that subsample.
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we divide our full sample into three sub-periods: pre-GFC (January, 2004 to August
2008), GFC (September, 2008 to March, 2010) and post-GFC (April, 2010 to December,
2015), and calculate the average beta estimates for the three sub-sample periods. The
summary of the results are shown in Table 2.5. Both continuous and jumps betas are
lower during the GFC period than their values in pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. The
variations as indicated by the standard veviations of betas also did not increase during
the GFC. We report the individual bank results in Table 2.6. The range of the beta
estimates varies considerably for each individual bank. For example, the continuous
beta for KARU during the GFC is as low as 0.19, while for DCBA and IDBI, the
continuous beta estimates are consistently above unity in any sub-sample periods.
For most banks, the average continuous and average jump betas of banking stocks
decrease during the GFC from the pre-GFC period. However, these betas increase after
the GFC and rise above the pre-GFC level. This pattern of changes is more evident
for jump beta than continuous beta. However, it contradicts what we would expect
from the financial contagion literature, that co-movements among assets during crisis
would become stronger. On the other hand, this phenomenon could be explained as a
distinctive feature of an emerging market compared to well-developed financial markets.
As the banking sector was hit particularly hard by the crisis, investors of these stocks
may refrain from trading. Consequently, these stocks may become detached from the
market resulting in lower betas.
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2.5.2. Risk premia
The estimates of beta are now considered with respect to their explanatory power for
observed stock returns (see, for example, Black et al., 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973).
The usual approach regresses the standard CAPM beta on stock returns, using a pooled
OLS approach, as follows
dpi,t = δ + φh βˆhi,t + vi,t, (2.14)
where βˆhi,t denotes the estimated single-factor CAPM beta. We extend this to incorporate
the separation of market returns into continuous and jump components below:
dpi,t = δ + φcβˆci,t + φdβˆdi,t + ωi,t, (2.15)
where dpi indicates stock returns, and βˆci , and βˆdi denote the estimated continuous and
jump betas, respectively. The models should produce a constant value, δ, equal to the
risk free rate, and the coefficients on the beta estimates, φ’s, should indicate the relevant
market risk premium which are expected to be significantly positive.
We first estimate monthly standard single factor CAPM beta in order to compare
the results with the disentangled betas. The summary statistics of estimated standard
CAPM betas βˆhi,t are reported in Table 2.7 while the average values these betas for each
of the sample banks are shown in Table 2.8. The mean value of standard betas lies in-
between the continuous and jump betas. It is an expected result given that continuous
and jump betas are decomposed form of standard CAPM betas. For all banks, the
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standard CAPM beta has a value higher than the continuous beta and lower than the
jump beta. Thus, it is clear that ignoring the source (continuous or jump) of change
in the market return may lead to an over-estimate of systematic risk during continuous
market movements, and under-estimate during discontinuous market movements. The
average standard beta across all Indian banks is 0.96, while the average continuous beta
is 0.75 and average jump beta is 1.42.
The results imply that the predictive power of CAPM beta is derived mainly from
its jump component rather than the continuous component. The regression results for
equations (2.14) and (2.15) are reported in Table 2.9 . We find positive and significant
coefficients of only jump and CAPM betas but not for continuous beta in univariate
regressions shown in models (1), (2) and (3). When we regress the stock returns on con-
tinuous and jump betas together as shown in model (4), jump beta remains significant,
the continuous beta again does not have a significant coefficient.5. The random effect
panel regression of the same model 6 shown in Table 2.10 provide us almost the same
results. The continuous beta is significant now in model (1) in the univariate regression
but still insignificant in model (4) thus reaffirming our finding that the jump beta has
higher price discovery characteristic than the continuous beta.
5Extending the set of potential explanatory variables to include firm characteristics covered in the next
section does not affect these conclusions. Results available from the authors on request.
6We choose random effect over fixed effect panel regression model as the Hausman Tests results fail to
reject that the random effect models are misspecified.
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2.5.3. The role of firm characteristics
There is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated continuous and discontinuous betas
across the banks although they belong to the same industry. Patton and Verardo (2012)
suggest that the variations in beta are associated with firm-specific news and stock
fundamentals. We hypothesize that firm characteristics may contribute to the variations
in the bank betas. The size of the banks, their profitability, leverage, capital stock
against risky assets and ownership may contribute to the estimated differences.
The Basel regulatory framework advocates higher capital stock as a buffer against
risky assets for banks implying that banks with higher capital adequacy ratios (CAR)
should have lower chance of failure and hence be more resilient to risks arising from the
market. Our first hypothesis is that CAR is negatively related to the systematic risk of
banking firms.
Leverage, on the other hand, has been argued to increase systematic risk through cor-
relation with business cycle conditions. Buiter and Rahbeir (2012) argue that leveraging
is positively related to long-lived and costly systemic risk. Thus, our second hypothesis
is that leverage is positively related to the systematic risk of banks.
Larger banks may be able to withstand market downturns via their ability to diversify
and increased market power, and hence the third hypothesis is that larger firms have a
lower beta. Profitable firms may exhibit stable price behaviour, stemming from the con-
fidence that investors bestow on these stocks, making profitable firms less volatile than
the market as a whole, leading to hypothesis four that higher profitability is negatively
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related to beta. Finally, we test whether similarly private versus government ownership
reduces or increases the systematic risk of a bank, as investors may have different degrees
of confidence on these two ownership modes.
Incorporating these firm characteristic factors, we estimate the following regression
model:
βˆi,t = α+
m∑
i=1
γXi,t + ui,t, (2.16)
for both jump beta and continuous beta separately, where Xi,t are the firm characteristic
variables of ith bank at time t. We collect data on the firm characteristics for 23 Indian
banks from Datastream7, and regress the jump beta or continuous beta on firm size,
profitability, leverage, ownership and CAR separately. Firm size is represented by market
capitalization in log form. Leverage is computed as the ratio of total debt to market
capitalization. Profitability is measured in percentage of the return on assets (RoA),
computed as earnings before interest tax and depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)
divided by market value of assets. We use a dummy variable for nationalized versus
private ownership of the banks and CAR is directly extracted from Datastream. The
summary statistics for the firm characteristics are reported in Table 2.11.
In addition to firm characteristics, we consider the potential role of individual stock
volatility. A firm that is highly volatile may show a greater reaction when the market
moves. Alternatively, volatile stocks may be largely influenced by idiosyncratic factors
rather than market conditions, and thus exhibit lower beta values. Thus our final form
7The macroeconomic data only for 23 of our sample banks are available in Datastream.
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of equation (2.16) takes the following form:
βˆi,t = α+γ1CARi,t+γ2Levi,t+γ3RoAi,t+γ4Sizei,t+γ5Privatei,t+γ6RVi,t+ui,t, (2.17)
incorporating capital assets ration (CAR), leverage (Lev), return on assets (RoA), size
(Size) and RVi,t is realized variation for the ith bank at time t.
Table 2.12 reports the regression results on the relationship between betas and firm
characteristics. The first column reports the results for continuous beta and the second
column the results for jump beta. In the continuous beta specification we additionally
include an AR(1) term to tackle the autocorrelation in the error term. The table reports
White adjusted standard errors.
The results in Table 2.12 show that relationship between continuous beta and leverage
is positive and significant, at the 1% significance level, while the relationship of contin-
uous beta with CAR is negative and significant at the 5% level. A decrease of one unit
in the leverage ratio is estimated to lead to a decrease of 0.03 in the continuous beta,
assessed at the mean value of leverage, this is equivalent to a decrease in the leverage
ratio for Indian banks from 2.05 to 1.85 resulting in a decrease in continuous beta of
0.006. It is immediately apparent that a large change in leverage would be required to
alter beta to an economically meaningful extent. Similarly, although the relationship
between continuous beta and CAR is statistically significant, and negative, the change
required in CAR to obtain an economically meaningful reduction in beta is relatively
large; an increase in CAR from its mean value of 9.52 to 10.52 results in a small 0.02
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decrease in continuous beta.
Size and volatility have significant effects on continuous beta. The positive coefficient
of market capitalization indicates that banks of larger size show higher sensitivities to-
wards continuous market movements. The negative coefficient of profitability (RoA)
indicate that less profitable banks have higher continuous systemic risk though the co-
efficient is not statistically significant. The volatility measure, RV , is a significant and
positive factor for the continuous beta, indicating that higher price volatility results in
higher continuous risk for these banks. Private versus government ownership (Private)
has significant and negative relationship with continuous beta at the 10% significance
level, implying that government owned banks are more sensitive than public sector banks
towards continuous market movements.
Among the explanatory variables, leverage and size and ownership have significant
effects on jump beta – CAR, RoA and volatility, however, do not. The signs are the
same as those for the continuous beta estimates; thus decreased leverage and size and
government ownership increase jump beta. The effects of CAR are smaller than in the
continuous case and statistically insignificant, thus increasing bank capital has even lower
impact here on reducing the reaction to market discontinuities than in the continuous
case. The leverage effect is only slightly higher than in the continuous case. Although
the coefficient on size almost halves for jump betas compared with continuous betas,
in both cases larger firms have lower betas than their comparator firms, supporting
the hypothesis that larger firms are less able to diversify away from the market. The
insignificant coefficient of RoA in both case of betas fails to support the hypothesis that
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profits provide a buffer from unexpected market movements.
Our investigation quantifies the importance of the well-recognised decomposition of
financial price movements into continuous and jump components. We test whether
separating the beta estimates for these two components is warranted and unambiguously
reject the hypothesis that the jump beta and continuous beta are the same using data
for the Indian banking sector. The evidence strongly suggests that jump beta is higher
than continuous beta, and that it has more explanatory power over returns, consistent
with the view that discontinuities in financial prices are indicative of new information
entering the market as in Patton and Verardo (2012) and the evidence for US markets
in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) and Alexeev et al. (2017).
We estimate the continuous and jump betas for an emerging market, and moreover, the
banking sector of that market which bears a high responsibility for effectively funding
future growth in India. Investigating the banking market specifically ties our results
firmly to propositions for reducing systematic risk in that sector, with a view to reducing
systemic risk in the economy as a whole. We find that recent proposals to reduce
systemic risk via increasing capital requirements or reducing leverage in the banking
sector would have the desired effect of reducing the systematic risk in the sector for
both continuous and jump betas, but either the changes in capital or leverage required
to produce economically meaningful results are very large or there is a substantial non-
linearity in the relationship between these variables and systematic risk which is not
captured by either this or other existing frameworks.
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2.6. Conclusion
New tools allow the separate estimation of the beta on the continuous and jump com-
ponent of the underlying price process which characterises financial market data. The
existing literature for the US in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) and Alexeev et al. (2017)
estimate higher jump beta than continuous beta. This study produces a similar finding
for Indian banking stocks. The focus on the Indian banking sector links the results to
an important emerging economy with a high reliance on the banking sector for funding
future growth, and contemporary issues concerning regulatory proposals for reducing
systemic risk in international banking sectors.
Using 5-minute stock price data for 41 listed Indian banks for 2004-2015 we establish
evidence of jumps in the Indian equity markets, consistent with existing evidence for
developed markets and as yet a small range of equities in emerging market. The results
show that the proportion of days containing a jump, at 4.68% of trading days, is not
dissimilar to the evidence for developed economies – and that the proportion of jumps did
not increase during the GFC, also consistent with the small existing literature concerning
jump behaviour during crisis periods.
The estimates of separate continuous and jump betas for the Indian banks show that
on average jump beta exceeds continuous beta by 159%, and the confidence band on these
estimate rarely overlap for any of the individual stocks. We conclude that the reaction of
individual stocks to discontinuities in the market indicator price is substantially higher
than the reaction to continuous movements. This is consistent with the documented
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strong association of jumps with news events, particularly unanticipated news, and the
learning model posited in Patton and Verardo (2012) which anticipates temporarily
increased beta for stocks around the time of earnings announcements. Our study differs
from theirs in that we condition the differing beta estimates on the existence of jumps,
rather than on the existence of a news announcement (there is clearly overlap between
these groups but it is by no means complete).
The estimated continuous and jump betas are related positively to firm size and lever-
age, and negatively to capital adequacy and profitability. Smaller profitable firms, with
lower leverage and strong capital will have lower betas. However, the effect of size on
beta is twice as large for continuous beta than jump beta, and the effect of profitability
is twice as strong for jump beta than continuous beta. These findings have bearing
on the debate concerning future regulatory practice for the banking sector in reducing
systemic risk. Our results show that proposals to increase bank capital and decrease
leverage will act to reduce the systematic risk in the Indian banking sector, with capital
slightly more effective against continuous risk and leverage slightly more effective against
jump risk, but the extent of the reduction in betas that can be produced in this manner
are economically quite small. If the linear specification proposed in this study is cor-
rect the required reduction in leverage or increase in capital to produce an economically
meaningful impact on jump or continuous beta is beyond the scope of current policy
discussions. The behaviour of beta in response to leverage and capital would need to
be highly non-linear to prompt the required regulatory response – the existence of such
non-linearities is a scope for further research.
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The results can be extended to other emerging economies to see whether the results
are unique to the Indian market or can be generalized for all emerging markets. We
include only banking stocks in this exercise. A comparison with other sectors would
provide validity of the results and thus subject to future studies. We can also check
whether the results stand when we use other jump tests available in the literature and
use different sampling frequencies. We conduct different jump tests at different sampling
frequencies on the Indian stocks in Chapter three.
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Table 2.1: Banks listed on the NSE
The table shows names and codes of 41 banks listed on the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE).
No. Bank Name Code No. Bank Name Code
1 Andhra Bank ADBK 22 Karur Vysya Bank KARU
2 Allahabad Bank ALBK 23 Karnataka Bank KBNK
3 Axis Bank AXBK 24 Kotak Mahindra Bank KTKM
4 Bank Of Maharashtra BMBK 25 Lakshmi Vilas Bank LVLS
5 Bank Of Baroda BOB 26 Oriental Bank Of Commerce ORBC
6 Bank Of India BOI 27 Punjab National Bank PNBK
7 Central Bank Of India CBI 28 Punjab & Sind Bank PUNA
8 Canara Bank CNBK 29 State Bank Of India SBI
9 Corporation Bank CRBK 30 State Bank Of Bikaner And
Jaipur
SBKB
10 City Union Bank CTBK 31 State Bank Of Mysore SBKM
11 Development Credit Bank DCBA 32 State Bank Of Travancore SBKT
12 Dena Bank DENA 33 Syndicate Bank SBNK
13 Dhanlaxmi Bank Ltd DNBK 34 South Indian Bank SIBK
14 Federal Bank FED 35 Standard Chartered Bank STNCy
15 HDFC Bank HDBK 36 United Bank Of India UBOI
16 ICICI Bank ICBK 37 UCO Bank UCBK
17 IDBI Bank IDBI 38 Union Bank Of India UNBK
18 Indian Bank INBA 39 Vijaya Bank VJBK
19 Indusind Bank Limited INBK 40 Ing Vysya Bank Ltd VYSA
20 Indian Overseas Bank IOBK 41 Yes Bank YESB
21 Jammu And Kashmir Bank JKBK
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Table 2.2: Volatility measures for Indian market during the sample period 2004 – 2015
The Table reports the descriptive statistics of the two daily volatility measures RV and BV of the
CNX500. The square root version of the volatility measures are shown here. We report both daily and
monthly measures of these variable.
Descriptive Statistics Daily Monthly√
RV
√
BV
√
RV
√
BV
Mean 0.00760 0.00728 0.04273 0.04025
Median 0.00676 0.00642 0.03489 0.03352
Std. Dev. 0.00612 0.00577 0.02399 0.02040
maximum 0.09633 0.07384 0.16732 0.12823
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of continuous and jump betas
The second column and third column show the summary statistics of continuous and jump betas of all
sample banking stocks respectively.
Banks BetaC BetaD
Mean 0.75 1.42
Max 1.26 1.85
Min 0.04 0.47
Standard Dev 0.36 0.32
Skewness -0.43 -0.76
Kurtosis -1.27 0.36
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Table 2.4: Average continuous and jump betas for listed Indian Banks
We show bank names in the first column, average monthly continuous betas in the second column, the
95% confidence levels of continuous betas in column three and four, average monthly jump betas in
column five, 95% confidence levels of jump betas in column six and seven and the differences between
the two average beta values in column eight.
Banks βci βdi Difference (%)
ADBK 0.98 [0.90, 1.06] 1.48 [1.46, 1.49] 51.02
ALBK 1.01 [0.93, 1.09 ] 1.61 [1.60, 1.62 ] 59.71
AXBK 1.09 [1.01, 1.16 ] 1.56 [1.54, 1.57 ] 43.29
BMBK 0.48 [0.40, 0.57 ] 1.21 [1.19, 1.22 ] 150.19
BOB 1.05 [0.96, 1.13 ] 1.68 [1.67, 1.69 ] 60.43
BOI 1.25 [1.16, 1.33 ] 1.85 [1.84, 1.87 ] 48.42
CBI 0.75 [0.66, 0.84 ] 1.47 [1.45, 1.48 ] 95.21
CNBK 1.12 [1.04, 1.21 ] 1.74 [1.73, 1.76 ] 55.08
CRBK 0.38 [0.29, 0.47 ] 1.14 [1.13, 1.16 ] 199.83
CTBK 0.32 [0.23, 0.41 ] 1.03 [1.01, 1.05 ] 218.91
DCBA 1.04 [0.95, 1.13 ] 1.83 [1.81, 1.84 ] 75.24
DENA 1.06 [0.97, 1.15 ] 1.68 [1.66, 1.69 ] 58.47
DNBK 0.49 [0.39, 0.60 ] 1.16 [1.14, 1.19 ] 134.59
FED 0.71 [0.62, 0.79 ] 1.39 [1.38, 1.40 ] 96.88
HDBK 0.69 [0.61, 0.76 ] 1.19 [1.19, 1.20 ] 73.92
ICBK 1.04 [0.96, 1.11 ] 1.55 [1.54, 1.56 ] 49.75
IDBI 1.26 [1.18, 1.34 ] 1.82 [1.81, 1.84 ] 44.58
INBA 0.63 [0.54, 0.72 ] 1.41 [1.39, 1.42 ] 122.86
INBK 0.98 [0.89, 1.06 ] 1.71 [1.69, 1.72 ] 75.26
IOBK 0.92 [0.83, 1.00 ] 1.54 [1.52, 1.55 ] 67.31
JKBK 0.27 [0.19, 0.36 ] 1.04 [1.03, 1.06 ] 282.08
KARU 0.24 [0.16, 0.32 ] 0.82 [0.80, 0.83 ] 244.32
KBNK 0.96 [0.88, 1.05 ] 1.72 [1.70, 1.73 ] 78.33
KTKM 0.87 [0.79, 0.96 ] 1.42 [1.40, 1.43 ] 62.19
LVLS 0.40 [0.31, 0.49 ] 1.17 [1.15, 1.18 ] 189.46
ORBC 1.07 [0.98, 1.15 ] 1.74 [1.73, 1.76 ] 63.58
PNBK 1.01 [0.93, 1.09 ] 1.63 [1.62, 1.64 ] 61.66
PUNA 0.38 [0.29, 0.47 ] 1.36 [1.35, 1.36 ] 259.62
SBI 1.03 [0.96, 1.10 ] 1.50 [1.49, 1.51 ] 45.27
SBKB 0.24 [0.15, 0.32 ] 1.09 [1.08, 1.10 ] 362.56
SBKM 0.14 [0.05, 0.24 ] 0.96 [0.96, 0.97 ] 570.01
SBKT 0.21 [0.12, 0.30 ] 1.08 [1.08, 1.09 ] 414.70
SBNK 1.11 [1.03, 1.20 ] 1.83 [1.82, 1.84 ] 64.39
SIBK 0.51 [0.42, 0.60 ] 1.23 [1.21, 1.24 ] 139.65
STNCy 0.04 [-0.04, 0.12 ] 0.47 [0.46, 0.47 ] 1144.74
UBOI 0.56 [0.46, 0.65 ] 1.45 [1.44, 1.46 ] 160.90
UCBK 1.15 [1.07, 1.24 ] 1.82 [1.81, 1.83 ] 58.06
UNBK 1.12 [1.03, 1.20 ] 1.78 [1.77, 1.80 ] 59.80
VJBK 0.97 [0.89, 1.05 ] 1.56 [1.55, 1.57 ] 61.01
VYSA 0.29 [0.20, 0.38 ] 1.08 [1.06, 1.10 ] 277.22
YESB 1.05 [0.96, 1.13 ] 1.62 [1.60, 1.63 ] 54.1642
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics of Indian Bank betas during pre-GFC, GFC and
post-GFC periods
The second, third and fourth columns show the summary statistics of continuous betas sample banking
stocks in the pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods. The same statistics for jump betas are shown in
the fifth, sixth and seventh columns.
BetaC BetaC
PreGFC GFC Post-GFC PreGFC GFC Post-GFC
Mean 0.73 0.68 0.96 1.40 1.13 1.63
Max 1.18 1.17 1.55 1.89 1.57 2.34
Min 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.72 0.71 0.84
Std 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.23 0.37
Skewness -0.42 0.17 -0.57 -0.38 -0.01 -0.43
Kurtosis -0.85 -0.87 -0.94 -0.14 -0.49 -0.54
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Table 2.6: Average continuous and jump betas during the pre-GFC, GFC and
post-GFC periods for listed Indian Banks.
The pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC average monthly continuous betas are reported in column two, three
and four, whereas the average monthly jump betas of these same time periods are reported in column
five, six and seven.
Banks BetaC BetaD
PreGFC GFC Post-GFC PreGFC GFC Post-GFC
ADBK 0.88 0.52 1.18 1.28 1.02 1.75
ALBK 0.74 0.63 1.33 1.36 1.11 1.95
AXBK 0.76 1.04 1.16 1.18 1.28 1.69
BMBK 0.51 0.44 0.47 1.33 0.94 1.16
BOB 1.08 0.74 1.11 1.62 1.05 1.87
BOI 1.18 0.91 1.40 1.80 1.19 2.04
CBI 0.63 0.57 0.82 1.14 1.18 1.59
CNBK 1.01 0.68 1.34 1.68 1.06 1.95
CRBK 0.45 0.30 0.34 1.33 0.71 1.07
CTBK 0.33 0.48 0.27 1.04 1.28 0.96
DCBA 1.00 1.12 1.03 1.89 1.56 1.86
DENA 0.85 0.97 1.26 1.61 1.28 1.83
DNBK 0.20 0.53 0.71 0.72 1.15 1.55
FED 0.63 0.42 0.85 1.33 0.89 1.56
HDBK 0.56 0.71 0.79 1.16 0.94 1.28
ICBK 0.88 1.16 1.12 1.40 1.44 1.71
IDBI 1.09 1.15 1.43 1.75 1.57 1.95
INBA 0.87 0.59 0.58 1.63 1.17 1.39
INBK 1.07 0.82 0.94 1.83 1.43 1.66
IOBK 0.76 0.68 1.11 1.46 1.29 1.66
JKBK 0.33 0.19 0.25 0.98 0.71 1.17
KARU 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.82 0.72 0.84
KBNK 0.77 0.42 1.27 1.60 0.89 2.01
KTKM 0.67 1.17 0.96 1.38 1.37 1.46
LVLS 0.40 0.31 0.43 1.13 0.90 1.26
ORBC 0.86 0.60 1.36 1.53 1.14 2.07
PNBK 0.94 0.75 1.13 1.48 1.09 1.88
SBI 1.00 0.94 1.09 1.46 1.05 1.63
SBNK 0.97 0.58 1.38 1.78 1.20 2.02
SIBK 0.45 0.41 0.59 1.24 0.88 1.29
UCBK 0.78 0.83 1.55 1.39 1.22 2.34
UNBK 1.03 0.57 1.33 1.75 0.97 1.99
VJBK 0.84 0.89 1.09 1.50 1.37 1.66
VYSA 0.27 0.33 0.29 1.15 1.03 1.02
YESB 0.66 1.00 1.28 1.42 1.37 1.79
Average 0.73 0.68 0.96 1.40 1.13 1.63
The banks which were not listed on NSE for the full sample period are excluded here.
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics of continuous, jump and standard CAPM betas of
Indian Banks.
The second, third and fourth columns show the summary statistics of continuous and jump and
standard CAPM betas of all sample banking stocks respectively.
BetaC BetaD BetaSTD
Mean 0.75 1.42 0.96
Max 1.26 1.85 1.49
Min 0.04 0.47 0.11
Standard Dev 0.36 0.32 0.39
Skewness -0.43 -0.76 -0.48
Kurtosis -1.27 0.36 -1.09
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Table 2.8: Average monthly continuous, jump and standard CAPM betas for Indian
banks
The second, third and the fourth columns are showing the average monthly continuous, jump and
standard betas of 41 listed banks in India.
Bank BetaC BetaD BetaStD Bank BetaC BetaD BetaSTD
ADBK 0.98 1.48 1.22 KARU 0.24 0.82 0.35
ALBK 1.01 1.61 1.25 KBNK 0.96 1.72 1.21
AXBK 1.09 1.56 1.27 KTKM 0.87 1.42 1.04
BMBK 0.48 1.21 0.69 LVLS 0.40 1.17 0.59
BOB 1.05 1.68 1.28 ORBC 1.07 1.74 1.33
BOI 1.25 1.85 1.49 PNBK 1.01 1.63 1.23
CBI 0.75 1.47 0.97 PUNA 0.38 1.36 0.66
CNBK 1.12 1.74 1.37 SBI 1.03 1.50 1.20
CRBK 0.38 1.14 0.56 SBKB 0.24 1.09 0.45
CTBK 0.32 1.03 0.46 SBKM 0.14 0.96 0.34
DCBA 1.04 1.83 1.29 SBKT 0.21 1.08 0.40
DENA 1.06 1.68 1.30 SBNK 1.11 1.83 1.40
DNBK 0.49 1.16 0.71 SIBK 0.51 1.23 0.69
FED 0.71 1.39 0.92 STNCy 0.04 0.47 0.11
HDBK 0.69 1.19 0.82 UBOI 0.56 1.45 0.80
ICBK 1.04 1.55 1.21 UCBK 1.15 1.82 1.42
IDBI 1.26 1.82 1.49 UNBK 1.12 1.78 1.38
INBA 0.63 1.41 0.87 VJBK 0.97 1.56 1.20
INBK 0.98 1.71 1.20 VYSA 0.29 1.08 0.43
IOBK 0.92 1.54 1.16 YESB 1.05 1.62 1.25
JKBK 0.27 1.04 0.42
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Table 2.9: Impact of continuous and jump beta on stock returns
The regression results of stock returns on different betas are shown in different columns. All models are
estimated using pooled regression with the dependent variable monthly stock returns. The number of
banks included cross section is 41. The number of periods is 144 in regression 1 and 3 and 87 in
regression 2 and 4. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance
levels: † : 10%, ∗ : 5%, ∗∗ : 1%.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0078* -0.0092* -0.0106** -0.0072
(0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0058)
βci 0.0058 -0.0081
(0.0044) (0.0071)
βdi 0.0078∗∗ 0.0108∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0044)
βhi 0.0074**
(0.0038)
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.0013 0.0005 0.0014
F -stat 1.7453 5.2009 3.91 3.24
DW stat 1.92 1.99 1.92 1.99
Table 2.10: Impact of continuous and jump beta on stock returns: the random effect
model
The regression results of stock returns on different betas are shown in different columns. All models are
estimated using random effect panel regression with the dependent variable monthly stock returns. The
number of banks included cross section is 41. The number of periods is 144 in regression 1 and 3 and
87 in regression 2 and 4. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Significance levels: † : 10%, ∗ : 5%, ∗∗ : 1%.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0078*** -0.0092* -0.0106*** -0.0072
(0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0049)
βci 0.0058** -0.0061
(0.0023) (0.0071)
βdi 0.0078∗∗ 0.0108∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0047)
βhi 0.0074***
(0.0023)
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0013 0.0005 0.0013
F -stat 1.7453 5.2009 3.9118 3.2432
DW stat 1.92 1.99 1.92 1.99
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Table 2.11: Summary statistics of firm characteristics
CAR denotes the capital adequacy ratio, RoA denotes the return on asset, Lev denotes the leverage
ratio, Size denotes the logarithm of market capitalization, and RV denotes the realized variation.
CAR Lev RoA Size RV
Mean 9.52 2.05 1.75 4.73 0.0123
Median 8.95 1.25 1.77 4.42 0.0089
Maximum 19.11 18.95 4.72 7.9 0.2083
Minimum 5.04 0.14 -0.96 2.01 0
Std. Dev. 2.41 2.5 0.8 1.29 0.013
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Table 2.12: Relationship between firm characteristics and the betas
The second column shows the regression results of continuous betas on firm characteristic variables,
whereas the third column shows the regression results of jump betas on the same firm characteristic
variables. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. Both models are estimated
using pooled OLS regression. The number of banks is 23, and the number of periods is 144 for models of
βˆci,t, and 87 for models of βˆdi,t. . Significance levels: † : 10%, ∗ : 5%, ∗∗ : 1%.
Variables cont. beta jump beta
Constant 0.504 1.230∗∗∗
(0.1719) (0.1509)
CAR -0.024∗∗ -0.009
(0.0106) (0.0085)
Lev 0.029∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0123)
RoA -0.005 -0.008
(0.025) (0.0326)
Size 0.126∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.022)
Private -0.147∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.0773) (0.0632)
100RV 0.038∗∗∗ -0.036
(0.0098) (0.0558)
AR(1) 0.837∗∗∗
(0.0228)
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.08
F-stat 1099.48 21.73
DW stat 2.35 1.31
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Figure 2.1: The occurrence of jump days detected with the BNS test in the CNX500
index
The figure shows the intensity of jump occurrences in the Indian market represented by CNX500
throughout the sample period of 2004 to 2015. The vertical lines here represent days with jumps
detected by the BNS test. Thus more vertical lines within a given period indicates higher intensity of
jump occurrences.
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Figure 2.2: Confidence interval of average monthly βˆci and βˆdi of all banks
The 95% confidence intervals of average monthly continuous betas of all banks are shown by the red
lines and of jump betas shown by the blue dots. The lack of overlapping between these two sets of
confidence intervals shows that these two components of systematic risks are significantly different to
each other.
Figure 2.3: Confidence interval of monthly βˆci and βˆdi of SBI from 2004 to 2012
The 95% confidence intervals of average monthly continuous betas of State Bank of India (SBI) are
shown by the red lines and of jump betas shown by the blue dots. The lack of overlapping between these
two sets of confidence intervals shows that these two components of systematic risks are significantly
different to each other.
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3.1. Introduction
We show evidence in chapter 2 in favour of the argument in the literature (such as
Andersen et al., 2007a) that an asset price process experiences infrequent jumps in
addition to the continuous Brownian motion and drift movements. The irregular and
unpredictable nature of jumps generates risks for asset investors who price the risk either
positively (Driessen and Maenhout, 2013) or negatively (Cremers et al., 2015) in the
stock market. Therefore identifying jump risk has gained wide attention from academic
researchers as well as practitioners. While papers on jumps have concentrated on the
U.S. and other developed markets our second study measures the extent of jump risks
and draws out the characteristics of jump occurrences in India, an important emerging
market, with especial emphasis on its financial sector.
After the recent global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009, it has become increas-
ingly recognized that the risk of individual banks and financial institutions needs to be
addressed at the the systemic level (Haldane and May, 2011). Instability in financial
markets can trigger deep economic crises, creating political and social unrest (Crotty,
2009). This motivates us to concentrate our examination of jump risk in the banking and
non-banking financial corporations (FI) sectors and make a comparative analysis with
the overall market. A series of failures of banks and financial institutions in the U.S.
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led the prolonged recession during the GFC. As observed by Morgan (2000), the opacity
of banks can create a financial system crisis which can have a substantial contagious
and systemic effect on the entire market. Therefore, we make a comparison of jump
risks between the financial sectors and the whole economy in the context of an emerging
economy where bank-based financial intermediation plays a larger role in the financial
system than in the developed markets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996, Kim and Wu,
2008).
The popularity of financial sector stocks in India is associated with a high frequency
of trading, and that facilitates the use of non-parametric jump tests requiring high
frequency trading data. A complement to the banks, there is a full range of non-bank
financial institutions (FIs) that act as effective financial intermediaries. The FIs are
companies that are engaged in loans and advances, acquisitions of shares, stocks , bonds,
hire-purchase and insurance. Like the commercial banks these companies are regulated
by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within the framework of the Reserve Bank of India
Act, 1934 (Chapter III B). The major differences from commercial banks are that FIs
can not accept demand deposits and they are not part of payment and settlement system
of the RBI. As the importance of FIs in fulfilling the credit needs of the market is well
recognized, appropriate regulatory attention and risk monitoring are required in the
interest of financial stability.
This study examines the jump risks of the banking sector represented by 41 Indian
banking stocks, and the FI sector represented by 55 FIs, all listed on the National Stock
Exchange of India (NSE). Drawing on high frequency intra-day data from the Thompson
Reuters Tick History (TRTH) Database provided by SIRCA, we use recent econometric
techniques to provide a comprehensive characterization of the jump risk in the Indian
financial sector.
We explore the interaction of jump risks between the financial sector and the whole
economy. Jumps in asset price series are typically interpreted as associated with sudden
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arrival of new information to the market (Andersen et al., 2007a). This new inform-
ation usually causes a rapid movement in prices of assets. Prices of stocks that are
popular among the investors and followed by analysts, are likely to show quick reflec-
tion of the news/information arrival into the market. Banking stocks are among the
large-capitalization stocks in the Indian market and are under constant analysis by mar-
ket experts. On the other hand, the total market consists of a variety of firms that
vary widely in terms of size and liquidity. Thus we hypothesize that the banking in-
dustry as a whole experiences a higher amount of jump risk than the overall market.
The non-banking financial firms are different from each other from the perspective of
operation, size and reputation among the investors. Therefore it is difficult to predict
the jump intensity of this industry, and a comparison with the overall market is worth
investigating.
We also present a comparison of jump risk exposure between banking and FI sectors
as two sub-sectors of the financial sector. Investors get benefit from diversification if
different sub-sectors are prone to different degrees of any particular risk. Firms belonging
to these two sectors compete with each other for investment funds (Bikker and Haaf,
2002) and thus might be vulnerable to the same shocks. Therefore, it is expected that
shocks in one industry will be transmitted into the other industry, especially from the
banking sector to the FI sector. We expect to see simultaneous or common jumps in
these two sectors in addition to sector-specific jumps. As we are unaware of any paper
investigating the sectoral differences in jump risk, this study serves as a beginning at
this direction.
When we observe the co-occurrence of jumps (referred as ’common jumps’ or ’cojumps’
by Jacod and Todorov, 2009) in a sector and in the market, we call it a systematic
jump for that sector. When a sector experiences a stand alone jump, we refer it as a
sector-specific idiosyncratic jump. Theoretically, idiosyncratic jump risk is diversifiable
(Merton, 1976; Bollerslev et al., 2008), but Yan (2011) shows that both systematic and
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idiosyncratic jump risks are priced at different rates by investors, and thus are important
to ascertain. We report the portion of days that the banking and FI sectors experience
each type of jump in this study.
An important question for portfolio management is whether occurrences of jumps in
the market have causal effects on the jump occurrences in any sector. On a similar
note, it is intuitive to think that among two closely related sectors, jumps in one sector
may trigger jumps in the other sector. If this is true, then investors in one sector
should be aware of jumps not only in that sector but also in the related sectors or the
market. We examine this question by applying a probit regression and find that jump
occurrences in the overall market in a given period significantly change the probability of
jump occurrences both in the banking sector and FI sector. Jumps are not significantly
transmitted in either direction between these two sectors.
Jump intensity during a crisis period is another area of interest for researchers. As
jumps are often the result of information arrival and generally crisis periods are charac-
terized by arrival of news more frequently than that of calm period, we expect to find
more jumps during a crisis. But computationally jumps are measured relative to the
volatility of a given window period. Hence, if the overall volatility during a crisis period
increases as shown by Aït-Sahalia and Xiu (2016), then we may not be able to detect
jumps at a higher rate than a non-crisis and non-volatile period. In this study, we find
that during the global financial crisis of 2008-09 jump intensity increased for banking
stocks, while the FI stocks experienced no such change in the jump risk during the same
period.
We explore the intraday, day of the week and month of the year pattern of jumps
in the Indian market. Jumps are described as rare Poisson events in the literature (for
example, Merton, 1976 and Ball and Torous, 1985). If this is true then they should
appear in stock prices randomly, and only upon the arrival of abnormal information1.
1According to the Merton (1976) price changes caused by arrival of normal information leads to price
changes as log normal diffusion while the log-normally distributed jumps in the security return appear
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On the other hand, jumps are a particular state of stock returns depending on the overall
volatility of window period. It is well established in asset pricing literature that stock
prices are subject to time of the day, day of the week, month of the year among other
effects, which are considered in literature as anomalies (French, 1980, Chang et al., 1993,
Jaffe and Westerfield, 1989). The seasonality of stock prices may be reflected in jump
patterns. If jumps are information-driven then corporate announcements may be an
important instigator of jumps (Patton and Verardo, 2012). Corporate bodies may have
a tendency to declare especially unfavourable earning announcements after trading hours
are finished (Michaely et al., 2013) in which case the resultant jumps would occur in
the after-hours electronic platforms (Dungey et al., 2009a) or in the early hours of the
next trading day. Bollerslev et al. (2008) find the presence of strong intra-day patterns
in jumps, with the peak coinciding with the time of news release. We examine the
seasonality of jumps in Indian market and find evidence of intra-day patterns in jumps.
Jumps in the Indian market cluster largely at the opening hours and to some extent
ending hours of the trading period.
The day of the week effect on stock returns is documented in the literature (for ex-
ample, French, 1980; Chang et al., 1993 and Dubois and Louvet, 1996). Researchers have
shown that stock returns are generally lowest and negative on Mondays and highest on
Fridays compared with other days of the week in various markets, although Choudhry
(2000), Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Raj and Kumari (2006) report mixed results for
this effect for the Indian market. Our findings corroborate the day of the week effect,
especially the Monday effect on jumps, in the Indian market. Among different months,
the January effect on stock return is most cited by researchers (Ariel, 1987 and Jaffe and
Westerfield, 1989). However, due to differences in financial years and religious traditions
in different markets, we may see a different pattern of the month effect on jumps. Our
results show higher jump intensity in the middle of the year, which matches the April
upon arrival of abnormal information which is a Poisson process.
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to March financial year generally followed by Indian companies.
Do jumps have a memory and exhibit clustering behaviour? We apply a model de-
veloped by Corsi (2004) to determine the existence of memory as well as seasonality by
regressing the binary jump variable with its lag values representing one day, one week
and one month time periods. We find significant coefficients for these lag variables show-
ing seasonality and predictability of jump events. Given the extent of jump activity and
its seasonal pattern, our findings conform with the conclusion drawn by Bormetti et al.
(2015) that jump arrivals can not be described by a Poisson process.
In any study related to jump risk, an intriguing question is which method to ap-
ply in identifying jumps. A growing literature in high frequency financial econometrics
proposes a number of methodologies for testing for the presence of jumps in the price
processes. Dumitru and Urga (2012) conduct a comprehensive comparison of nine altern-
ative testing procedures, and use several stocks listed in the New York Stock Exchange
as an empirical example. All of these tests are based on non-parametric estimators of the
continuous and jump variations in the price processes that are robust to jumps. How-
ever, given such a wide range of testing procedures available to empirical researchers, it
is still unclear as to which test should be implemented in practice. In particular, given
the distinct behaviour of financial stocks from emerging markets, it is unclear whether
the data characteristics can affect the performance of different tests. In order to answer
these questions, we apply the most widely-used jump detection procedures to Indian
financial stocks. The other two studies that present a comparative analysis of different
jump test methods are Theodosiou and Zikes (2009) and Schwert (2009) using the U.S.
data. None of these papers report any conclusive evidence about the superiority of any
particular method.
The commonly used non-parametric jump detection methods include the tests de-
veloped by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) (henceforth BNS method), Andersen
et al. (2012) (henceforth ADS method), Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) (henceforth AJ method),
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Lee and Mykland (2008) (henceforth LM method), Andersen et al. (2007b) (henceforth
ABD method), Jiang and Oomen (2008) (henceforth JO method), Corsi et al. (2010)
(henceforth CPR method) . BNS developed the first non-parametric test of jump detec-
tion by taking the difference or ratio of the variation and the jump-robust multi-power
variation. Multi-power variation can have upward or downward biases as a jump-robust
estimator in the presence of zero returns or large returns. To remove this bias in multi-
power variation, ABD propose tests using the median or minimum return based realized
variation against the total variation. CPR on the other hand use the realized threshold
multi-power variation by truncating the large absolute returns. The JO method applies
a swap variance test by taking the difference between the simple returns and the log-
arithmic returns. AJ propose computing a ratio of two time-scale power variation to
determine the existence of jumps in a window of returns while ABD and LM use a local
volatility measure to identify the jump returns and check how big a particular return is
in the context of the local volatility measure.
We implement two versions of the BNS method, one by using quad-power variance
(henceforth BNS_QV) and another by using tri-power variation (henceforth BNS_TQ).
We use the nonparametric procedures on a market index - CNX500, an equally weighted
index of banking industry and on an equally weighted index of the FI industry. The
results vary widely across different jump methods, data frequencies and different signific-
ance levels. Generally LM/ABD, CPR and BNS_QV methods report a high proportion
of jump days and JO, AJ and Min_RV methods are in the opposite end of the spectrum.
One of the problems of jump test applications is to determine the optimal sampling
frequency. The asymptotic theory requires high frequency data to ensure data continuity
whereas very high frequency data is susceptible to the market micro-structure noise.
Market micro-structure noise can be defined as the deviation of the observed stock
prices from the fundamental or true values (Bandi and Russell, 2008). This noise results
from market frictions, such as the change in transaction price as multiples of ticks (price
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discreteness) or availability of multiple prices for buyers and sellers (bid-ask bounce).
Our estimated variance and other statistics can be biased in the presence of market
micro-structure noise, and it can have a significant impact on the tests for jumps in
asset prices.
One way to check the effect of market micro-structure noise and suggest the optimal
sampling frequency is to use a graphical tool known as the volatility signature plot
developed by Andersen et al. (1999). The volatility signature plot may reveal the effect
of sampling frequency on volatility by plotting sampling intervals on the horizontal axis
and volatility on the vertical axis. The underlying assumption behind the plot is that the
variance of a price process is independent of the frequency at which the data is collected.
Thus, if we observe a distortion on the realized variance measure at a certain frequency,
we can identify that the market micro-structure noise is causing the distortion at that
frequency.
In our study, all of the methods detect lower evidence of jumps when we increase the
interval of returns, in other words decrease the data frequency. Although our volatility
signature plot suggests that a 15-minute data frequency may pacify the effect of market
micro-structure noise, some of the methods fail to detect the level of jumps suggested in
literature, at this frequency.
This is the first study to conduct a comprehensive analysis of jump risk on the Indian
financial market. One of the contributions of this paper is strengthening the notion
argued by few recent studies that jump occurrences may not be a Poisson process as is
described in the early literature. The clustering behaviour of jumps and the causal rela-
tionship between market jumps and sectoral jumps found in this paper are the evidence
in this argument. Another contribution of this paper is examining few well-known mar-
ket anomalies from the perspective of jump occurrences not tested before in the jump
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literature.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the jump detection
methods implemented in this study. We outline data collection and cleaning processes
along with choices of calibrated parameter values in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses
the results of the empirical analysis and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Jump testing methods
A short description of the jump detection methods applied in this study are as follows.
3.2.1. Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006)
We describe this model in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. The model utilizes the difference
between two volatility measures - realized variance,
RV [0,T ] =
[T/∆n]∑
j=1
|∆nj p|2, (3.1)
and bi-power variation, defined as
BV [0,T ] = µ−2
[T/∆n]∑
j=2
|∆nj p||∆nj−1p|. (3.2)
The contribution from the jump component to QV [0,T ], the total volatility can be es-
timated by applying the adjusted ratio test statistic in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard
(2006) as:
Jˆ = 1√4n ·
1√
θ ·max (1, DV [0,T ]/(BV [0,T ])2) · (
BV [0,T ]
RV [0,T ]
− 1), (3.3)
where θ = pi24 + pi − 5 and DV [0,T ] =
∑[T/4n−3]
j=1 |∆nj p||∆nj+1p||∆nj+2p||∆nj+3p| a quad-
power as used by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006). Andersen et al. (2007a), on
the other hand suggest to a use tri-power variation as such -
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DV [0,T ] = ( T/4
n
T/4n − 2)µ
−3
4 (
[T/4n−2]∑
j=1
|∆nj p|4/3|∆nj+1p|4/3|∆nj+2p|4/3, (3.4)
where µ4 = γ(6/7)γ(1/2)2
2/3 instead of quad-power variation. In the absence of jumps the
test statistic Jˆ given in (3.3) follows a standard normal distribution asymptotically.
Therefore, under the null of no jumps,
Jˆ L−→ N (0, 1) as ∆n → 0. (3.5)
We reject the null hypothesis if the test statistic is significantly negative.
3.2.2. Andersen et al. (2007b) and Lee and Mykland (2008)
Andersen et al. (2007b) (ABD) and Lee and Mykland (2008) (LM) develop tests that
can detect jump at individual return observations instead of a given time span. They
propose a test statistic by calculating the ratio of the return at each observation to a
local volatility measure that covers variance over a number of returns preceding that
return. ABD and LM use different distributions under the null hypothesis when testing
if the return is a jump by comparing test statistic with a threshold. The statistics Li
that tests for a jump at time ti is defined as
Li =
∆ntip
σˆ(ti)
, (3.6)
where σˆ(ti)2 is the local volatility measure. Here we use the bipower variation of K
observations preceding the relevant observation. Thus the test can identify the presence
of jumps in an observation against the volatility in the prior period determined by value
of K and can be defined as
σˆ(ti)2 =
1
K − 2
i−1∑
j=1−K+2
|∆nj p||∆nj−1p|. (3.7)
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Here ∆nj p is the return as defined in the previous section. Lee and Mykland (2008)
suggest A window size K between 252×n and √252× n, where n is the number of
observations in a day so that the window size poses a balance between being a jump-
robust volatility measure and being effective in scaling the trend in volatility. In our
study, we use 350, 250, 150, 100, 80, 75 and 50 as values of K for the 1-minute, 5-
minute, 10-minute, 15-minute, 20-minute, 30-minute and 60-minute sampling intervals,
respectively.
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is as follows:
max(Li)− Cn
Sn
→ ξ, (3.8)
where P (ξ ≤ x) = exp(−e−x), the constants
Cn =
(2logn)1/2
c
− logpi + log(logn)
2c(2logn)1/2
, (3.9)
Sn =
1
c(2logn)1/2
, (3.10)
and
c =
√
2
pi
. (3.11)
Thus LM test detect jumps by comparing the maximized value of Li to the critical
value from the Gumbel distribution. ABD, on the other hand, propose comparing Li to
a normal threshold as Li is asymptotically normal. By applying their method, jump is
identified when Li > Φ1−β/2 where β = 1− (1− α)δnfor a given nominal daily α.
3.2.3. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009)
Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) develop a test statistic that converges to one if there is jump
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in a given price process, and to a known number if there is no jump. Utilizing the
advantage of higher return moments, their test statistic compares the ratio of the sum of
the absolute returns powered by τ for a given return window of two different sampling
intervals k∆n and ∆n, where ∆n is the base sampling interval.
The test statistic is:
ASJ(τ, k,∆n) = Bˆ(τ, k∆
n)
Bˆ(τ,∆n)
, (3.12)
where
Bˆ(τ,∆n) =
n∑
i=1
|∆ni p|τ . (3.13)
Under the null hypothesis of no jumps, when τ > 2, ASJ(τ, k,∆n) converges to kτ/2−1,
and one under the alternative hypothesis. The reason is that when τ > 2, Bˆ(τ,∆n) can
only retain the effect of jump components of the return process and diminishes the
continuous component asymptotically. As a result when jumps are present in a return
series, Bˆ(τ,∆n) will indicate the same number regardless of the sampling frequency used
in the calculation.
The null hypothesis of no jumps is rejected when ASJ < ξ, where
ξ = kτ/2−1 − zα
√
Vˆ , (3.14)
where
Vˆ = ∆
nM(P,K)Aˆ(2τ,∆n)
Aˆ(τ,∆n)2
, and (3.15)
Aˆ(τ,∆) = ∆
1−τ/2
µτ
n∑
i
|∆ni p|τ1{|∆ni p|≤α∆$}. (3.16)
In this study we choose τ = 4, M(4,K) = 16k(2k
2−k−1)
3 , α = 0.05 (Zα = 1.64) and
$ = 0.48 as the constant values.
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3.2.4. Jiang and Oomen (2008)
Jiang and Oomen (henceforth JO) propose a test for jumps based on the difference
between simple and logarithmic returns. Instead of using a jump robust measure to com-
pare with the realized volatility, as in BNS, JO use a jump-sensitive measure (Theodo-
siou and Zikes, 2009). The accumulated difference between the simple return and the
log return approaches one half of the integrated variance. Thus
SwV = 2
[T/∆n]∑
j=2
(Rj −∆nj p) p−→
ˆ T
0
σ2sds, (3.17)
where Rj denotes the jth arithmetic intra-day return or Pj−Pj−1Pj−1 as P is the price of an
asset, while ∆nj p is the jth log return. While there is no jump the difference between
SwV and the realized variance becomes 0; If there is jump then the difference converges
as follows
SwVt −RVt p−→ 2
∑
tj∈[0,T ]
(exp(κj)− κj − 1)−
∑
tj∈[0,T ]
κ2j . (3.18)
Under the alternative, in the limit, the difference SwV −RV captures jumps in expo-
nential form. The test statistic is defined as
JOt =
[T/∆n]BVt√
ΩSwV
(1− RVt
SwVt
) L−→ N (0, 1), (3.19)
where
ΩˆSwV =
µ6
9
[T/∆n]3µ−43/2
[T/∆n]− 3
n∑
i=5
|∆nj p|3/2|∆nj−1p|3/2|∆nj−2p|3/2|∆nj−3p|3/2. (3.20)
Here µp stands for the pth moment of the absolute value of a variable U ∼ N(0, 1)
defined by,
µp = E(| U |p) = pi−1/22p/2Γ(p+ 12 ),
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where Γ denotes the gamma distribution. A jump can be identified from this test as the
test statistic becomes very large in the presence of large returns.
3.2.5. Andersen et al. (2012)(henceforth MinRV test and MedRV test)
In the presence of jumps multi-power variation can exhibit an upwardly biased estim-
ator of integrated variance while presence of zero returns can result downward biased
estimator. To avoid such bias of multi-power variation Andersen et al. (2012) propose
a new set of estimators to represent integrated variance in the presence of jumps. They
are based on the minimum of two consecutive and median of three consecutive absolute
intra-day returns. Thus
MinRVt =
pi
pi − 2(
[T/∆n]
[T/∆n]− 1)
[T/∆n]−1∑
j=1
min(|∆nj |, |∆nj+1 |)2, (3.21)
and
MedRVt =
pi
6− 4√3 + pi (
[T/∆n]
[T/∆n]− 2)
[T/∆n]−1∑
j=2
med(|∆nj−1|, |∆nj |, |∆nj+1 |)2. (3.22)
These estimators can avoid bias since large absolute returns are eliminated from the
calculation by the minimum and median operators. TheMedRV estimator has an added
benefit of avoiding the impact of zero intraday returns.
ADS propose the test statistic by exploiting MinRVt and MedRVt in the same way
as BNS:
JMinRVt =
1− MinRVtRVt√
1.81 1[T/∆n]max(1,
minRQt
MinRV 2t
)
L−→ N (0, 1), (3.23)
JMedRVt =
1− MedRVtRVt√
0.96 1[T/∆n]max(1,
medRQt
MedRV 2t
)
L−→ N (0, 1), (3.24)
where MinRQt = pi3pi−8(
[T/∆n]2
[T/∆n]−1)
∑[T/∆n]
j=2 min(|∆nj |, |∆nj+1 |)4 is the minimum realized
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Quarticity and MedRQt = 3pi9pi+72−52√3(
[T/∆n]2
[T/∆n]−2)
∑[T/∆n]
j=3 med(|∆nj−1|, |∆nj |, |∆nj+1 |)4
the median realized quarticity that estimates the integrated quarticity.
3.2.6. Corsi et al. (2010)
Mancini (2009) devises a technique to determine a consistent non parametric estimator
of the integrated volatility by excluding time intervals where the return of a given asset
jumps. Combining the idea of the threshold estimators of Mancini (2009) and the multi-
power variation estimation of BNS, Corsi et al. (2010) (henceforth CPR) propose a new
test method. The authors eliminate the bias associated with multi-power variation in
the presence of jumps by truncating large absolute returns. They construct the corrected
realized threshold bi-power variation as an alternative to the BVt of the BNS method.
The new estimator is a variation of bi-power variation discarding returns over a certain
threshold. The following test statistic is employed:
JCPR =
1− CTBVtRVt√
0.61 1[T/∆n] max (1,
CTTVt
CTBV 2t
)
L−→ N (0, 1), (3.25)
where CTBVt and CTTVt represent the corrected realized threshold bi-power and tri-
power variation, respectively, defined as:
CTBVt = 1.57
[T/∆n]∑
j=2
Z1(∆nj p, υj)Z1(∆nj−1p, υj−1), (3.26)
CTTVt = 1.74
[T/∆n]∑
j=3
Z1(∆nj p, υj)Z1(∆nj−1p, υj−1)Z1(∆nj−2p, υj−2), (3.27)
where Z1(∆nj p, υj) = {
|∆nj p|, [∆nj p]2<υj
1.094υ1/2j , [∆nj p]2<υj
is a function of the return at time tjand a
threshold υj = c2υ ∗ Vˆj ∗ c2υ is a scale free constant and Vˆj is a local volatility estimator.
We take cυ = 3 , as the authors suggest in computing the threshold, υj . For the auxiliary
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local volatility estimate, Vˆj , we employ the non-parametric filter proposed by CPR that
removes jumps from data in several iterations.
Given the characteristics of data, different methods may overestimate or underestimate
jump occurrences. We ultimately employ the jump method that averages out the over-
and-under-estimations and detects a reasonable number of jump occurrences. Another
criterion for choosing a jump method is whether we want to detect a jump in a given
window such as a day, or in each observation. We conduct the above jump tests in
detecting jumps in the Indian market and use the results of the jump tests based on
these two criteria.
3.3. Data
We collect data for the Indian market index, stock prices of listed banks and non bank-
ing financial institutes (FIs) from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database
provided by SIRCA. We use the stock price of same 41 banks that we have used in
chapter 2. For easy reference we repeat the list of banks in Table 3.1 along with the list
of non-banking financial companies in Table 3.2. These banks and financial institutions
are listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE). Our sample includes stock prices of all
41 listed banks and 55 out of 88 listed FIs. We exclude 33 FIs due to the low quality of
data of these stocks in the TRTH database. This is reflected by a high share of missing
observations and the presence of unexplained discontinuities in the data for these series.
Our data extends from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2013, covering the period
of global financial crisis in 2008-09. A total of 2497 trading days exists in our sample
period. We collect intra-day 1-minute data from TRTH. We use the last price recorded
in each of the 1-minute intervals from 9:15 a.m. to 3:30 pm, the normal trading session of
NSE, where missing data are filled with the price of the previous interval which assumes
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that the price remains unchanged during a non-trading interval. Again we drop the
first 15 minutes of each day to avoid noise associated with market opening. Hence, our
trading hours are 9.30 am to 3.30 pm local Indian time. We have 360, 72, 36, 24, 20, 12,
6 observations for 1-minute, 5-minute, 10-minute, 15-minute, 20-minute, 30-minute and
60-minute data respectively. Following our previous study we use the CNX500 index as
the benchmark market portfolio.
3.4. Results
We construct equally weighted indices for the banking industry and non-banking fin-
ancial institutions industry (FIs) using the returns of the 41 banks and 55 FIs in the
sample, respectively. Descriptive statistics of the 1-minute return on the market index,
the banking sector and the FI sector are presented in Table 3.3. During the sample
period from January 2004 to December 2013, the investor’s average returns on the mar-
ket, banking sector stocks and FI sector stocks (excluding dividend) are all negative. FI
stocks experience a lower return than the banking stocks and the overall market. How-
ever, the banking stocks experience higher volatility than the FI and the overall market,
as shown by both the standard deviation and the average daily volatility measure.
The returns on CNX500, the bank and FI industry indices are plotted in Figure 3.1.
The volatility of the return, computed as realized volatility, is shown in Figure 3.2. From
these figures it is clear that the banking sector return and volatility pattern resemble
the overall market more closely than FI industry. The FI stocks have lower volatility
compared with the market and banking sectors. Figure 3.2 shows that the banking and
financial sectors as well as the overall market experienced considerable volatility during
the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Volatility decreased noticeably after 2009 in all
cases and it is lower than the pre-crisis period.
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3.4.1. Jump test results
We implement the different jump test methods on a daily basis. The BNS methods
are applied by using quad-power (QV) variation as a jump robust measure suggested by
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) as well as tri-power (TQ) variation suggested by
Andersen et al. (2007a). As results from these two tests vary substantially, we report
both sets of results separately as BNS_QV test and BNS_TQ test. We apply these
methods to the CNX500 index and the equally weighted indices of the banking sector
and the FI sector. We identify the days on which the assets experience jumps. We test
for jumps using seven different sampling frequencies: 1-minute, 5-minute, 10-minute,
15-minute, 20-minute, 30-minute and 60-minute at three significance levels: 0.1%, 1%
and 5%. Dumitru and Urga (2012), Theodosiou and Zikes (2009) and Schwert (2009)
show that jump detection rate varies with changes in the sampling frequency and the
significance level of the tests.
We can see from Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 that results vary substantially across different
methods, data frequencies and significance levels. Generally the LM/ABD test provides
the highest percentage of jump days in higher frequencies (except for the FI index)
but as sampling intervals increase the CPR method leads to the highest proportion of
jump days. The other two methods that provide a relatively high proportion of jump
days are the BNS_QV method and the Med_RV method. Dumitru and Urga (2012)
also report a high percentage of jump days on individual US stocks resulting from the
ABD/LM test, the CPR test and the BNS tests. They argue that the presence of
many zero returns creates downward bias in the multi-power variations as measures of
integrated variance. As a result, any test statistics based on the difference between total
volatility and integrated volatility will be upward biased. The percentage of jump days
in Dumitru and Urga (2012) at different frequencies are higher than what we observe
in the Indian market. This may result from our use of an index instead of individual
stocks. The impact of jumps in individual stocks in an index can be offset by opposite
69
3 Jump Risk in Indian Financial Market
price movements in other stocks. Thus, it is more likely that we see fewer jumps in the
index than in individual stocks.
The most conservative method in our study is the JO followed by the AJ, Min_RV and
BNS_TQ methods. These findings are consistent with Theodosiou and Zikes (2009) who
ascertain the independence of JO test from the presence of zero returns as the reason of
such low jump detection rate. The proportion of detected jump days varies from 72.81%
(LM/ABD method) to 11.41% (JO) in different jump tests by using 1-minute CNX500
data tested at 5% significance level, 65.84% (LM/ABD method) to 7.73% (JO) at 1%
significance level and 58.19% (LM/ABD method) to 4.73% (JO) at 0.1% significance
level. Med_RV method generally provides jump days proportion which is in between
the two extremes.
Despite broad differences in the testing results, different tests identify the same days
as jump days quite often. Dumitru and Urga (2012), Theodosiou and Zikes (2009) and
Schwert (2009) report that combining more than one jump method to detect jumps may
improve the jump detection rates. Table 3.7 shows the jump days agreed by any two
methods in 5-minute CNX500 return (significance level - 1%) in the upper panel. The
diagonal numbers are the number of jump days detected by a specific method and the
off-diagonal cells show the jump days agreed by the two methods shown as the column
and row headings of the given cell. As expected the methods detecting higher jump
proportions produce higher numbers of common jump days. Out of 587 jump days
detected by the BNS_QV, 579 jump days are also detected by the CPR method. CPR
also detects 317 out of 320 jump days detected by the BNS_TQ test, 564 out of 669
jump days detected by the LM test, 396 out of 397 jump days detected by the Min_RV
test, 496 out of 518 jump days detected the Med_RV test and 68 out of 114 jump days
detected by the AJ test. Therefore, the CPR method is able to detect a large proportions
of jumps detected by other methods using 5-minute data. However, this test agrees with
only two of the 18 jump days detected by the JO method. Since the JO test detects
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jumps most conservatively, common jump days of this method with other methods are
relatively rare. Common jump day detection of different tests in association with the
AJ test are also relatively low.
Although the BNS method can identify more jumps when used with QV instead of TQ,
all the jump days identified by BNS_TQ test agree with the BNS_QV test indicating
that TQ is a conservative alternative of QV in detecting jumps. The LM test and the
BNS_QV test in general agree most with the other tests whether a given day is a jump
day. The results indicate that the BNS_QV, BNS_TQ, LM, Mid_RV, Min_RV and
CPR methods identify mostly the same price movements as jumps. However, the JO and
AJ methods detect jumps relatively rarely, and the detected jump days are also largely
different from those detected by other tests. The middle panel of Table 3.7 shows that
the methods also agree mostly in identifying days which are not jump days. This is
expected, given the fact that jumps are rare events.
3.4.2. Jump test results across different frequencies
We also see differences in Table 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 in the percentages of jump days
across different frequencies for the same test applied. All methods show a declining
percentage of jump days as we increase the sampling interval from 1-minute towards 60-
minute. Dumitru and Urga (2012) find that the relationship for the U.S. stocks regarding
sampling frequency and detected jump day proportion is similar to our finding in the
Indian market.
If there is a jump at any moment of a day, then a jump test should be able to detect
jumps in that given day irrespective of the frequency of data examined. However, the
reality is quite different, as we see that a gradual decrease in data frequency results in
varying proportions of detected jump days. We can see a big drop in the proportion
of jump day when moving from 1-minute to 5-minute data irrespective of the jump
method applied. We attribute this to the effect of market micro-structure noise on
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higher frequency data. The proportion of jump days continues decreasing, but at a lower
rate as we increase the return intervals. Figure 3.3 shows the relative jump signature
plot developed by plotting the proportion of jump days detected by different jump tests
against the different sampling intervals. We observe the most abrupt decrease in jump
days in the LM/ABD test followed by the CPR and BNS_QV methods. It seems that
the methods which are liberal in detecting jumps are more vulnerable to market micro-
structure noise at higher frequencies (for example, in 1-minute data).
The signature plots for our data are shown in Figure 3.4. We develop these plots by
using daily average RV, BV, TQ and QV of the market index, CNX500. It is evident
from the figure that the volatility measures moves up and down abruptly as data intervals
increase from 1-minute to around 15-minute. After that we observe relative stability in
the volatility measure as we increase the data intervals. Therefore, our volatility signa-
ture plots suggest that, given the liquidity of Indian capital market, the 15-minute time
interval poses the balance between market micro-structure noise and desired continuity
of dataset. However, some of the jump methods we apply in this study detect very low or
zero jump intensity in our price series contradicting the general notion of jump-diffusion
model of asset price. As a result, we emphasize detecting jumps in 1-minute, 5-minute,
10-minute and 15-minute frequencies for our dataset.
We do not observe any definite slope in the signature plots. The plots are upward
sloping from 1-minute to 10-minute frequencies and then downward sloping. Andersen
et al. (1999) show that the highest levels of volatility occur at the highest sampling
frequencies for a liquid asset, and that the lowest levels of volatility occur at the highest
sampling frequencies for an illiquid assets. Consequently the volatility signature plot
for the liquid asset is a downward sloping curve and the volatility signature plot for the
illiquid asset is an upward sloping curve. The pattern of slopes of our signature plots
suggests that the Indian stocks are not as liquid as the US stocks.
Based on the discussions above, we see that jump intensities are found different for
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different jump tests. They are also different for different sampling frequencies. The
signature plot method gives us a solution to the problem of choosing the correct sampling
frequency which is 15-minute in our case. The best test method should be the one
that avoids both overestimation and underestimation, In that case, the method which
identifies an average amount of jump intensities among all methods are more likely to
refrain from these problems. BNS_QV method seems to fit this criterion in our case.
Thus we use this method on 15-minute price observations for our analysis of jump risk
in the Indian financial market.
3.4.3. Jump days Comparison among market, banks and FIs
In this section we address the question whether jump risk in the banking sector and
the non-banking financial sector is higher than the overall market. Figure 3.5 shows
the bar chart reporting the percentage of jump days detected in the market (CNX500),
banks and FIs at 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 significance level based on 15-minute data. At
the 0.001 significance level the number of jump days is higher in banks than the market
using the BNS_QV, LM/ABD, Med_RV and CPR methods. The Min_RV, JO and
AJ methods methods report almost no jump occurrences at this significance level. Only
one test, the BNS_TQ indicates slightly lower number of jump days in banks compared
with the market. At 1% and 5% significance level, only the AJ test method detects lower
jump intensity in the banking sector than in the market. All other methods report the
opposite. Thus, the overall results suggest that stocks of the banking sector are more
sensitive towards shocks such as news arrival than the overall market and thus exhibits
higher number of jumps.
In comparison, between the non-banking FI sector and the market, the results are
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quite similar for all methods at different significance levels. Except for the AJ method,
all other methods show lower jump intensity, and thus lower jump risks, in the FI sector
than both the market and the banking sector. Only the AJ test reports higher jump
risk in this sector compared with the market and the banking sector. Hence, we may
draw a conclusion from these results that it is generally the banking sector which bears
higher jump intensity and the FI sector is subject to lower jump risk than the market.
Investors’ may benefit from diversifying their fund allocated for financial stocks to both
the banking and FI sectors rather than concentrating on the banking sector.
The higher jump intensity in banking stocks may result from higher sensitivity and
awareness of bank investors. Assets of banks are diversified to different sectors of the
economy. Thus banking stocks can be affected by a wide range of news. Banking stocks
are generally of the large volume and followed by a large number of investors. The arrival
of any relevant information is spotted by these investors immediately causing a sharp
change in prices of the stocks. Besides, Boudt and Petitjean (2014)and Jiang et al.
(2011) show that liquidity shocks are another important source of jump occurrences.
As Banking stocks are generally among the highly liquid stocks, any shock in liquidity
interrupts the market equilibrium and cause jumps.
Jump risk in the banking sector and FI sector may arise from the overall market
shock or it can be attributable to sector-specific shocks. These two sectors are closely
linked in the sense that these organizations are involved in similar operations. Thus,
shocks in one sector may create jump risks in the other sector. We identify the days on
which the banking sector and/or the FI sector experience jumps when the overall market
has jumps, reported in Table 3.8, and also the days when both the banking sector and
FI experience jumps. There are also trading days when both the sectors along with
the market experience jumps. We show the results at four different data frequencies
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and three significance levels. By considering the 5-minute data at 0.01 significance
level we find that common jump days are higher between the banks and the market
than between the FIs and the market. FIs’ co-jump with the market is higher than
its co-jumps with the banks, as evident from majority of the jump test results. We
also report the common jump days of the market, banks and FIs in the each fourth
columns of the three significance level categories in the Table which confirm that there
is a considerable percentage of trading days when all three market jumps together. At
1% significance level the BNS_QV method shows 16.14% common jumps between the
market and banks, 27.67% common jumps between the market and the FIs, 19.06%
common jumps between the banks and FIs, and 12.9% common jumps in the market
and the two sectors. together. We may attribute to large macroeconomic shocks causing
this kind of pervasive jumps across the market and different sectors.
Not all jumps in Banks and FIs are associated with market shocks. We have shown the
proportion of jump days for banks and FIs when the market does not experience jumps.
We can denote these as sectoral idiosyncratic jumps. On the basis of 5-minute data we
find that FIs have higher proportion of sector-specific jump days than the banking sector
stocks. For example the BNS_QV test reports 17.54% sectoral idiosyncratic jumps in FIs
and 7.25% in Banks as shown in Table 3.9. The higher idiosyncratic jumps from the FIs
can be explained by the nature of financing that FIs are involved. FIs invest in specialized
sectors where banks spread their investment to wider economic sectors. Hence, FIs bear
higher exposure to the idiosyncratic jump risk than the banking companies.
We examine further the impact of jump occurrence in the market and one of the
banking sector or FI sector on that of the other sector by using regression models. Here
a jump occurrence is expressed as a binary variable; if we have jump in a given day we
assign 1 to that day, otherwise zero. We run probit regressions based on following model
P (Ji,t = 1) = φ(β0,t + βm,tJm,t−1 + βj,tJj,t−1), (3.28)
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and
P (Jj,t = 1) = φ(β0,t + βm,tJm,t−1 + βi,tJi,t−1), (3.29)
where Ji and Jj are the jump risk of banks and FIs and Jm is the jump risks of market.
We run two separate regressions to see first, the impact of jump occurrences in the
market and the banking sector on jump occurrences in the FI sector, and second, the
impact of jump occurrences in the market and the FI sector on jump occurrences in the
FI sector. We have used the results of the BNS_QV test using 15 minutes data in these
regressions. This is evident from our regression results (shown in Table 3.10) that jump
occurrence in the market significantly increases the probability of jump occurrence in
banks and FIs in the next period. Jump risk is not transmitted from banking sector
to FI sector or in the opposite direction. The marginal effects of the coefficients at the
mean value shows that the presence of jumps in the market on a given day increases the
chance of having a jump in the banking sector by 7.25% and in the FI sector by 5.20% in
the next day. The results strengthen the findings of Bormetti et al. (2015) rejecting the
Poisson model which requires a jump in a given asset to be an independent event. The
predictability of jumps in one sector following jumps in the market or another sector
enables investors to hedge against risks arising from jumps.
By analyzing the year-wise jump-day spread we examine the change of jump intensity
during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09. From Figure 3.6 we see the number of
jump days for the banking sector (the upper panel) is higher from mid-2007 to the end of
2009 - a period which coincides with the GFC. Jump intensity has noticeably decreased
after that period. On the other hand, the number of jump days of the FI sector was
surprisingly lower during the GFC than both the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. These
sectoral differences reiterate the benefit of sectoral diversification in mitigating the jump
risk.
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3.4.4. Jump pattern in Indian market
Knowing the extent of jumps in the market, the question that comes naturally is
whether any pattern in jump occurrences exists, in contrast to the definition of Poisson
distribution by which jumps are described in the early literature. By pattern, here we
mean having any biases towards any unit of time including trading hour(s), day(s) or
month(s) in the jump occurrences. These biases may also reflect existences of memories
and clustering tendencies in jumps. Given the importance of jumps in decision making
for different market players and regulators, the knowledge of patterns in jumps, if they
exist, may be useful for the decision makers.
We check the pattern of jumps for the time of the day, day of the week and month
of the year basis. Jumps are partially the results of news arrival in the market. If news
arrives in the market following a pattern, jumps also could exhibit the same pattern.
However, the theoretical rarity and randomness of jumps may limit the possibility of
finding any sequence in the jump occurrence. We use the LM test results to identify
the jumps in each of the return observations and the relevant time periods. We use
15-minute return data in this exercise.
Figure 3.7 shows the time of the day pattern of jumps found in the market index,
banking sector index and FI sector index. Jumps around 9.45 to 10.00 am are strikingly
higher than other times of the day. A large portion of news announcements occur after
the trading hours are closed. Normal trading in the market starts at 9.15 am on the
next day after the pre-open order entry and closing continues from 9:00 am to 9:08 am.
Block deals2 are executed between 9:15 am to 9:50 am. We observe a high concentration
2A block deal is a single transaction, of a minimum quantity of 500,000 shares or a minimum value of
Rs. 50 million, between two, mostly institutional, parties.
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of jump occurrences just after the end of this block deal session and it continues till
10:00 am (the same analysis with 5-minute data show that the exact time period of
high jump intensity in the Indian market is from 9:50 am to 10:00 am). Retail investors
with overnight news start trading after that, and the liquidity of the market suddenly
escalates which may prompt abnormal changes in stock prices in the way news and/or
liquidity factors direct. We also observe a small surge of jumps in the final hours of the
normal trading period. This jump time pattern is consistent with the findings of Cui
and Zhao (2015) who show that jump intensity in the Chinese market is higher at the
opening and closing hours of the trading period.
The day of the week effects on jumps in Indian market are shown in Figure 3.8. The
Monday effect in stock returns is most commonly found in the literature (see Choudhry
(2000)Bhattacharya et al. (2003)Raj and Kumari (2006). We also find a higher number
of jumps on Mondays in all three cases. The effects of other days are different for the
market and the two sectoral indices. Thus, we can not generalize the effects of Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday on the Indian market and the financial sector. The
probit regression results confirm the Monday effect on jump occurrences in the market
and also in the banking sector as shown in Table 3.11. However, the effect is not
statistically significant for the FI sector. The Monday effect may stem from the arrival
macroeconomic and company-specific information developed among the investors during
the two days weekly holidays. Based on the merit of the information investors want to
take a position in the market on Monday as early as possible before other investors. The
resulting pressure on the stock price causes jumps.
The month of the year pattern of the jump occurrences is shown Figure 3.9. We do
not observe any common pattern in the market and the banking and the FI sectors. The
literature suggests evidence of January effect and December effect in the equity markets,
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although the effects depends on the fiscal year of a particular country. The fiscal year
of Indian companies generally ends in March, and we observe a decrease in jump risk
in April from March both in the banking and the FI sectors. Generally we see more
jumps during the middle of the year than the beginning or ending of the year in the
Indian market. We examine the statistical significance of the month of the year effects
on jump occurrences by running probit regressions reported in Table 3.12. Here we find
that none of the months have statistically significant effects on the jump occurrences in
the market or in either of the sectors.
We examine the memory dependence and clustering behaviour in jumps by applying
an Heterogeneous Autoregressive (HAR) model following Corsi (2009) and Andersen
et al. (2007a). We use here the LM test results identifying jumps in each of the 15-
minute return observations. We explore the predictability of jumps based on time of the
day and day of the week effects by running a probit regression on the following model:
P (Jt = 1) = φ(β0 + β1Jt−1 + βDJt−24 + βWJt−120 + βMJt−528). (3.30)
Here we use different lag values, i, that represent different past times including the
previous time interval, the same time at the previous trading day and same day at
the previous week and the previous month. We apply a probit model here since our
dependent variable, having a jump or not in a given return observation is a binary
variable. The lag values that have been used in this models 1, 24, 120 and 528 considering
24 return observations per day, 5 days a week and 22 trading days a month windows.
Table 3.13 displays the probit regression results. All the lag variables have statistically
significant coefficients for the jump occurrence of the market, the banking sector and the
FI sector showing existence of daily and weekly seasonal patterns in jump risk of assets.
Thus our results again reiterates the findings of Bormetti et al. (2015) that jumps are
not a Poisson distribution that can explain multiple jumps of the same asset within a
given time window.
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3.5. Conclusion
This study implements methodologies in identifying jump risks in the financial sector
of India. The study examines the jump risks for banking sector represented by 41 Indian
banking stocks listed on the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), as well as 55 FIs.
Using intra-day high frequency data we apply eight widely-used jump tests to the price
series of the financial institutions listed on the National Stock Exchange of India.
We consider alternative non-parametric jump detection methods that are commonly-
used in the literature on CNX500, an Indian market index, then on equally weighted
indices of the banking and FI industries. The results vary widely across different
jump methods, data frequencies and significance levels. Generally LM/ABD, CPR and
BNS_QV methods report high proportion of jump days and JO, AJ and Min_RV meth-
ods detect low jump-day percentage. Decreasing sampling frequency results in lower
jump detection by all the tests applied in this study. Our volatility signature plot sug-
gests that a 15-minute data establish the balance between market micro-structure noise
and data continuity problem. However, some of the tests fail to detect a reasonable
amount of jumps, as suggested in literature, at this frequency.
Our test results show that the banking industry is associated with a higher amount of
jump risk in comparison with the market using most of the jump methods. The result
is reversed for the FI industry as most of the methods show lower jump risk for the FI
industry than the market and the banking sector. A probit regression indicates that
jumps in the market have significant effects on the probability of jump occurrences in
the banking industry and FI industry. Jumps in the banking sector have impact on
jumps in the FI sector but we do not find impact in the opposite direction. We analyse
the intra-day jump pattern of Indian financial stocks by applying the LM method. The
results indicate the existence of intra-day and weekly seasonality in jump patterns, in
contradiction with the description of jump occurrences as a Poisson distribution.
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Focusing on the sub-sector differences between banks and non-bank financial insti-
tutions (FIs) this study provides a comprehensive characterization of the exposure of
financial stocks to jump risk in Indian financial market. The paper shows the existence
of the jump risk in the Indian market and thus the need to consider this risk in portfolio
decisions and risk hedging by investors. It may not be possible to avoid systematic jump
risks but investors may reduce the idiosyncratic jump risks by diversifying their portfo-
lio. The jump risk may be also be priced which we have already discussed in chapter
2. The time of the day and day of the week characteristics found in our analysis will
help especially the high-frequency traders to hedge or speculate the jump occurrences.
The regulators should monitor jump risks and take appropriate measures in stabilizing
the market. The literature suggests that news/information arrival in the market causes
jumps. But not all jumps can be explained by news/information arrival. Research should
be conducted to explore the non-news factors causing jumps. Liquidity can be one of
those factors that we examine in the next chapter.
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Table 3.1: List of Sample Banks
The 41 Indian banks listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) at the end of 2013.
The first column shows the Codes used in TRTH database to identify the banks. The
second column shows the name and the third column reports the market capitalization
of each bank in thousand Indian Rupees (INR).
Codes Banks Market Cap. Codes Banks Market Cap.
ADBK Andhra Bank 52,880,344 KARU Karur Vysya Bank 3,795,074
ALBK Allahabad Bank 63,253,313 KBNK Karnataka Bank 24,625,022
AXBK Axis Bank 608,925,751 KTKM Kotak Mahindra
Bank
485,807,555
BMBK Bank of
Maharashtra
30,010,238 LVLS Lakshmi Vilas
Bank
7,934,934
BOB Bank of Baroda 278,659,424 ORBC Oriental Bank of
Commerce
73,056,998
BOI Bank of India 180,260,454 PNBK Punjab National
Bank
243,360,705
CBI Central Bank of
India
49,246,122 PUNA Punjab & Sind
Bank
14,796,734
CNBK Canara Bank 170,311,355 SBI State Bank of India 1,390,909,091
CRBK Corporation Bank 56,903,852 SBKB State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur
28,913,499
CTBK City Union Bank 28,375,184 SBKM State Bank of
Mysore
25,957,504
DCBA Dev. Credit Bank 10,667,260 SBKT State Bank of
Travancore
25,942,498
DENA Dena Bank 31,295,233 SBNK Syndicate Bank 66,184,395
DNBK Dhanlaxmi Bank
Ltd
3,894,987 SIBK South Indian Bank 32,861,116
FED Federal Bank 82,160,033 STNCy Standard
Chartered Bank
N/A
HDBK HDFC Bank 1,484,995,359 UBOI United Bank of
India
20,360,339
ICBK ICICI Bank 1,205,864,240 UCBK UCO Bank 41,959,043
IDBI IDBI Bank 102,593,696 UNBK Union Bank of
India
120,047,218
INBA Indian Bank 74,522,115 VJBK Vijaya Bank 23,240,779
INBK Indusind Bank
Limited
211,649,245 VYSA Ing Vysya Bank
Ltd
86,366,707
IOBK Indian Overseas
Bank
51,964,280 YESB Yes Bank 153,687,577
JKBK Jammu and
Kashmir Bank
57,729,789
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Table 3.2: List of Sample Financial Institutions
The 55 Indian Non banking financial institutions (FIs) listed on the National Stock
Exchange (NSE) at the end of 2013. The first column shows the Codes used in TRTH
database to identify the banks. The second column shows the name and the third column
reports the market capitalization of each bank in thousand Indian Rupees (INR).
Codes Financial Institutes Market Cap Codes Financial Institutes Market Cap
ALSL Almondz Global Sec. 188,960 MONE Capri Global Capital 3,817,677
BJAT Bajaj Holdings and Inv. 101,783,478 MUTT Muthoot Finance 67,688,897
BJFN Bajaj Finance 47,461,619 NAHA Nahar Capital & Fin. 661,473
BJFS Bajaj Finserv 122,396,915 NALS Nalwa Sons Inv. 19,736,004
CHLA Chola. Inv. and Fin. 38,832,286 NEFI Network 18 Media & Inv. 30,660,492
CNFH Can Fin Homes 2,823,891 ONEL Onelife Cap. Advisors 1,942,543
CONS Consolidated Finvest 1,910,488 PAIN Pan India Corp. 29,821
DWNH Dewan Housing Fin. 19,082,228 PILN Pilani Inv. & Industries 10,851,991
EDEL Edelweiss Fin. 23,640,919 PNBG PNB Gilts 3,343,131
FCHL Capital First 11,043,306 PTCI PTC India Fin. Services 7,863,545
GICH GIC Housing Finance 5,662,439 PWFC Power Finance Corp. 239,582,724
GRUH GRUH Finance 37,524,720 RANE Rane Holdings 1,121,613
HBSH HB Stockholdings 226,977 RLCP Reliance Capital 76,809,379
HDFC HDFC Ltd. 1,276,286,598 RURL Rural Elect. Corp. 205,539,584
IDFC IDFC Ltd. 217,590,614 STEL STEL Holdings 176,433
IFCI IFCI Ltd. 43,347,854 SKSM SKS Microfinance 13,153,253
IGLS Inventure Growth 432,600 SNFN Sundaram Finance 28,923,300
ITSL Indo Thai Sec. 104,500 SREI Srei Infrastructure Fin. 13,457,559
JMSH JM Financial 12,212,868 SRTR Shriram Transport Fin. 222,819,820
JNSW JSW Holdings 4,479,253 TCIF TCI Finance 344,982
KRBR Kirloskar Brothers Inv. 3,839,609 TFCI Tourism Fin. Corp. 1,723,302
LICH LIC Housing Fin. 113,523,940 TINV Tata Inv. Corp. 21,864,015
LTFH L&T Finance Holdings 126,939,171 TRFI Transwarranty Finance 157,526
MAGM Magma Fincorp 15,661,935 VLSF VLS Finance 382,525
MCDH McDowell Holdings 484,831 VRDM Vardhman Holdings 1,465,506
MNFL Manappuram Finance 18,254,195 WICL Welspun Inv. and Com. 66,511
MMFS M & M Fin. Service 110,482,593 WILM Williamson Magor & Co. 442,089
MOFS Motil Oswal Fin. 11,154,108
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics are computed based on 1-minute data of CNX500, equally
weighted index of Banking stocks and equally weighted index of FI stocks.
CNX500 Banks FIs
Mean 1-minute return -3.51E-07 -8.82E-07 -1.23E-06
Annualized mean return -0.031318 -0.076857 -0.105972
Standard deviation 0.000678 0.000737 0.000663
Average daily RV 0.000165 0.000195 0.000158
Average daily BV 7.21E-05 9.57E-05 7.27E-05
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Table 3.4: Jump-day proportion, Significance level: .001
The upper, middle and the lower panel shows the jump days proportion of eight
different jump tests over seven different sampling frequencies for the market index
(CNX500), the equally weighted indexes of banks and FIs respectively at 0.1%
significance level. The total number of trading days here is 2497.
1 min 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 30 min 60 min
CNX500
BNS_QV 0.3088 0.1678 0.1534 0.0897 0.0957 0.0324 0.0008
BNS_TQ 0.1690 0.0709 0.0581 0.0344 0.0328 0.0116 0.0008
LM/ABD 0.5819 0.2018 0.1262 0.0689 0.0565 0.0216 0.0080
Min_RV 0.1766 0.0885 0.0513 - - - -
Med_RV 0.2227 0.1446 0.1181 0.0701 0.0665 0.0128 -
JO 0.0473 0.0032 0.0008 0.0004 - - -
AJ 0.0805 0.0184 0.0052 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004 -
CPR 0.4954 0.2575 0.2087 0.1502 0.1446 0.0721 0.0064
All banks
BNS_QV 0.1950 0.1157 0.1506 0.1005 0.0993 0.0296 0.0004
BNS_TQ 0.1001 0.0449 0.0561 0.0308 0.0376 0.0132 0.0004
LM/ABD 0.5691 0.1986 0.1478 0.0797 0.0777 0.0272 0.0100
Min_RV 0.0765 0.0220 0.0032 - - - -
Med_RV 0.1542 0.0989 0.1181 0.0737 0.0669 0.0140 -
JO 0.0781 0.0028 0.0016 0.0004 0.0004 - 0.0004
AJ 0.0613 0.0192 0.0068 0.0016 0.0008 0.0012 0.0004
CPR 0.4273 0.2579 0.2467 0.1778 0.1734 0.0817 0.0052
All FIs
BNS_QV 0.6884 0.1438 0.1097 0.0637 0.0625 0.0176 0.0020
BNS_TQ 0.3953 0.0380 0.0288 0.0188 0.0160 0.0056 0.0016
LM/ABD 0.7545 0.1418 0.0901 0.0437 0.0437 0.0108 0.0056
Min_RV 0.2687 0.0120 0.0012 - - - -
Med_RV 0.5186 0.1033 0.0805 0.0416 0.0400 0.0072 -
JO 0.1009 0.0032 - - 0.0004 - -
AJ 0.0713 0.0084 0.0060 0.0012 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004
CPR 0.8791 0.3052 0.2091 0.1177 0.1266 0.0364 0.0040
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Table 3.5: Jump day proportion, Significance level - .01
The upper, middle and the lower panel shows the jump days proportion of eight
different jump tests over seven different sampling frequencies for the market index
(CNX500), the equally weighted indexes of banks and FIs respectively at 0.1%
significance level. The total number of trading days here is 2497.
1_min 5_min 10_min 15_min 20_min 30_min 60_min
CNX500
BNS_QV 0.3889 0.2351 0.2199 0.1618 0.1618 0.0965 0.0533
BNS_TQ 0.2255 0.1282 0.1133 0.0777 0.0825 0.0461 0.0192
LM/ABD 0.6584 0.2679 0.2034 0.1278 0.1201 0.0453 0.0244
Min_RV 0.2471 0.1590 0.1342 0.0032 - - -
Med_RV 0.2972 0.2074 0.1930 0.1474 0.1466 0.0877 0.0164
JO 0.0773 0.0072 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 - -
AJ 0.1458 0.0457 0.0457 0.0160 0.0156 0.0244 0.0164
CPR 0.5727 0.3404 0.2920 0.2363 0.2291 0.1602 0.1197
All Banks
BNS_QV 0.2467 0.1774 0.2307 0.1826 0.1926 0.0985 0.0641
BNS_TQ 0.1450 0.0805 0.1045 0.0821 0.0921 0.0465 0.0244
LM/ABD 0.6344 0.2851 0.2371 0.1586 0.1502 0.0549 0.0320
Min_RV 0.1065 0.0380 0.0364 0.0028 - - -
Med_RV 0.2191 0.1650 0.1922 0.1602 0.1758 0.0909 0.0240
JO 0.1165 0.0044 0.0016 0.0004 0.0004 - 0.0004
AJ 0.0997 0.0541 0.0384 0.0112 0.0160 0.0152 0.0148
CPR 0.4950 0.3604 0.3360 0.2851 0.2771 0.1862 0.1486
All FIs
BNS_QV 0.7805 0.2383 0.2006 0.1318 0.1390 0.0709 0.0376
BNS_TQ 0.5563 0.0925 0.0785 0.0509 0.0577 0.0256 0.0180
LM/ABD 0.8714 0.2499 0.1706 0.0945 0.0953 0.0300 0.0192
Min_RV 0.3757 0.0425 0.0176 0.0028 - - -
Med_RV 0.6508 0.2091 0.1650 0.1185 0.1245 0.0593 0.0128
JO 0.1622 0.0060 0.0004 - 0.0004 - -
AJ 0.1930 0.0541 0.0465 0.0292 0.0180 0.0228 0.0124
CPR 0.9243 0.4325 0.3268 0.2259 0.2303 0.1338 0.1061
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Table 3.6: Jump-day proportion, Significance level: .05
The upper, middle and the lower panel shows the jump days proportion of eight
different jump tests over seven different sampling frequencies for the market index
(CNX500), the equally weighted indexes of banks and FIs respectively at 5%
significance level. The total number of trading days here is 2497.
1_min 5_min 10_min 15_min 20_min 30_min 60_min
CNX500
BNS_QV 0.4890 0.3128 0.3192 0.2635 0.2575 0.1902 0.1678
BNS_TQ 0.3272 0.2062 0.2026 0.1618 0.1654 0.1221 0.0989
LM/ABD 0.7281 0.3740 0.2903 0.2199 0.2078 0.0885 0.0545
Min_RV 0.3448 0.2559 0.3460 0.0445 0.0216 - -
Med_RV 0.4013 0.3012 0.2928 0.2535 0.2507 0.2211 0.1954
JO 0.1141 0.0112 0.0020 0.0004 0.0008 - -
AJ 0.2078 0.2199 0.1550 0.1053 0.0945 0.1350 0.1262
CPR 0.6596 0.4437 0.3965 0.3404 0.3540 0.2899 0.2903
All Banks
BNS_QV 0.3224 0.2815 0.3252 0.2835 0.2895 0.2022 0.1894
BNS_TQ 0.1962 0.1490 0.2042 0.1718 0.1898 0.1254 0.1193
LM/ABD 0.6928 0.3765 0.3188 0.2543 0.2423 0.1045 0.0693
Min_RV 0.1390 0.0801 0.0885 0.0445 0.0300 - -
Med_RV 0.3008 0.2699 0.3100 0.2715 0.2936 0.2231 0.2058
JO 0.1898 0.0100 0.0020 0.0004 0.0004 - 0.0004
AJ 0.1434 0.1430 0.1418 0.0829 0.0813 0.1213 0.1157
CPR 0.5747 0.4786 0.4465 0.3969 0.3877 0.3084 0.3152
All FIs
BNS_QV 0.8546 0.3773 0.3192 0.2331 0.2539 0.1698 0.1454
BNS_TQ 0.7117 0.2006 0.1782 0.1286 0.1506 0.0905 0.0825
LM/ABD 0.9407 0.3736 0.2647 0.1778 0.1834 0.0697 0.0489
Min_RV 0.5034 0.0969 0.0613 0.0256 0.0156 - -
Med_RV 0.7725 0.3452 0.2976 0.2247 0.2479 0.1878 0.1626
JO 0.2731 0.0104 0.0016 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 -
AJ 0.4037 0.1698 0.1634 0.1370 0.1133 0.1270 0.1225
CPR 0.9596 0.5607 0.4698 0.3600 0.3532 0.2699 0.2707
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Table 3.7: Jump days agreed by two methods in 5 min data
Number of jump days agreed by any two methods in 5-minutes return at 1%
significance level are shown in the upper panel. The middle panel shows the number of
days with no jumps agreed by any tow methods. The lowers panel reports number of
days disagreed by any two methods on the existence of jumps. the diagonal cells show
the numbers reported by any one method only.
BNS_QV BNS_TQ LM Min_RV Med_RV JO AJ CPR
Agreed on days with jumps
BNS_QV 587
BNS_TQ 320 320
LM 436 286 669
MinRV 390 288 327 397
MedRV 459 301 403 373 518
JO - - 5 - - 18
AJ 53 33 68 38 50 - 114
CPR 579 317 564 396 496 2 68 850
Agreed on days with no jump
BNS_QV 1910
BNS_TQ 1910 2177
LM 1677 1794 1828
MinRV 1903 2068 1758 2100
MedRV 1851 1960 1713 1955 1979
JO 1892 2159 1815 2082 1961 2479
AJ 1849 2096 1782 2024 1915 2365 2383
CPR 1639 1644 1542 1646 1625 1631 1601 1647
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Table 3.8: Common jump days across the market, Banking sector and FI sector
The table shows common jump days in percentage reported by different combinations
asset classes by eight jump tests at three significance levels and four different
frequencies.
Mk∩Bks Mk∩FIS Bks∩Fis All Mk∩Bks Mk∩FIS Bks∩Fis All Mk∩Bks Mk∩FIS Bks∩Fis All
1 min Sig. level - 0.001 Sig. level - 0.01 Sig. level - 0.05
BNS_QV 0.1362 0.2082 0.1350 0.0965 0.1614 0.2767 0.1906 0.1298 0.2347 0.4233 0.2771 0.2058
BNS_TQ 0.0553 0.0585 0.0380 0.0240 0.0881 0.1125 0.0753 0.0485 0.1310 0.2295 0.1001 0.0985
LM 0.4934 0.4734 0.4650 0.4113 0.5607 0.5915 0.5751 0.5118 0.6187 0.6936 0.6600 0.5919
MinRV 0.0396 0.0408 0.0216 0.0108 0.0573 0.0849 0.0380 0.0204 0.0841 0.1714 0.0673 0.0429
MedRV 0.0789 0.1057 0.0745 0.0412 0.1181 0.1902 0.1418 0.0801 0.1770 0.3120 0.2351 0.1414
JO 0.0172 0.0056 0.0040 0.0016 0.0312 0.0104 0.0136 0.0040 0.0597 0.0176 0.0372 0.0108
AJ 0.0188 0.0100 0.0108 0.0048 0.0372 0.0328 0.0296 0.0104 0.0609 0.0761 0.0609 0.0256
CPR 0.3556 0.4401 0.3805 0.3224 0.4089 0.5362 0.4622 0.3833 0.4818 0.6400 0.5571 0.4682
5 min Sig. level - 0.001 Sig. level - 0.01 Sig. level - 0.05
BNS_QV 0.0653 0.0288 0.0224 0.0144 0.1049 0.0629 0.0477 0.0300 0.1662 0.1229 0.1177 0.0713
BNS_TQ 0.0172 0.0064 0.0040 0.0020 0.0421 0.0160 0.0120 0.0080 0.0813 0.0481 0.0368 0.0232
LM 0.1229 0.0641 0.0577 0.0477 0.1850 0.0785 0.1169 0.0901 0.2599 0.1922 0.1930 0.1490
MinRV 0.0100 0.0024 0.0004 0.0004 0.0212 0.0076 0.0032 0.0012 0.0485 0.0276 0.0104 0.0060
MedRV 0.0497 0.0220 0.0156 0.0100 0.0821 0.0505 0.0453 0.0260 0.1434 0.1085 0.1045 0.0581
JO - - - - - - - - 0.0008 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008
AJ 0.0036 0.0016 0.0012 0.0012 0.0120 0.0028 0.0064 0.0020 0.0665 0.0421 0.0300 0.0156
CPR 0.1658 0.1113 0.1109 0.0793 0.2347 0.1810 0.1922 0.1358 0.3192 0.2731 0.2984 0.2091
10 min Sig. level - 0.001 Sig. level - 0.01 Sig. level - 0.05
BNS_QV 0.0945 0.0445 0.0453 0.0364 0.1482 0.0877 0.0885 0.0741 0.2147 0.1494 0.0885 0.1169
BNS_TQ 0.0264 0.0092 0.0076 0.0052 0.0597 0.0280 0.0248 0.0188 0.1217 0.0677 0.0697 0.0545
LM 0.0849 0.0453 0.0473 0.0400 0.1526 0.0921 0.0965 0.0805 0.2215 0.1482 0.1574 0.1306
MinRV 0.0016 - - - 0.0304 0.0088 0.0048 0.0044 0.0705 0.0316 0.0188 0.0172
MedRV 0.0661 0.0268 0.0264 0.0196 0.1217 0.0609 0.0597 0.0477 0.2026 0.1241 0.1278 0.0953
JO - - - - - - - - - - - -
AJ 0.0012 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0148 0.0064 0.0040 0.0024 0.0709 0.0457 0.0352 0.0208
CPR 0.1514 0.0937 0.1037 0.0813 0.2091 0.1514 0.1674 0.1245 0.2988 0.2435 0.2671 0.1994
15 min Sig. level - 0.001 Sig. level - 0.01 Sig. level - 0.05
BNS_QV 0.0517 0.0196 0.0224 0.0156 0.1021 0.0533 0.0561 0.0433 0.1698 0.1045 0.1001 0.0773
BNS_TQ 0.0104 0.0032 0.0032 0.0016 0.0396 0.0156 0.0136 0.0116 0.0969 0.0477 0.0485 0.0368
LM 0.0421 0.0212 0.0236 0.0204 0.0833 0.0445 0.0457 0.0392 0.1538 0.0965 0.0961 0.0797
MinRV - - - - 0.0016 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0212 0.0064 0.0060 0.0048
MedRV 0.0408 0.0120 0.0104 0.0092 0.0925 0.0412 0.0400 0.0300 0.1634 0.0921 0.0957 0.0713
JO - - - - - - - - - - - -
AJ - - - - 0.0016 0.0008 0.0024 0.0004 0.0284 0.0236 0.0192 0.0100
CPR 0.1029 0.0513 0.0541 0.0416 0.1670 0.1069 0.1165 0.0877 0.2455 0.1714 0.1914 0.1410
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Table 3.9: Sector specific jumps in Banks and Financial Institutions
Idiosyncratic jump-day percentage in Banking and FI sectors at three significance level
and four different frequencies. Number of trading days is 2497 here.
BanksFIs
Sig. level 0.0010 0.0100 0.0500 0.001 0.01 0.05
1 min
BNS_QV 0.0589 0.0853 0.0877 0.4802 0.5038 0.4313
BNS_TQ 0.0449 0.0569 0.0653 0.3368 0.4437 6.8899
LM 0.0757 0.0737 0.0741 0.2811 0.2799 0.2471
MinRV 0.0368 0.0493 0.0549 0.2279 0.2907 0.3320
MedRV 0.0753 0.1009 0.1237 0.4129 0.4606 0.4606
JO 0.0609 0.0853 0.1302 0.0953 0.1518 0.2555
AJ 0.0425 0.0625 0.0825 0.0613 0.1602 0.3276
CPR 0.0717 0.0861 0.0929 0.4389 0.3881 0.3196
5 min
BNS_QV 0.0505 0.0725 0.1153 0.1149 0.1754 0.2543
BNS_TQ 0.0276 0.0384 0.0677 0.0316 0.0765 0.1526
LM 0.0757 0.1001 0.1165 0.0777 0.1714 0.1814
MinRV 0.0120 0.0168 0.0316 0.0096 0.0348 0.0693
MedRV 0.0493 0.0829 0.1266 0.0813 0.1586 0.2367
JO 0.0028 0.0044 0.0092 0.0032 0.0060 0.0100
AJ 0.0156 0.0421 0.0765 0.0068 0.0513 0.1278
CPR 0.0921 0.1258 0.1594 0.1938 0.2515 0.2875
10 min
BNS_QV 0.0561 0.0825 0.1105 0.0653 0.1129 0.1698
BNS_TQ 0.0296 0.0449 0.0825 0.0196 0.0505 0.1105
LM 0.0629 0.0845 0.0973 0.0449 0.0785 0.1165
MinRV 0.0016 0.0060 0.0180 0.0012 0.0088 0.0296
MedRV 0.0521 0.0705 0.1073 0.0537 0.1041 0.1734
JO 0.0016 0.0016 0.0020 - 0.0004 0.0016
AJ 0.0056 0.0236 0.0709 0.0056 0.0400 0.1177
CPR 0.0953 0.1270 0.1478 0.1153 0.1754 0.2263
15 min
BNS_QV 0.0489 0.0805 0.1137 0.0441 0.0785 0.1286
BNS_TQ 0.0204 0.0425 0.0749 0.0156 0.0352 0.0809
LM 0.0376 0.0753 0.1005 0.0224 0.0501 0.0813
MinRV - 0.0012 0.0232 - 0.0020 0.0192
MedRV 0.0328 0.0677 0.1081 0.0296 0.0773 0.1326
JO 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 - - 0.0004
AJ 0.0016 0.0096 0.0545 0.0012 0.0284 0.1133
CPR 0.0749 0.1181 0.1514 0.0665 0.1189 0.1886
90
3 Jump Risk in Indian Financial Market
Table 3.10: Probit regression results.
Dependent variable : Jump occurances (dummy variable). Dependent variable : daily jump
occurances (dummy variable). The BNS_QV test results on 15 minute data have been used in
this regression. Included observations: 2497.
Independent variables Jump in Banks Jump in FIs
Jump in markets in the previous period 0.2747*** 0.1972**
(0.0781) (.0976)
Jump in banks in the previous period 0.0334
(0.0771)
Jump in FIs in the previous period -0.1393
(0.0904)
Constant value -0.9357*** -1.1595***
(0.0334) (0.0363)
McFadden R-squared 0.005225 0.0035
Standard error values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks *, **,
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3.11: Probit regresson results of the day of the week effect
Dependent variable : intraday jump occurances (dummy variable). The BNS_QV intraday test
results on 15 minute data have been used in this regression. Included observations: 2497.
Variables Jumps in the Market Jumps in the Banks Jumps in the FIs
Mon 0.1914** 0.2115** 0.1028
(0.0935) (0.089992) (0.1002)
Tue -0.0738 -0.150204 0.0990
(0.0981) (0.095681) (0.1002)
Wed 0.0342 0.050109 0.0723
(0.0963) (0.092395) (0.1011)
Thu 0.1101 0.029298 (0.0289)
(0.0948) 0.092536 0.101874
C -1.0431*** -0.9391*** -1.1793***
(0.0679) (0.0652) (0.0719)
McFadden R-Squared 0.0042 0.006545 0.000823
Standard error values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks *, **,
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Probit regression results for month of the year effetc.
Dependent variable : intraday jump occurances (dummy variable). The BNS_QV intraday test
results on 15 minute data have been used in this regression. Included observations: 2497.
Variables Market Banks FIs
Jan 0.0467 0.1155 -0.2601
(0.1491) (0.1431) (0.1671)
Feb -0.1710 -0.0811 -0.0845
(0.1587) (0.1504) (0.1614)
Mar 0.0373 0.0880 -0.0737
(0.1488) (0.1432) 0.1581
Apr 0.0548 -0.1134 -0.2195
(0.1517) (0.1523) (0.1685)
May 0.2345 0.2334 0.1657
(0.1433) (0.1395) (0.1497)
Jun 0.1126 -0.0408 0.1627
(0.1458) (0.1455) (0.1496)
Jul 0.0701 0.1127 0.0598
(0.1466) (0.1414) (0.1521)
Aug 0.0698 0.1157 0.0354
(0.1476) (0.1423) (0.1539)
Sep 0.1079 0.0656 0.0313
(0.1476) (0.1444) (0.1551)
Oct 0.1212 0.0607 -0.1021
(0.1480) (0.1452) (0.1608)
Nov -0.0430 0.1152 0.2809
(0.1527) 0.1440 (0.1491)
C -1.0467*** -0.9674*** -1.1331***
(0.1061) (0.1029) (0.1100)
McFadden R-squared 0.000823 0.004255 0.011462
Standard error values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks *, **,
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.13: Probit model results of memory dependence of jumps.
Dependent variable : intraday jump occurances (dummy variable). The LM intraday test results
on 15 minute data have been used in this regression. Included observations: 59400.
Variables Market Banks FIs
Jumpt−1 0.9662*** 0.8622*** 0.8639***
(0.1170) (0.1086) (0.1513)
Jumpt−24 1.1041*** 1.1517*** 1.1737***
(0.1086) (0.0918) (0.1212)
Jumpt−120 1.1416*** 1.0001*** 0.9096***
(0.1086) (0.1006) (0.1415)
Jumpt−528 1.1297*** 1.1792*** 0.8915***
(0.1083) (0.0903) (0.1431)
Constant -2.6489*** -2.5865 -2.6986
(0.0213) (0.0199) (0.0229)
McFadden R-squared 0.1258 0.1338 0.0692
Standard error values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks *, **,
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Return Market Index, Banks and FIs
The historical one-minute return series from January 2004 to December 2013 the
market index CNX500, the equally weighted index of banks and FIs are shown in the
upper, middle and lower panel respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Volatility of Returns
The historical one-minute daily realized volatility series from January 2004 to
December 2013 the market index CNX500, the equally weighted index of banks and
FIs are shown in the upper, middle and lower panel respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Relative Jump Signature Plot
This graph reports the percentage of jump days at different frequencies by the eight
methods applied in our study at 1% significance level.
Figure 3.4: Signature Plot
We draw the signature plots by plotting the a volatility measure in Y-axis and sampling
frequencies in the X-axis. In the upper panel graphs we show Realized variation and
Bipower variation and as volatility measure and tri-power variation and Quad-power
variation in the lower panel graphs.
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Figure 3.5: Jumps days comparison - Market, Banks and FIs with 15 min data
The graph shows a comparison of jump days percentage among the Market index,
banking industry and the FI industry reported by eight different jump methods. Here
the results are taken from jump tests in 15-minutes data at 0.1% significance level in
the upper panel, at 1% significance level in the middle panel and 5% level at the lower
panel.
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Figure 3.6: Year-wise jump-day spread
The upper panel shows the jump-day concentration of the banking sector and lower
panel shows that of FI sector. We use the BNS_QV test outcomes with 15-minutes
data at 1% significance level to construct these graphs.
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Figure 3.7: Jump time pattern
The graph shows the frequncy of jump times in the trading days for the market index,
the banking sector, and the FI sector in panal a, b and c respectively. We use the LM
test outcomes with 15-minutes data at 1% significance level to construct these graphs.
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Figure 3.8: Day of the Week Pattern
The graph shows the frequncy of jump days in 5-day weeks for the market index, the
banking sector, and the FI sector in panal a, b and c respectively. We use the BNS_QV
test outcomes with 15-minutes data at 1% significance level to construct these graphs.
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Figure 3.9: Month of the Year Pattern
The graph shows the frequncy of jump months in our sample years for the market
index, the banking sector, and the FI sector in panal a, b and c respectively. We use the
BNS_QV test outcomes with 15-minutes data at 1% significance level to construct
these graphs.
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4.1. Introduction
As argued in the previous chapters, jumps, described as abrupt changes in return, are
important in investors’ risk management and hedging decisions. It is believed that in
general the arrival of news in the market causes jumps. However, empirical studies show
that a large portion of jumps can not be attributed to news arrivals. There must be
other factors that are associated with jump occurrences and the importance of jumps
warrants examining those factors. Not many studies have been conducted so far, in the
direction of unearthing jump-related non-news variables. Our third study presented in
this chapter is an effort to bridge the gap in the existing literature by examining the
relationship of liquidity variables with the jump movements of equity securities. Using
ten of the largest Indian banking stocks we explore the relationship between liquidity
variables and the jump returns of these stocks.
The relationship between liquidity and stock return is well studied in the literature.
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The effect of liquidity on the expected return may arise from the investor’s recognition
that they will face transaction costs when selling their stocks in the future. This will
prompt discounting of stocks with higher transaction costs or capital restrictions (Batten
and Vo, 2014). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that in equilibrium, investors with
longer investment horizons will hold less liquid assets. As a result of this horizon clientele,
the observed asset returns are an increasing and concave function of the transaction
costs. Jumps, as a state of returns that is statistically different from other returns given
the volatility of a given time window, may result from extreme changes in liquidity
conditions.
Some authors argue that liquidity affects stock returns through its positive effect
on corporate governance and firm performance (e.g., Karolyi, 2012). Batten and Vo
(2014) discuss a number of different ways in which more liquidity may affect corporate
governance, such as, by making it easier for non-block-holders to intervene and become
block-holders as shown in Maug (1998), by facilitating the information of a toehold
stake as shown in Kyle and Vila (1991); by reducing managerial opportunism such as in
Edmans (2009), and by stimulating trade and thereby improving investment decisions by
informed investors such as in Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001). The liquidity-return
relationship prompts us to anticipate that the jumps that can not be explained by news
arrival may be related to rapid change in market liquidity, as argued by Lahaye et al.
(2011). Boudt and Petitjean (2014) find that jumps are driven by the variations in the
demand for immediacy as such jumps occur due to market inability to absorb new orders
without moving the price significantly up or down.
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Liquidity, by its nature, is a difficult concept to define and hence difficult to estimate
(Lesmond, 2005). Kyle (1985) notes that the liquidity concept is “slippery” and “elusive”,
and he attributes this to a number of transactional properties of markets encompassed in
liquidity, such as tightness, depth, and resiliency. Following this, Lesmond (2005) span
the definition of empirical liquidity into direct trading costs (tightness) measured by
the bid-ask quotes (quoted or effective), to indirect trading costs (depth and resiliency),
measured by price impact. A wide variety of liquidity measures have been used in the
literature reflecting its multiple dimensions. For example Liu (2006) defines liquidity as
the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost and with little price impact. Four
dimensions, namely trading quantity (depth), trading speed (immediacy), trading cost
(tightness) and price impact (resilience) emerge from this definition. As our motive is
to pin down the causes of the jump, we map the different dimensions of liquidity that
can be observed in the limit order book, and investigate whether there is any systematic
pattern prior to or at the time of a jump.
An important measure of liquidity is trading volume or turnover. Amihud and Mendel-
son (1986) show that turnover is negatively related to illiquidity costs. Shahzad et al.
(2014) explain the relation between volatility and volume by arguing that it is impossible
for prices to vary in absence of any trading activity. Individual investors behave as noise
or liquidity traders (Barber and Odean (1999). When volume and market depth surge
due to increased market activities of uninformed or noise traders, then efficiency would
decrease by increasing the volatility in incorporating information. The occurrence of a
jump increases uncertainty around fundamental values and it is likely to have a positive
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impact on future volatility. Thus, there is a practical interest in identifying the jump
component of volatility and understanding how market activities contribute to jumps
in volatility. Earlier studies have been mainly conducted on the US markets, with the
presence of specialists or dealers. However, whether the results for the US market can
be replicated in other markets is an open question given that the majority of them are
now electronic limit orders (Jain, 2005).
The interaction among public announcement, volume and stock price has been dis-
cussed in Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Atiase and Bamber (1994) and can be summar-
ised as follows: each investor achieves the optimal portfolio prior to a public disclosure
based on existing public and private information in the pre-disclosure period. The an-
nouncement of public information forces investors to revise their beliefs inducing both
price changes and trading volume. After the announcement, investors with more pre-
cise private pre-disclosure information will on average make smaller belief revisions than
less informed investors with less precise private information. Thus pre-disclosure in-
formation asymmetry results in differential belief revisions, in turn, inducing trading
volume. Thus it can be shown that trading volume reaction is proportional to both
the absolute price change and level of pre-disclosure information asymmetry. When the
pre-disclosure information asymmetry is abnormally high, the trading volume reaction
will be high enough to induce jumps in the stock price.
An important measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread or depths at quoted bid
and ask prices (Amihud et al., 2006). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) propose that
illiquidity can be measured by the cost of immediate execution which can be explained
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by a trade-off faced by an investor willing to transact. The investor can either choose
waiting to transact when the market price matches with his desired price or choose to
execute immediately at the current bid or ask price. The quoted ask and bid prices
includes a premium or concession for immediate execution of the trade. Thus Amihud
and Mendelson (1986) shows that a natural measure of illiquidity is the spread between
the bid and ask prices which is the sum of the buying premium and selling concession.
Indeed the relative quoted spread on stocks has been found to be negatively correlated
with liquidity characteristics such as the trading volume and stock price continuity. The
authors predict that the higher-spread assets yield higher expected return. In other
words the bid-ask spread, which is often called the quoted spread, is a transaction cost
to the trader for immediacy (Copeland and Galai, 1983).
Another spread measure, the effective spread is considered to be one of the best
proxies for stock liquidity. The effective spread is defined by Fang et al. (2009) as
the difference between the execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask
quote (the effective spread). Like the quoted spread measure, the effective spread is
standardized to adjust for the stock price level converting it to a relative effective spread
measure. Liquidity proxies calculated using low frequency stock returns are frequently
compared to benchmark liquidity measures calculated using high frequency data to judge
their effectiveness as a liquidity proxy. Statman et al. (2006) show that high returns lead
to additional trading activity, hence reverse causality is a potential concern for liquidity
proxies that rely on trading activity as a measurement input. Fang et al. (2009) argue
that the effective spread measure is less subject to this concern than other measures of
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liquidity.
In addition to liquidity conditions, liquidity shocks may play an important role in asset
(fixed income assets in their paper) price jumps as suggested by Jiang et al. (2011).
In their analysis, liquidity shocks carries a broad meaning, and it could arise due to
pure trading imbalance or order withdrawal. As discussed in Fleming and Piazzasi
(2006) dealers tend to withdraw their orders to avoid being picked off in the upcoming
information event. Jiang et al. (2011) define a shock in spread as the difference between
overall spread in an interval and the mean of overall spread over the previous five intervals
scaled by its standard deviation.
Trading imbalance is another variable that provides a link between trading activity and
returns, Chordia et al. (2002). Order imbalances, which show imbalance between buy
orders less sell orders or excess buy or sell orders, reduce liquidity. Chordia et al. (2002)
and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) argue that market-wide returns are strongly
affected by contemporaneous and lagged order imbalances. They show that prices and
liquidity should be more strongly affected by more extreme order imbalances, regardless
of volume, for two reasons. First order imbalances sometimes signal private information,
thus reducing liquidity at least temporarily. Second, large order imbalances expose the
inventory problem faced by the market maker, who in turn may respond by changing bid-
ask spreads by changing price quotations. Hence, order imbalances should be important
influences on stock returns and liquidity, conceivably even more important than volume.
To the best of our knowledge, the only three papers that study the liquidity dynamics
around jumps are Jiang et al. (2011), Boudt and Petitjean (2014) and Frömmel et al.
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(2013). Among these papers only Boudt and Petitjean (2014) examined jumps in stock
returns while Jiang et al. (2011) used bond returns and Frömmel et al. (2013) use
exchange rate returns to find the effect of liquidity. All of these papers have been
conducted on the U.S market which is driven by the market dealer or market makers.
Most of the theories discussed in the literature on market activities is based on how
the market maker reacts to a change in market activity. Hence, the findings may be
different in a market like India which is order driven rather than quote driven. We focus
on stocks of the National Stock Exchange in India (NSE) where trading takes place
through an open electronic limit order book, in which order matching is done by the
trading computer. There are no market makers or specialists and the entire process
is order driven, which means that market orders placed by investors are automatically
matched with the best limit orders.
The argument in favour of choosing India for this study follows Bekaert et al. (2007).
The growing body of research on liquidity primarily focuses on the U.S., arguably the
most liquid market in the world. In contrast, our research focuses on an emerging market
where liquidity effects may be particularly strong. Emerging markets are known to be
less liquid, hence higher liquidity premia should be found in these markets. Thus the
focus on emerging markets should yield powerful evidence of liquidity impacts on any
variable like jumps. In addition, the vastness of the U.S. market allows a very diversified
ownership structure, combining long horizon investors (less subject to liquidity risk) with
short-term investors. Hence, the pricing of liquidity is mitigated by the clientele effects
in portfolio choice in this market. Such diversity in securities and ownership is lacking
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in emerging markets, potentially strengthening liquidity effects.
We have chosen ten banking stocks with the largest market capitalization. In countries
like India banking stocks are popular, and are among the stocks that are most followed
by investors and analysed by experts. Thus, we expect that there will be considerable
amount of variation in liquidity variables with the changing market conditions, which
enables us to capture the dynamics between liquidity and jumps.
We use the jump test developed by Lee and Mykland (2008). This method has the
advantage of identifying jumps in individual return observations. We observe jumps in
1.58% to 1.73% of return observations in the ten banking stocks. In all cases the number
of positive jumps is higher than the number of negative jumps. We implement a non-
parametric method to analyse the link between intra-day liquidity dynamics and properly
identified intra-day jumps regardless of the arrival of information. To complement the
non-parametric event study we apply a parametric analysis to assess the contribution of
liquidity shocks in both the occurrence of jumps and price discovery process. We find that
liquidity measures are largely affected by jumps in the stocks. If we characterize liquidity
by the market spread, jumps do improve market liquidity conditions which is in contrast
with the findings of Boudt and Petitjean (2014). If trading quantity and immediacy
are considered, we observe again an improvement in the market liquidity. The surge in
volume can be translated as a sharp increase in investors’ orders for immediate execution
around jumps. Among the two drivers of volume surges, the rise in average trade size and
the rise in number of trades, our analysis reveals that the former is more prominent than
the latter. The market depth is deepened at the time of jumps. We show that negative
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jumps are associated with higher bid and ask depths, indicating the existence of thicker
buying and selling pressures. Thus it is the heightened demand of immediacy from the
market participants of both sides, rather than the traders’ withdrawal of liquidity that
causes jumps. The Mann-Whitney test results also confirm the significant changes in
the liquidity variable during the jump intervals from non-jump intervals.
We examine the contemporaneous and lagged effect of liquidity factors on the probab-
ility of jump occurrences, and find the prevalence of both effects in different degrees for
different jump measures. However, the explanatory power of contemporaneous liquidity
variables is much higher than the lagged variables for all jumps (19.17% vs 1.54% in the
probit regression). The liquidity variables have more explanatory power in determining
the probability of negative than that of positive jumps (35% vs 11.53% in the contempor-
aneous probit regression and 2.18% vs. 1.29% in the lagged probit regression). Negative
jumps are more associated with change in liquidity conditions than the positive jumps.
Among the liquidity variables, volume, quoted spreads, effective spread shock and or-
der imbalance are key drivers of the occurrences of positive jumps. For negative jump
occurrences the effective spread and effective spread shock play important roles.
As investor behaviour may change during a crisis, the dynamics between liquidity
variables and jump occurrences may also change. We examine changes by dividing our
sample period into pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis periods. However, we do not observe
substantial changes in the results in those sub-samples indicating the effects of liquidity
variables are general on jump occurrences.
Finally, several liquidity variables are shown to contribute to price discovery. Volume,
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depth, quoted and effective spreads, effective spread shock and order imbalances are
significant contributors to the price discovery process. However, the post jump price
discovery process does not appear to be very much related with these liquidity variables.
The study is an addition to a small list of papers examining the relationship between
liquidity variables and jump occurrences. the uniqueness of this paper is that it conducts
the study on an emerging market which is not dealer driven like the U.S. market. The
previous two papers only examined the effects of the lagged liquidity variables on the
jumps while we have analysed both the contemporaneous and lagged effects of liquidity
on the probability of jump occurrences.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 documents the
liquidity variables used in this study. A description of data used in this study and the
jump detection methodology are discussed in section 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. We present
the results in section 5.3 followed by conclusion in section 5.4.
4.2. Variables
We use the liquidity measures widely used in the literature to examine the relationship
between market liquidity and stock returns or jumps. We list these liquidity measures
and the respective computing methods below:
We measure the immediacy and depth of the market by volume of stocks traded
(VOL), depth at best ask price (DPTA) and depth at best bid price (DPTB) as follows:
(1) VOL = Number of stocks traded
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(2) DPTA = Best Ask Price × Number of Ask
(3) DPTB = Best Bid Price × Number of Bid
Spreads are taken as relative terms and are defined both as quoted spreads (RSPD)
and effective spreads (RESPD) as follows:
(4) RSPD = (Best Ask Price - Best Bid Price)/Mid Quote,
where Mid Quote = 1/2 (Best Ask Price + Best Bid Price)
(5) RESPD = (Last Price - Mid Quote)/Mid Quote
The spread shock variables are shown as the difference between overall relative quoted
(effective) spread in an interval and the mean of overall (effective) spread over intervals
t− 5 to t− 1, scaled by its standard deviation. Thus
(6) DDRSPD = Change in RSPD in time interval t =
RSPDt−1/5
∑5
j=1RSPDt−j
σRSPD
and
(7) DDRESPD: Change in RESPD in time interval t =
RESPDt−1/5
∑5
j=1RESPDt−j
σRESPD
The order imbalance variable is defined in our study as
(8) OB (Order Imbalance) = DPTAt −DTPBt
Macroeconomic news is considered as the most important causal factor in inciting
jumps. Boudt and Petitjean (2014) report that a third of the jumps are caused by
macroeconomic news while another 5% of the jumps are associated with firm-specific
news. Macroeconomic news tends to effect whole market, hence we should observe a
market-wide jump as a consequence of arrival of macroeconomic news. We take the
jump occurrences in the market index (CNX500) as a proxy of such market-wide jumps.
(9) MJump = Jump in the market - A proxy of arrival in news in the market.
Our dependent variable in the regression analysis is a binary variable indicating the
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existence of a jump in a given time interval. This variable takes the value of one when
the Lee-Mykland jump test detects a jump in a given time interval, otherwise it is zero.
4.3. Data
We collect data for the Indian market index, stock prices of listed banks from the Thom-
son Reuters Tisk History (TRTH) database provided by SIRCA. We take 10 of the
largest banks in term of market capitalization at the end of 2013 in our sample shown
in Table 4.1 . These 10 banks are listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE).
Our data covers from the period of January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2013, which
includes the global financial crisis in 2008-09. There are a total of 2497 trading days
in our sample period. We collect intra-day 15-minute data from TRTH. In chapter
3 we show through a signature plot that data with 15 minutes sampling frequency
for Indian stock prices provides a balance between measurement accuracy and market
microstructure noise of high frequency data. Following our previous studies we use the
last price recorded in each of the 15-minute intervals during the normal trading session
of NSE from 9:15 a.m. to 3:30 pm, where missing data are filled with the price of the
previous interval which assumes that the price remains unchanged during a non-trading
interval. We drop the first 15 minutes of each day to avoid noise associated with market
opening. Hence, our trading hours are 9.30 am to 3.30 pm local Indian time. We have
24 observations of 15-minute data for each trading day. We use the CNX500 index as
the market index following our previous papers.
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4.4. Jump Detection Method
We use jump detection method proposed by Lee and Mykland (2008) (LM) which has
the advantage of detecting jumps at individual return observation level instead of a given
time span. Although the method is already described in Chapter 3 we provide a short
description of the method here for easy references. The statistics Li that tests for a
jump at every intra-day period ti is defined as
Li =
∆tip
σˆ(ti)
, (4.1)
where ∆tip is the intra-day return and σ(ti) is the local volatility measure. Here we use
the bipower variation of K observations preceding the relevant observation. Thus the
test can identify the presence of jumps in an observation against the volatility in the
prior period and can be defined as
σˆ(ti)2 =
1
K − 2
i−1∑
j=i−K
| ∆tjp || ∆tj−1p | . (4.2)
Lee and Mykland (2008) suggest a window size K between 252×n and √252× n,
where n is the number of observations in a day so that the window size poses a balance
between being a jump-robust volatility measure and being effective in scaling the trend
in volatility. In our study, we use 80 as values of K for our 15-minute sampling interval
where n=24.
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is as follows:
max(Li)− Cn
Sn
→ ξ, (4.3)
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where P (ξ ≤ x) = exp(−e−x), the constants
Cn =
(2logn)1/2
c
− logpi + log(logn)
2c(2logn)1/2
, (4.4)
Sn =
1
c(2logn)1/2
, (4.5)
and
c =
√
2
pi
. (4.6)
Thus the LM test detects jumps by comparing the maximized value of Li to the critical
value from the Gumbel distribution. We use the LM test method in this study, applying
a significance level of 0.01.
4.5. Empirical Analysis
We study the dynamics of different liquidity variables such as trading volume, number of
trades, depth of ask and depth of bid, the quoted spread ratio and effective spread ratio,
the order imbalance in relation to jump occurrences. Further, for each time interval of
the event window we use a Mann-Whitney test to examine whether the median value
of the liquidity measures on jump intervals is the same on intervals without jumps. We
supplement our investigation by undergoing a parametric analysis to assess the impact of
liquidity shocks in intra-day jump occurrences and price discovery. Lastly we analyse the
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impact of economic crisis on the liquidity-jump relationship by comparing sub-sample
regression results.
4.5.1. Liquidity around jumps
To see how liquidity variables behave around the jump time, we take the average values
of the liquidity variables within the jump intervals, 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes prior to the
jump times, and also 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes after the jump times. We remove all the
jumps that we find during the first and last trading hours so that we have the liquidity
measures 1 hour before and after all detected jumps. In addition we also discard the
jumps when we find two consecutive jumps within a two hour interval to avoid liquidity
measures which may have overlapping effects from more than one jump. Table 4.2
presents a summary of the intra-day jumps we detect for the ten sample banks. Out
of 87,672 return observations, each bank experiences 1461.5 jumps on average, which is
1.67% of the total observations. 55.41% of all jumps are positive, the remaining 44.59%
jumps are negative.
4.5.1.1 Return around jumps
Figure 4.1 shows the average return behaviour around the time intervals when jumps
occur. Jump returns are prominently higher than the returns before and after the jump
intervals as expected. Panel (a) shows that returns are moving towards zero from positive
figures before the jump occurrences. After the jump interval returns become negative
and then again start moving toward zero from this point. But if we separate positive and
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negative jumps in panel (b) and (c) we observe a specific pattern in changes of returns
before and after jump intervals. Returns are gradually decreasing before positive jumps,
and there is a price correction immediately after the jump return. Returns behave in
just the opposite way around the negative jumps. The movement of returns support the
overreaction of investors and return reversals hypotheses that have been well documented
in the literature (Bondt and Thaler 1985 and Chopra et al. 1992).
4.5.1.2 Trading volume and depth around jumps
We use the increase in trading volume and number of trades as sign of demand increase
for immediate execution by the investors. It is evident from our analysis that the demand
for immediate execution rises around jumps. Figure 4.2 shows a substantial surge in
trading volume, averaged over the sample period at the time when price jumps. In the
15-minute jump interval, the abnormal average volume is three times the median value
across the non-jump time intervals. That is consistent with hypothesis that jumps are
caused by the market mechanism of moving the price significantly up or down in the face
of sudden surge of new orders. These findings support that the demand for immediacy
is a driving force behind jump occurrences. The news alone can not explain the jump
arrivals, the impact may be transmitted through the market liquidity changes which in
turn move the price up and down.
Our figure also shows that volume decreases gradually from one hour before the jump
interval, indicating that the informed investors restrain themselves from trading and
wait for the arrival of news. They do get involved in trading once the news has arrived
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thus contributing a surge in the trading volume. During the one hour following the
jump, the volume decreases gradually but remains at a level higher than one hour prior
to the jump. This may result from the fact that a section of the investors take time
to react after the news become public, or that investors wait to observe the market
reaction of the news and then start trading. Our results show a slightly decreasing trend
of volume measurements leading to the jump time whereas Boudt and Petitjean (2014)
show that the graph is pretty flat until right before the jump. This indicates that it is
the unexpected part of news content that leads to jump occurrences.
The drivers behind the volume surge may be a higher number of trades or a larger
average trade size. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show an increase in both of these trade variables
during the jump intervals. Nonetheless, the rise of average trade size during the jump
intervals is more prominent than the number of trades. When news arrives in the market,
informed investors become engaged in trading in higher volume per trade, surging the
total volume for the stock and creating jumps. This finding is in line with Kim and
Wu (2008) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) who show that informed traders incline to be
involved in trading in larger sizes. Our findings differ slightly from Boudt and Petitjean
(2014) who show that both number of trade and average trade size contributed equally
to the rapid surge of volume at the jump time. The subtle difference may arise because
of the difference between the U.S. market from the Indian market where information
may not spread to a wide number of investors as quickly as in the U.S. market.
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate how the depth in the market at the best bid and ask price
increases around the jump intervals. Although higher spreads, as well as, higher trading
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volume exist, the quoted market depth is not withdrawn from the market. Our findings
here support Boudt and Petitjean (2014) that a greater demand for liquidity instead of
a weak liquidity supply, is accounted for price jumps.
4.5.1.3 Spread around jumps
Figure 4.7 and 4.8 show a significant decrease in average spreads at the time of price
jumps indicating a fall of one of the three typical cost components of the spread: order
processing costs, inventory holding costs, and/or asymmetric information risk. The
effective spread, RESPD is increasing in the hour before jumps and then shows a slump
just at the jump interval and stays low for around 45 minutes. The reduction in spread
may result from the increase in the volume in the market around jumps. The result is
opposite to that for the U.S. market as shown by Boudt and Petitjean (2014), which
they explain as a consequence of having the unusually large trading volume at jump
time putting pressure on the specialist’s or market maker’s inventory. As the Indian
market is broker driven rather than dealer driven, the impact of the rise in volume may
have different impact on spread. The higher volume increases market efficiency and thus
decreases the spread cost.
The spread shows an increasing trend one hour before the positive jump arrival time.
We may relate this trend with the decrease in volume at the corresponding time intervals.
The gradual fall in volume and rise in spread may indicate that investors adjusts their
behaviour in advance before important news are released, unlike the U.S. investors.
The effect of jumps on ex-ante liquidity in terms of RSPD is less pronounced as we
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do not observe any clear fall or rise in RSPD in the jump interval from the previous
few intervals. Ex-post liquidity is rather more severely affected confirming that liquidity
providers do not improve their displayed quoted prices in response to the jump occur-
rences and the bid-ask spread widens, as a result. However, the post jump quoted spread
rises dramatically when the jump is negative and remains there for the whole hour that
we examine indicating that after a large negative return the byers and sellers become
overcautious in quoting their respective prices. We do not observe any such pattern in
quoted spread after a positive jump occurrence.
4.5.1.4 Order imbalance
Figure 4.9 shows the trading activity at the time of a jump occurrence is unbalanced.
Positive (negative) jumps can be attributed to large buying (selling) pressure as we
observe sharp step up in the order imbalances in the jump intervals. Chordia et al. (2002)
relate the degree of order imbalance to the relevance of the released information. Boudt
and Petitjean (2014) explain the existence of high number of trades as an indication
of large sample of independent observers receiving the same signal and creating a high
disequilibrium between buy and sell transactions.
The imbalance measure drops back quickly to its pre-jump level after the jump in
the case of negative jumps. In contrast, trading imbalances are more persistent after
the positive jumps. The results indicate that initial agreement on the price direction, is
dismantled quickly when heterogeneous beliefs among the investors on the fundamental
asset value reappear; this is more pronounced for negative jumps, leading to a more
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balanced interaction between bulls and bears. It also indicates that the overreaction to
the news is more prevalent for negative jump returns than the positive ones.
4.5.1.5 Mann-Whitney Test Results
The Mann-Whitney test is used to rank a series from smallest value to largest, and to
compare the sum of the ranks from one subgroup to the sum of the ranks from another
subgroup. If the groups have the same median, the values should be similar. We use
EViews to reports the asymptotic normal approximation to the U-statistic and the p-
values for a two-sided test; for details, see Sheskin (2003). The test in Eviews is based
on a one-way analysis of variance using only ranks of the data.
Table 4.3 reports the Mann-Whitney test results of whether the liquidity measures in
the time interval of jump occurrences come from the same distribution as the ones in
intervals without jumps for the ten sample banks. We show the results for all jumps,
positive jumps and negative jumps in separate rows for the liquidity variables used in
this study. Volume is significantly different during the jump intervals for all ten banks
at the 95% confidence level and for both positive and negative jumps, which shows that
jump occurrences are strongly related with trading volumes. For example, the median
volume of non-jump intervals is 28,335 while the median volume of jump intervals is
30,699 for HDBK bank. The arrival of news prompts investors to trade in the market,
and the price changes rapidly depending on the strength of buying or selling pressure.
Median values of both the depth measures DPTB and DPTA (depth is bid and ask)
are also significantly higher in the jump intervals, supporting the notion of the sudden
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change in stock prices backed by investors’ desire for immediacy.
The relative spread measures the quoted spread, RSPD and the effective spread,
RESPD, are found to have significantly different values in the jump and non-jump inter-
vals. For HDBK Bank the median value of RSPD is 0.000854 during the jump intervals
which is around twice as large as the median value of 0.000425 in non-jump intervals. We
see similar patterns for the relative effective spread measure, RESPD showing that ex-
treme price movements are associated with increased transaction costs for the investors.
The order imbalance measure, OB also varies significantly in jump and non-jump
intervals. The median order imbalance is almost four times higher in jump intervals
than the non-jump intervals for HDBK Bank. The Mann-Whitney test results show
that the difference is more prominent for negative jump intervals than for positive jump
intervals. We can interpret this as evidence that the extreme price drops are connected
with high selling pressure which creates substantial order imbalance in the market.
Our results are consistent to the findings of Boudt and Petitjean (2014) and Jiang
et al. (2011). Although the Indian market is order driven rather than quote driven, our
results reveal that the liquidity variables are significantly related to the jump occurrences
as in the USA market.
4.5.2. Impact of Liquidity on jump probabilities
The empirical findings documented in the previous subsections suggest that liquidity
shocks around jumps are substantial. In this subsection, we examine how shocks in
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volume, depth, effective and quoted spreads and order imbalance variables explain the
probability that a jump occurs. The following regression is estimated for each of the 10
banking stocks over the sample period from January 1 2004 to December 31, 2013:
P (Jumpj = 1 | X) = G(αj + β1MJumpj + β2V olj + β3DPTBj + β4RSPDj + β5RESPDj
+β6OBj + βDDRSPDj + β8DDRESPDj), (4.7)
where X is a vector of regressors. We include a dummy variable, MJump to represent
the existence of jumps in the market in a given time interval. We use this variable as
a proxy of macroeconomic news arrival with the assumption that the whole market will
be affected by the news. We use only one measure of depth, DPTB as the co-relation
between DPTB and DPTA is very high. We run two binary dependent variable models,
as shown in Table 4.4 and 4.5, to test whether any liquidity variable contributes to
the occurrence of stock jumps contemporaneously. The probit and logit models lead
to the same conclusions. First, we examine the contemporaneous effect of liquidity on
overall jumps, positive jumps and negative jumps. We report the average coefficients of
the variables in the second column and from 3rd to 6th columns we show the number
of stocks where we find the relationship is positive and significant at 5%, positive and
significant at 10%, negative and significant at 5% and negative and significant at 10%
level for each independent variables. We also report the average McFadden R-squared
values for each set of regressions.
Occurrences of market jumps increase the probability of having jumps in the individual
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stocks significantly at the 5% level for all of the ten stocks analysed in our study. A
jump in the market indicates that the broad investors receive a signal that affects a large
number of stocks. The individual stocks are then more likely to react to the signal. The
probability of either a positive or negative jump at the time of occurrence of market
jumps both increases.
An increase in volume (VOL) increases the likelihood of contemporaneous jumps for
Indian stocks as shown in all ten of our sample stocks. When volume surges the price
changes rapidly in the direction that is dictated by the buying vs. selling pressures. We
see the impact of volume is more pronounced for positive jumps than negative jumps,
and the signs of the coefficients are also opposite. When volume increases, the market
takes it as a bullish signal and the corresponding response generates a positive jump.
Conversely, in case of negative jumps we find that the reaction is significantly negative
in four regressions and positive in only one regression. We may interpret the results in
two ways. First, the abnormal negative returns may arise from bad news rather than
from the impact of volume surge. Second, it is the decrease in market volume that
increases the chances of having negative jumps in the stock. A fall in volume depresses
the market, the investors become bearish, and the stock price falls substantially creating
negative jumps.
The market depth at bid price (DPTB) has a significant positive coefficient in 4 stocks
for positive jumps, and 6 stocks for negative jumps. This shows that the depth is more
associated with negative jumps than the positive jumps. The increase in buying pressure
implies greater demand for liquidity rather than a weak liquidity supply, resulting in
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extreme price changes in either direction. However, the depth variable is not as strong
as the volume variable in determining the probability of jump occurrences for the Indian
banking stocks.
Among the two spread ratios we apply in our study the quoted spread, RSPD and
effective spread, RESPD, we see that RESPD affects the probability of jump occurrences
in more stocks (10 vs 8). However we see quite different results in the case of positive
jumps and negative jumps. In all 10 regressions the quoted spread significantly affects
the probability of jump occurrences at the 5% level, whereas the effective spread is
negatively significant at 5% in 6 regressions, and positively significant at 5% level in one
regression. In contrast, the effective spread can explain the negative jumps significantly
in all ten regressions. The results show that an increase in effective spread can increase
the probability of having a negative jump. High effective spreads may be indicative of
greater market imbalance between buying and selling pressures. The abnormal negative
returns or jumps are closely related to such market imbalances, which may result from
spread of negative news in the market. The negative coefficient of RESPD in 6 stocks
in case of positive jumps means that, an increase in RESPDs reduces the chance of
having an abnormally high positive returns, indicating that positive high returns are not
associated with market imbalances rather the higher differences between ask and bid
prices.
Changes in the spread ratio in the contemporaneous time intervals from their last
five values also significantly affect the probabilities of jump occurrences. Among the
two variables, DDRSPD (change in quoted spread) and DDRESPD (change in effective
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spread), we find DDRESPD has higher impact on jump probabilities. The rapid change
in effective spreads has higher likelihood of being accompanied by jump returns either
positive or negative.
The liquidity order imbalance variable, OB does not seem to be crucial variable for
jumps given that it has a significant coefficient at 5% only in two regressions when we look
at the overall jumps. However, by analysing the positive and negative jump regression
outcomes we see quite a different story. OB has a significantly negative coefficient in
9 regressions at the 5% level in the case of positive jumps. This variable is positively
significant at the 5% level in 9 out of 10 regressions in the case of negative jumps.
Thus an increase in order imbalance is associated with an increase in the probability of
negative jumps, and a decrease in the probability of positive jumps.
Overall the liquidity measures along with the market jumps can explain 19.17% of
the jump probabilities for all jumps as indicated by the average McFadden R2. The
difference in McFadden R2 values between the regressions for positive jumps and the
regression for negative jumps is noteworthy. While this value is only 11.53% for positive
jumps, it is 35% for the negative jumps. Thus liquidity variables are much more strongly
associated with negative returns rather than positive returns contrasting with our initial
predictions. Our results indicate that abnormal negative price movements are more
sensitive to the liquidity shocks. The probit regression results are largely supported by
the logit regression results presented in Table 4.5.
We also examine the lagged effect of the liquidity values on jump occurrences for the
Indian banking stocks. Table 4.6 shows that it is primarily the volume depth variables
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that have significant impact on the probabilities of positive jumps. VOL and DPTA
have significant positive coefficients in 9 and 7 regressions respectively. In the case of
negative jumps it is the effective spread and its variations from previous values (RESPD
and DDRESPD) that have significant coefficients. The results indicate that increase in
market depth leads to a positive jump in the next 15-minute interval, while the spread
change points towards negative jumps.
Next we examine the combined impact of contemporaneous and one order lagged li-
quidity variables jumps depicted in Table 4.7. Here we report the results obtained on all
jumps. We observe that the contemporaneous relationship between the liquidity vari-
ables and probability of jumps remain almost same as we show in Table 4.4. These vari-
ables have mostly positive relationship with jumps. The lagged version of the variables,
except market jumps (MJump) and the variations in effective spread (DDRESPD) ex-
hibit mostly negative relationships with jumps the jump probabilities. These regressions
results are not very much different from regression results we obtain from regressions of
jumps with the contemporaneous and lagged liquidity variables separately.
4.5.3. Liquidity and the Global Financial Crisis
We examine whether the liquidity-jump relationship of Indian banks shifts during crisis
periods. Traders may react differently to the liquidity shocks during the crisis period
than the non crisis periods. The results are reported in Table 4.8. As the global financial
crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 falls within our sample period, we analyse the impact by taking
sub-samples referring to the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. We follow Dungey
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et al. (2015) in identifying the crisis period, who identify 3rd July, 2007 as the beginning
of the crisis period when the connection between the troubled US sub-prime mortgage
market and the global credit markets came to light and just to prior to the resignation of
the CEO of UBS on 5th July. The second phase of crisis starts from early October 2008,
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and subsequent rescue of the American
Insurance Group. The breakpoint from crisis period to post crisis has been identified as
15 May 2009, which is the day of the publication of stress test results and new capital
raising by US banks, and the LIBOR rate falling below 1%. In our study we consider
both phases of crisis period as one crisis period. Thus in our sample, 1 January 2004
to 2 July 2007 is considered as the pre-crisis period, 3 July 2007 to 15 May 2009 as the
crisis period and 16 May 2009 to 31 December 2013 as the post crisis period.
We do not find any notable change in the liquidity-jump relationship among the pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The volume, effective spread ratio and the change
in effective spread ratio remain dominant in determining the probability of jumps in
all three phases. The average McFadden R2 has risen from 19.24% to 22.87% from the
pre-crisis period to the crisis period, indicating a rise in explanatory power of liquidity
variables in the crisis period. However, the McFadden R2 of the post-crisis period is
22.47% which is similar to the crisis period.
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4.5.4. Price Discovery and Liquidity
The impact of liquidity variables on stock returns when there are jumps is examined by
applying the following mode
∆ntip = αj + β1Jumpj−1 + β2V olj + β3V olj ∗ Jumpj−1 + β4DPTBj + β5DPTBj ∗ Jumpj−1
+β6RSPDj + β7RSPDj ∗ Jumpj−1 + β8RESPDj + β9RESPDj ∗ Jumpj−1
+β10OBj + β11OBj ∗ Jumpj−1 + β12DDRSPDj + β13DDRSPDj ∗ Jumpj−1
+β14DDRESPDj + β15DDRESPDj ∗ Jumpj−1 + vj . (4.8)
A dummy variable representing the jump with one lag is added to the the model, as
well as the interaction of this dummy variable with all the liquidity variables. We can see
from Table 4.9 that the jump dummy variable with a lag is positively significant at 5% in
only 3 out of 10 regressions. Hence, we do not find strong evidence that a jump in a given
time period has forecasting value for the return prediction of the next period. Similarly
none of the interaction variables with the jump dummy are overwhelmingly significant
in these 10 regressions. Volume itself significantly impacts the contemporaneous return
(10 out of 10 regressions at 5% level) but the interaction with the dummy variable with
one lag is negatively significant in 5 out of 10 regressions. When we have a jump in one
period the volume has a reverse relationship with the return. When jumps increase the
uncertainty in the market, investors want to sell their assets immediately, the price drops
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and buyers are attracted to the respective stock to take advantage of low prices, thus
volume rises in the market. The quoted spread, RSPD, has a positive and significant (at
5% level) impact on the return, indicating that an increased difference in bid and ask
is associated with higher returns. The effective spread, RESPD, on the other hand is
negatively associated with the return. When the executed price moves away from the mid
quote, the return decreases. However, the interaction terms of these two spread variables
with the jump dummies are not significant in most of the 10 regressions. The order
imbalance variable, OB, is negatively significant in the regressions while the interaction
term with jump is not significant in any case.
Among the two change in spread variables, the change in effective spread, DDRESPD,
is found to be negatively significant in determining the return in 8 out of 10 regressions
whereas the other variable, change in quoted spread, DDRSPD, in only two regressions.
Hence it is the effective spread rather than the quoted spread that changes with the
return. However, when we incorporate the jump of the previous interval with these
variables, none of the variables shows any definite relationship with stock returns.
Overall, it seems that having jumps in the previous time interval does not have a
notable impact on the liquidity measures in explaining the variations in stock returns.
However, the liquidity measures themselves are found to have significant coefficients in
the return regressions. The average adjusted R2 value of these regressions are 36.90%.
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4.6. Conclusion
Our study examines the relationship of liquidity variables with the jump movements
of equity securities. Using ten of the largest Indian banking stocks we explore the
relationship of liquidity variables with the jump returns of these stocks.
We use the jump test developed by Lee and Mykland (2008) and observe jumps in
1.58% to 1.73% return observations in ten banking stocks. We implemented an event
study method to analyse the link between intra-day liquidity dynamics and properly
identified intra-day jumps regardless of the arrival of information. To complement the
non-parametric event study we apply a parametric analysis to assess the contribution
of liquidity shocks in both the occurrence of jumps and the price discovery process.
We find notable variations in the liquidity measures around the jump intervals in the
stocks. If we characterize liquidity by market spread, trading quantity and immediacy,
market liquidity conditions do improve around jumps. We examine the drivers behind
this volume surge and find that the rise in average trade size is more prominent than the
rise in number of trade. We show that the negative jumps are associated with higher
bid and ask depth. The results indicate that the demand of immediacy of traders may
cause jumps in stock returns. The Mann-Whitney test results also confirm the significant
changes in the liquidity variable during the jump intervals from non-jump intervals.
We examine the contemporaneous and lagged effects of liquidity factors on the prob-
ability of jump occurrences. We find evidence of both effects in different degrees for
jump occurrences. Our probit estimation shows that the explanatory power of contem-
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poraneous liquidity variables is much higher than the lagged variables for all jumps.
When we divide the sample into negative and positive jumps we observe that the liquid-
ity variables have more explanatory power in determining probability of negative than
that of positive jumps. It seems that negative jumps require changes in market activ-
ities to occur more than the positive jumps do. Among the liquidity variables, volume,
quoted spreads, effective spread shock and order imbalance are the key drivers behind
the occurrences of positive jumps. For negative jump occurrences the effective spread
and effective spread shock play important roles.
We extend the analysis by dividing our sample into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis
periods to examine changes in the dynamics between liquidity variables and jump oc-
currences during the crisis period. We do not observe substantial changes in the results
in those sub-samples indicating that the effects of liquidity variables are general.
Finally, several liquidity variables are shown to contribute to price discovery. Volume,
depth, quoted and effective spreads, effective spread shock and order imbalances are
significant contributors in the price discovery process. However, the post jump price
discovery process does not seem to be strongly related to the liquidity variables.
We find mostly similar results for the Indian market as reported by Boudt and
Petitjean (2014) and Jiang et al. (2011) for the U.S. market. Boudt and Petitjean
(2014) also cite the the demand for immediacy as the main driver of jumps. However,
their results show that both number of trade and average trade size contribute to the
increase in trade volume at the jump interval whereas for Indian market it is the average
trade size which is driving the volume surge in the Indian market. This difference in
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results indicate that information does not spread to the smaller investors in this market
as fast as in the U.S. market. We also see a different scenario in the liquidity spread
measure around the jump interval as spread decreases in the Indian market which is
opposite in the US market reported by both Boudt and Petitjean (2014) and Jiang et al.
(2011). We think that the difference is arising as the Indian market is not dealer driven
like the U.S. market who change their quoted spread based on their inventory condition.
However, our results conform to the U.S. market findings that liquidity variables such as
shocks in spread and market depth have significant explanatory powers regarding jump
occurrences.
The findings imply that changes in the liquidity conditions can provide indications
of jump arrival in the market. The role of news announcements in causing jumps is
well documented in the literature as we discussed in previous sections. However, these
studies fail to associate a notable proportion of jumps with news-arrivals. Our study is
an addition to the small number of papers offering an alternative explanation of jump
probabilities. Investors should be aware of changes in market liquidity conditions to take
necessary steps in protecting their assets from the jump risk.
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Table 4.1: List of Sample Banks
We have 41 Indian banks listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) at the end of 2013. Ten largest
banks in market capitalization shown below have been analyzed in this study. The first column shows
the Codes used in TRTH database to identify the banks. The second column shows the name and the
third column reports the market capitalization of each bank in thousand Indian Rupees (INR).
Codes Banks Market Cap.
HDBK HDFC Bank 1,484,995,359
SBI State Bank of
India
1,390,909,091
ICBK ICICI Bank 1,205,864,240
AXBK Axis Bank 608,925,751
KTKM Kotak Mahindra
Bank
485,807,555
BOB Bank of Baroda 278,659,424
PNBK Punjab National
Bank
243,360,705
INBK Indusind Bank
Limited
211,649,245
BOI Bank of India 180,260,454
CNBK Canara Bank 170,311,355
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Jumps in ten banking stocks
The 2nd column shows percentage of jump returns in total observations. In the fourth and 6th column
we report the percentage of positive and negative jumps in total number of jumps respectively. Total
Number of return observations: 87672. Jumps are measured using Lee and Mykland (2008) method.
Banks Total Jumps Percentage Positive jumps Percentage Negative Jumps Percentage
of total obs. of total jumps of total jumps
HDBK 1454 1.66% 761 52.34% 693 47.66%
SBI 1382 1.58% 742 53.69% 640 46.31%
ICBK 1465 1.67% 776 52.97% 689 47.03%
AXBK 1520 1.73% 869 57.17% 651 42.83%
KTKM 1453 1.66% 833 57.33% 620 42.67%
BOB 1421 1.62% 779 54.82% 642 45.18%
PNBK 1496 1.71% 827 55.28% 669 44.72%
INBK 1486 1.69% 857 57.67% 629 42.33%
BOI 1470 1.68% 825 56.12% 645 43.88%
CNBK 1468 1.67% 832 56.68% 636 43.32%
Average 1461.5 1.67% 810.1 55.41% 651.4 44.59%
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Table 4.4: Regression Results: Jumps vs Liquidity - Probit
The probit regression results estimated on ten bank data separately are summarized here. The
dependent variable is Jump occurrences, a binary variable, the independent variables are as described in
Equation 4.7. The average coefficients are shown in the second column. Column three and four report
the number of regressions where the positive coefficients are significant at 5% and 10% level respectively
and while column five and six show the number of negative coefficients significant at 5% and 10% level
respectively. The results are reported for all jumps in the first panel, for positive jumps in the second
panel and for negative jumps in the third panel.
Variables Coefficients Positive at 5% Positive at 10% Negative at 5% Negative at 10%
All Jumps
C -2.7217 0 0 10 0
MJUMP 1.4435 10 0 0 0
VOL 0.0000 10 0 0 0
DPTB 0.0000 4 0 0 0
RSPD 60.5248 8 0 0 0
RESPD 66.2902 10 0 0 0
OB 0.0000 0 0 2 2
DDRESPD 0.0521 9 1 0 0
DDRSPD -0.0004 1 0 3 0
McFadden R-sq. 0.1917
Positive Jumps
C -2.7216 0 0 10 0
JUMP_MKT 1.0295 10 0 0 0
VOL 0.0000 10 0 0 0
DPTB 0.0000 4 0 0 0
RSPD 150.7759 10 0 0 0
RESPD -17.9099 1 0 6 0
OB -0.0000 0 0 9 1
DDRESPD 0.0375 9 0 0 0
DDRSPD -0.0007 0 0 5 0
McFadden R-sq. 0.1153
Negative jumps
C -3.2497271 0 0 10 0
JUMP_MKT 1.3633 10 0 0 0
VOL -0.0000 1 0 4 0
DPTB 0.0000 6 0 0 0
RSPD 16.4809 3 1 1 0
RESPD 102.0840 10 0 0 0
OB 0.0000 9 0 0 0
DDRESPD 0.0534 10 0 0 0
DDRSPD -0.0001 0 0 3 0
McFadden R-sq. 0.3500
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Table 4.5: Regression Results: Jumps vs Liquidity - Logit
The logit regression results estimated on ten bank data separately are summarized here. The dependent
variable is Jump occurrences, a binary variable, the independent variables are as described in Equation
4.7. The average coefficients are shown in the second column. Column three and four report the number
of regressions where the positive coefficients are significant at 5% and 10% level respectively and while
column five and six show the number of negative coefficients significant at 5% and 10% level
respectively. The results are reported for all jumps in the first panel, for positive jumps in the second
panel and for negative jumps in the third panel.
Variables Coefficients Positive at 5% Positive at 10% Negative at 5% Negative at 10%
All Jumps
C -5.3756 0 0 10 0
MJUMP 2.9173 10 0 0 0
VOL1 0.0000 9 1 0 0
DPTB 0.0000 4 2 0 0
RSPD 120.2242 8 0 0 0
RESPD 140.3423 10 0 0 0
OB -0.0000 0 0 2 1
DDRESPD 0.1080 10 0 0 0
DDRSPD -0.0008 0 0 4 0
McFadden R-sq. 0.1798
Positive Jumps
C -5.5192 0 0 10 0
MJUMP 2.3664 10 0 0 0
VOL1 0.0000 10 0 0 0
DPTB 0.0000 4 0 0 0
RSPD 333.8768 10 0 0
RESPD -40.0506 1 0 4 0
OB -0.0000 0 0 9 1
DDRESPD 0.0771 9 1 0 0
DDRSPD -0.0013 0 0 5 0
McFadden R-sq. 0.1032
Negative jumps
C -6.7348 0 0 10 0
JUMP_MKT 2.9808 10 0 0 0
VOL1 -0.0000 1 0 4 0
DPTB 0.0000 6 0 0 0
RSPD 27.5518 4 0 1 0
RESPD 220.2321 10 0 0 0
DDRESPD 0.1142 10 0 0 0
DDRSPD -0.0001 0 0 0 1
McFadden R-sq. 0.3240
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Table 4.6: Regression results with 1 lag liquidity variables
The probit regression results estimated on ten bank data separately are summarized here. The
dependent variable is Jump occurrences, a binary variable, the independent variables are as described in
Equation 4.7 in one order lagged form. The average coefficients are shown in the second column.
Column three and four report the number of regressions where the positive coefficients are significant at
5% and 10% level respectively and while column five and six show the number of negative coefficients
significant at 5% and 10% level respectively. The results are reported for all jumps in the first panel, for
positive jumps in the second panel and for negative jumps in the third panel.
Variables Coefficients Positive at 5% Positive at 10% Negative at 5% Negative at 10%
All Jumps
C -2.2233 10
MJUMP 0.8111 10
VOL 0.0000 7
DPTB -0.0000 7 1
RSPD 17.2791 2 1
RESPD 10.8049 4 1
OB -0.0000 2
DDRESPD 0.0165 6 2
DDRSPD -0.0002 2 2
McFadden R-sq. 0.0154
Positive Jumps
C -2.6401 10
MJUMP 0.7594 8 1
VOL 0.0000 9
DPTB -0.0000 7 1
RSPD 25.5296 3
RESPD -3.2890 1 1
OB -0.0000 5
DDRESPD 0.0196 5
DDRSPD -0.0006 2 1
McFadden R-sq. 0.0129
Negative jumps
C -2.8059 10
JUMP_MKT 0.9100 10
VOL 0.0000 2
DPTB -0.0000 3
RSPD 10.0960 2
RESPD 22.1471 9
OB 0.0000 2
DDRESPD 0.0155 5
DDRSPD -0.0002 5 1
McFadden R-sq. 0.0217603
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Table 4.7: Regression results of jumps on contemporaneous and lagged liquidity
variables
The probit regression results estimated on ten bank data separately are summarized here. The
dependent variable is Jump occurrences, a binary variable, the independent variables are the
contemporaneous and one order lag of the liquidity . The average coefficients are shown in the second
column. Column three and four report the number of regressions where the positive coefficients are
significant at 5% and 10% level respectively and while column five and six show the number of negative
coefficients significant at 5% and 10% level respectively. The results are reported for all jumps only.
Variables Coefficients Positive at 5% Positive at 10% Negative at 5% Negative at 10%
Dependent Variable: All Jumps
C -2.6067 10
MJUMP 1.3340 10
VOL 0.0000 10
DPTB 0.0000 10
RSPD 56.0611 8
RESPD 80.5939 10
OB 0.0000 2 1
DDRESPD 0.0409 9
DDRSPD -0.0005 3
MJUMP(-1) 0.7133 9
VOL(-1) -0.0000 8
DPTB(-1) -0.0000 10
RSPD(-1) -1.2645 1 1 1
RESPD(-1) -30.6054 6 2
OB(-1) -0.0000 5 1
DDRESPD(-1) 0.0317 9
DDRSPD(-1) -0.0003 1 3
McFadden R-sq. 0.2402
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Table 4.8: Regression results to showing the impact of GFC
The probit regression results estimated on ten bank data separately are summarized here. The
dependent variable is Jump occurrences, a binary variable, the independent variables are as described in
Equation 4.7. The average coefficients are shown in the second column. Column three and four report
the number of regressions where the positive coefficients are significant at 5% and 10% level respectively
and while column five and six show the number of negative coefficients significant at 5% and 10% level
respectively. The results are reported for pre-crisis period in the first panel, for crisis period in the
second panel and for post crisis period in the third panel.
Coefficients Positive at 5% Positive at 10% Negative at 5% Negative at 10%
Pre-crisis
C -2.5015 10
MJUMP 1.3289 10
VOL 0.0000 10
DPTB 0.0000 5
RSPD 15.4059 3
RESPD 76.5011 10
OB 0.0000 1 1 1
DDRESPD 0.0575 9
DDRSPD 0.0049 1 1
McFadden R-sq. 0.1924
Crisis
C -2.7774 10
MJUMP 1.4725 10
VOL 0.0000 8 1
DPTB 0.0000 7 2
RSPD -81.1604 2
RESPD 76.3678 10
OB 0.0000 1 1
DDRESPD 0.0784 10
DDRSPD 0.0073 3
McFadden R-sq. 0.2287
Post-crisis
C -3.3282 10
MJUMP 1.6466 10
VOL 0.0000 8 1
DPTB 0.0000 8
RSPD 74.4250 7 1
RESPD 117.2170 10
OB 0.0000 1 2
DDRESPD 0.0534 10
DDRSPD -0.0002 2
McFadden R-sq. 0.2247
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Table 4.9: Regression of price discovery
The OLS regression results estimated on ten bank data separately are summarized here. The dependent
variable is stock return, the independent variables are as described in Equation 4.8. The average
coefficients are shown in the second column. Column three and four report the number of regressions
where the positive coefficients are significant at 5% and 10% level respectively and while column five and
six show the number of negative coefficients significant at 5% and 10% level respectively.
Variables Coefficients Positive at 5% Positive at 10% Negative at 5% Negative at 10%
C 0.0011 10
JUMP01(-1) 0.0006 3 1
VOL 1.5956E-08 10
VOL*JUMP01(-1) -7.208E-09 4 1
DPTB 4.8904E-10 5 5
DPTB*JUMP01(-1) -1.48723E-09
RSPD 0.9433 10
RSPD*JUMP01(-1) 0.7797 3
RESPD -0.8721 10
RESPD*JUMP01(-1) 0.1210 1 2
OB -7.853E-09 10
OB*JUMP01(-1) -2.72636E-09
DDRESPD -0.0001 8
DDRESPD*JUMP01(-1) 2.3E-06 2 1 1 1
DDRSPD -2.917E-08 2 1
DDRSPD*JUMP01(-1) -2.21449E-06 4
Adjusted R-sq. 0.3690
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Figure 4.1: Return around the jump observations
The average returns at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times are shown here.
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Figure 4.2: Volume around the jump observations
The average trade volumes at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times are shown
here.
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Figure 4.3: Number of trade around jump observations
The average number of trades at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times are
shown here.
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Figure 4.4: Average Trade Size
The average trade sizes at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times are shown
here.
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Figure 4.5: Depth of ask around jump observations
The average depth of ask prices at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times are
shown here.
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Figure 4.6: Depth of bid around jump observations
The average depth of bid prices at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times are
shown here.
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Figure 4.7: RSPD around the jump observations
The average quoted spread (RSPD) ratios at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump
times are shown here.
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Figure 4.8: RESPD around the jump observations
The average effective spread ratios (RESPD) at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after
jump times are shown here.
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Figure 4.9: OB around the jump observations
The average order imbalances (OB) at 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes before and after jump times
are shown here.
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5 Network Analysis of Systemic Risk: The
Case of Indian Banks
5.1. Introduction
The systemic effect of the banking network has been a matter of concern for regulators
for the last few decades (Freixas et al., 2000, Gauthier et al., 2012 and Billio et al., 2012).
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 only reinforced their concern. It was the
network of banks and financial institutions through which shocks propagated first to the
financial sector and subsequently to the real sectors during the GFC. Thus, a measure of
the magnitude and strength of network connectivity within the financial system provides
a indication of the extent of systemic risk in an economy. In this chapter, we concentrate
on the network analysis of systemic risk for the banking sector of India.
Systemic risk can be defined as the likelihood of propagating financial adversity such as
illiquidity, insolvency and losses through a network system of interconnected institutions
(Billio et al., 2012). The interconnectedness of financial institutions may arise from
investing in the same asset (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008), their herding behaviour,
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stem from regularity requirements (Acharya, 2009), or their investment in illiquid assets
expecting that they will borrow from each other in shocks (Bhattacharya and Gale,
1985) among many other explanations. A number of methods has been used in the
literature and practised to identify systemic risk1. Some of the methods are based on
a particular source of systemic risk or channel of transmission. In contrast, a growing
number of systemic risk measures use market prices of securities issued by the financial
institutions. Here the logic is that in an efficient market the market price absorbs all the
information necessary to measure risks (Benoit et al., 2016). We use a method proposed
by Dungey et al. (2017) based on market prices in this study.
Not many papers on systemic risk have focused on the Indian banks, and even fewer use
network analysis. Acharya and Kulkarni (2010) is the first notable effort in estimating
the systemic risk contribution of the Indian banks by using market based data and
analysing the impact of ownership structure on bank vulnerability to crisis. Gupta
and Jayadev (2016) use equity prices to measure the systemic risk of Indian banks and
examine the impact of business strategy choice on such risks. Aggarwal et al. (2013) on
the other hand uses the average of the percentile ranking of three measures of systemic
risk - Granger Causality, Marginal Expected Shortfall and Conditional Value at Risk in
developing a single systemic risk index (SRI) for a firm. One contribution of the current
paper is to enrich the network literature of this fast-growing but understudied market.
The increasing openness of India’s economy is exposing its banking sector to the global
financial system postulating the need for measuring and monitoring the systemic risk of
1See Bisias et al. (2012) for a wide list of systemic risk measurement methods.
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this sector.
The monitoring of systemic risk in India is carried out by the Financial Stability and
Development Council (FSDC). A regular Systemic Risk Survey has been instituted by
the Reserve Bank of India to obtain the views of market participants and stakeholders to
build up an assessment of systemic risk. The FSDC devised a series of stability indices
and maps to track movements in the various risk dimensions which may affect the entire
financial system. The network model we apply in this study complements the existing
models used by the FSDC in this direction.
We use the stock returns of 40 listed commercial banks of India for the period of 2011
to 2015. First we apply a multivariate Granger causality test to establish statistically
significant connections between each pair of banks. To measure the strength of each
of the links we measure the weights of the link by applying the forecast error variance
decomposition method of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). By combining the weight matrix
with the Granger connection matrix we finally derive the network of banks where only
the statistically significant links with their respective weights are retained. From this
network matrix the most systemically active banks can be identified. We also identify
the banks that are most vulnerable to the change in stock returns of other banks within
the network. An analysis on the daily rolling window of the network measures shows
that the overall network completeness increases during our sample period.
The second contribution of this paper is to show that market liquidity and volatility
are related with the network completeness for the first time in literature. Decreases in
liquidity and increases in volatility heighten the completeness of networks. In addition,
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the systematically risky banks are also found to be the more active banks in strengthening
network completeness. Not many papers show the relationship between systematic risk
and systemic risk of firms. Thus, the third contribution of this paper is to shed light on
this relationship increasing the understanding of the sources of these risks.
The remainder of the chapter is presented in 3 more sections. In section 5.2 we describe
methodologies and data used in this study. The results are presented in section 5.3. The
conclusion is drawn in Section 5.4.
5.2. Methods and data
In detecting the Indian bank network we combine the methods applied by Billio et al.
(2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) following Dungey et al. (2017). To measure the
connectedness between banks we need to identify statistically significant relationships
amongst the banks. Following Billio et al. (2012) we apply Granger causality tests
to establish the edges of the network nodes. The directionality of the relationships is
found from these tests. Granger causality tests suggest causality if past values of one
time series, Y1, stock return series in our case - contain information that help forecast
another return series, Y2. These causalities can be represented as a VAR2
Yt =
k∑
j=1
βjYt−j + εt, (5.1)
with j = 1, ..., p. Granger causality between banking stock return Yi and Ys can be
assessed from the WALD test
2Here the constant term is suppressed without loss of generality.
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WT = [e.vec( ˆII)]′[e(Vˆ
⊗
(Y ′Y )−1)e′]−1[e.vec(IˆI),
in which Y is the matrix of independent variables from (5.1), vec ˆ(II) denotes the row
vectorized coefficient of IˆI = [β1, ...., βk], Vˆ = T−1
∑T
t=1 εˆtεˆt
′ and e is the k × 2(2k + 1)
selection matrix
e =

0 1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 0

,
where each row of e picks one of the coefficients to set to zero under the non-causal
hypothesis Yi → Ys. The matrix A records the Granger causality test results as a binary
entries as
A = [aij ], (5.2)
where,
aij =

0, if Yidoes not Granger cause Yj ,
1, if YiGranger causes Yj .
(5.3)
The direction of the edges, which we will refer to Granger links henceforth, is only one
aspect of the relationship between two banks in the network. Another important aspect
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is the strength of the relationship which we examine by assigning weight, Wij to each
of the significant relationship existing in the network. We use the Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009) (henceforth, DY) framework of variance decomposition to obtain these weights
and develop the weight matrix Wij = [wij]. The spillover is measured based on forecast
error variance decompositions in a vector auto-regression framework. Suppose that j’s
contribution to entity i′s H step ahead generalized forecast error variance, φgij(H) is
φgig(H) =
V −1jj
∑H−1
h=0 (e′iBhV ej)2∑H−1
h=0 (e′iBhV B′hej)
, (5.4)
where, H = 1,2,3,....,and V is the variance covariance matrix for the error vector εt,Vjj
is the standard deviation of the error term j and ei is the selection vector with one as the
ith element and zero otherwise. Bi is the coefficient matrix as Bi = φ1Bi−1 + φ2Bi−2 +
.......+φkBi−k with B0 an n×n identity matrix and Bi = 0 for i < 0. Each entry of the
generalized variance decomposition is normalized by the row sum as
wij =
θgij(H)∑n
j=1 θ
g
ij(H)
, (5.5)
where ∑nj=1wi,j = 1 and ∑ni,j=1 and ∑ni,j=1 = n. We call these values DY weights.
We combine the matrices A and W to form the weighted network by developing the
adjacency matrix A˜ as
A˜ = A
⊙
W, (5.6)
where ⊙ is the Hadamard product. Each element of the adjacency matrix A˜ captures
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the statistical significance and weight of connectedness between the banks. Henceforth
we will call them GDY weights. The completeness of the network is measured as
C =
∑n
i,j=1i 6=j a˜ij∑n
i,j=1i 6=j wij
. (5.7)
A high C means banks are highly connected to each other and are subject to domino
effects in the case of a large shock in any part of the banking system.
Based on the proposed econometric framework we test the following empirical hypo-
theses:
Hypothesis 1 The change in number of Granger links in the network is negatively
related with the change in liquidity of the market. As liquidity conditions deteriorate
banking stocks tend to depend on each other more.
Hypothesis 2 The change in the strength of the links expressed as DY weights is
positively related to the volatility of the market. In the volatile market conditions the
linked banking institutions have a tendency to depend more on each other.
Hypothesis 3 The change in the completeness of the network, given by GDY weights
is related to both liquidity and volatility of the market. If liquidity and volatility affect one
component each on the network connectivity both may have impact on the completeness
of the network.
Hypothesis 4 The banks with higher systematic risk or beta are also more active
participants in the networks.
Hypothesis 5 As market forces are not as strong as the developed economies, the
Indian banking network is more associated with the negative shocks than the positive
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ones, and exhibits asymmetry.
5.2.1. Data
We examine the connectedness of Indian banks through market based data in an attempt
to identify the vulnerability of Indian banks to systemic risk. We use daily stock returns
of the banks and measure the connectedness of the returns to form the network. Daily
prices of the 41 listed commercial banks of India are collected from Thomson Reuters
Tick History database provided by SIRCA. Our sample covers the period of 2011 to 2015
and we have complete data for 40 banks for this time period. Table 5.1. lists these 40
sample banks.
5.3. Results
The Granger causality tests shows the statistically significant edges among the Indian
banks. Table 5.2 reports the number of outward edges from each the banks in the
second column and the number of inward edges in the next column. SBI have the
highest influence on the other banks affecting 19 other banks in our sample. KBNK,
SBNK and FED each has 14, 14 and 12 outward edges respectively as shown in the
Table. Among the 40 banks, HDBK, BOB, and SBKB are the least affecting banks as
they only have 2, 4 and 5 statistically significant outward links respectively towards any
other bank during our sample period. Mensah and Premaratne (2017) also identify SBI
as the most connected bank of India in their multi-country Granger causality tests.
The banks which have the highest inward edges meaning that they are affected by
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other banks, are VJBK, DENA and LVLS. Conversely, HDBK, ICBK, JKBK, PNBK
and SBI are the least three affected banks in our sample. On average each bank Granger
causes 8.65 other banks. The banks that are most active in term of both inward and
outward edges are VJBK, DENA and KBNK (32, 29 and 28 respectively). On the other
hand the least active banks are HDBK, KTKM and ICBK.
To get a complete picture of impacts of one bank on the other we apply the framework
of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). The DY weights are shown in Table 5.3. In terms of
outward DY weights, the top three banks are UCBK, SBNK and IDBI. These banks
may not have the widest Granger links, but each of their impacts are strong. JKBK,
HDBK and STNCy exhibit the weakest DY connectivity with other banks. Among these
banks, HDBK possesses low Granger causalities as well. UCBK, SBNK and IDBI are
associated with the strongest inward DY weights. These banks are also the banks with
strongest outward DY connectivity on other banks. JKBK, HDBK and STNCy again
are associated with the weakest inward DY weights. Here we observe that the banks
with strong (weak) outward DY weights are also associated with strong (weak) inward
DY weights.
Combining the Granger links and DY weights we draw the complete picture of the
network amongst the Indian banks as shown in Equation 5.6 and reported in Table
5.4. According to these results the three most important banks for systemic risk (or
with highest outward GDY weights) of the Indian banking sector are KBNK, SBNK
and CRBK. The lowest systemic risks stem from HDBK, BOB and JKBK. The three
most vulnerable banks with inward GDY weights are VJBK, DENA and IDBI. It is noted
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here that these findings could not be reached by concentrating only on Granger causality
tests or DY weight measurements. Thus combining these two sets of results discloses
information which may not be evident from the individual tests. The completeness
measure (by using equation 5.7) for this Indian banking network is 0.2852. The banking
networks illustrated in Figure 5.1 shows the complexity of the network.
5.3.1. Rolling window dynamic analysis of the network
Here we provide a dynamic analysis to comprehend the changes in the Indian banking
network during the years in our sample. We measure the network connectivity variables,
Granger, DY, and GDY on a daily rolling window basis. The estimation window is 20%
of our sample period. The window covers around one year of data, thus allows us to
account market activities of a full cycle and analyse results from the beginning of 2012.
The plots of these variables are shown in Figure 5.2. We observe an overall upward trend
with periodic peak and troughs in the average number of Granger links shown in panel
(a) during the period of 2012 to 20153. After stock markets around the world plummeted
in the second half of 2011, amid the Greek debt crisis, markets underwent a continuous
recovery in 2012 following the February 12 second EU bailout agreement in that year.
After a rise in early 2013, the number of edges obtained from Granger causality tests
remains relatively stable up to mid-2014. Then we observe another surge after mid-2014
towards mid-2015 followed by a downfall afterwards. After the declaration of Indian
general election results the stock market was buoyant in May, 2014. Stock markets show
3We have taken 20% of our sample as the rolling window, thus the plots report variables from 2012 to
2015
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reactions after the steep crash of Chinese capital market in June 2015 which continues
in July and August. If we link the movements in Granger connectivity with these
events, we observe that the connectivity increases in calm market conditions. However,
Granger links are only one component of network connectivity in our model. According
to Acemoglu et al. (2015) the increase in links or diversification makes the financial
system less fragile unless any negative market shock crosses a certain level of severity;
beyond a threshold level, interconnections may trigger propagating the shock. Thus
during calm periods the banks may show a tendency to create links with each other as
a strategy for reducing small shocks.
The DY spillover index, the other component of the network connectivity in our model
plotted in panel (b) of Figure 5.2 maintains a stable movement during 2012 to 2014
followed by a sudden decline in its value with few spikes in 2015. The decline may have
eased the pressure on the overall network created by the increasing number of Granger
links. The combined measure GDY weights plotted in panel (c) combines the effects of
changes in Granger edges and DY weights. It exhibits a slowly increasing trend which
indicates that this measurement is ultimately dominated by the Granger edges. Thus the
increasing trend of the GDY weights increases the chance that a negative shock above
threshold may be propagated through the network of the banking sector. We also show
a volatility measure, realized variance (RV ) in the same rolling window in panel (d) and
observe an increase in volatility in the market first in mid-2012 and again in mid-2014.
The volatility of the market decreases largely after mid-2014 which corresponds with the
decrease in the DY measure but not in the Granger links.
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From the Granger and DY time series plots a structural change from mid-2014 is
visible. After this period we see a steep upward trend in Granger links and the opposite
trend in DY weights. We can identify this change more clearly from the rolling window
plots of higher moments of our combined network variable, GDY in Figure 5.3. The
rolling window plots of standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of GDY show that
until mid-2014 these measures of higher moments are stable. After mid-2014 we see
a sharp increase in all of these measures, indicating a substantial change in network
topology.
The general election in India was held from 7the April to 12th May of 2014 and the
result was declared on 16th May 2014. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies
won the right to form the largest majority government since the 1984 general election.
Mr. Narendra Modi, known for his pro-business vision was nominated as the Prime
Minister from BJP and took oath on 26 May. The market was buoyant since then until
it was negatively affected by the Chinese market turmoil in the second half of 2015.
Therefore, we have divided our sample period into two sub samples, one from January
2011 to May 2014 and another is from June 2014 to December 2015 and compute the
network connectivity of these two periods separately the report the changes in Table 5.5.
The network is thicker in the second phase as the number of Granger links increased
from 298 to 457, whereas the average strength for each link decreased only slightly from
0.0260 to 0.0251. The completeness measure shows that the network is stronger in the
second phase than in the first which is attributed to higher number of new links created
in the second phase than the number of links removed. Overall the results indicate that
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after the general election the network of Indian Banks becomes stronger and increases
the risk of systemic spread of risks of individual banks upon occurrences of large shocks.
This finding is also confirmed by a higher standard deviation of GDY after the election
from Figure 5.3.
5.3.2. Network, liquidity and volatility
We analyse the impact of market liquidity and volatility on net connectivity expressed
as the number of average Granger links, DY weight and DGY weight of the whole
network. As the market liquidity measure we use the ratio of daily effective spread
(RESPD). Here, RESPD = (LastPrice−MidQuote)/MidQuote, whereMidQuote =
1/2(BestAskPrice+BestBidPrice). Market volatility is represented by realized volat-
ility (RV ) where RV [0,T ] = ∑[T/∆n]j=1 |∆nj p|2 as ∆nj p is the return of any asset at time
j. Both of the liquidity and volatility measures are computed for each of the banking
stocks on daily basis by taking data from their intra-day 5-minute observations. All the
variables are taken on a daily rolling window basis and equally weighted for the whole
sample of banks.
The following model is used to observe the impact of one order lag values of RESPD
and RV on the net variables separately
Networkt = α+ β1RESPDt−1 + β2RVt−1 + εt, (5.8)
where t = 1, 2, 3.....N reflects the days and Network implies one of the Granger, DY and
GDY measures we use in the previous sections. The regression results are summarized
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in Table 5.6. We use the first difference of the variables as the variables are found non-
stationary at level and stationary at first difference in Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
unit root tests.
When Granger is used as the dependent variable the liquidity measure RESPD is
negatively significant at 5% indicating that increase in spread decreases the significant
linkages among the banks. Increasing the spread is a sign of worsening market liquidity
conditions and it seems from the result that when liquidity is low investors become more
sensitive in trading and become aware of what is happening to the similar or peer stocks.
As a result, the connectivity among the stocks tightens. The volatility measure in this
regression is positive though the coefficient is not statistically significant.
The liquidity variable is positive but significant only at the 10% level when DY is used
as the network connectivity level. However, the volatility measure RV has a significant
and positive coefficient at 5% for this variable. The positive relationship can be explained
as higher market volatility intensifying the strength of each of the relationships within
the network. As DY is a measure of variance decomposition it is expected that DY is
more driven by the volatility measure. The result can be interpreted as when the market
is more volatile the banks with linkages between them become more dependent on each
other as argued by Dungey et al. (2017). These results support both of Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2 that Granger links positively negativey related to market liquidity
while DY weights are positively related to market volatility.
Our combined network measure GDY is more affected by Granger as discussed in
a previous section. Consequently, GDY is significantly affected by the liquidity or in
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this case, lack of liquidity. The RV does not have a significant coefficient against this
variable. Thus the completeness of the network in Indian banking sector is bolstered by
the deteriorating liquidity conditions as indicated by its negative coefficient. This result
does not support our Hypothesis 3 which predicts that both liquidity and volatility have
impacts on the network completeness measure.
5.3.3. Systemic risk and systematic risk
Systemic risk is generally associated with a shock that can be propagated to a certain
industry and economy. On the other hand systematic risk is defined as the market risk
faced by a certain unit such as a bank. Systematic risk is determined based on the co-
movement of an asset with the market as a whole and expressed as beta. Todorov and
Bollerslev (2010) show that beta should be decomposed into continuous beta and jump
beta representing the asset’s different sensitivities towards the continuous movements
and jump movements of the market (see also Bollerslev et al., 2016 and Alexeev et al.,
2017). We examine the cross-sectional relationship between the decomposed measure of
systematic risk with the network connectivity variables.
For this analysis we use the beta of Indian Banks computed in Chapter 2. The average
monthly values of continuous beta (BetaC) and jump beta (BetaJ) for our sample period
of 2011 to 2015 and the combined network variables GDY outward and GDY inward
weights are shown in Table 5.7. The high beta banks are more sensitive to changes in the
market, and thus may also be more active agents of systemic risk. We run cross-sectional
regressions to check the relationship between these two types of risk variables and report
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the results in Table 5.8. As BetaC and BetaJ are highly correlated we run separate
regressions to capture the relationships. Both the continuous and jump betas are highly
positively related with both the inward and outward GDY connectivities supporting the
notion that systematically vulnerable banks are also systemically active. However, the
magnitude of the relation of both betas are higher with inward GDY weights than the
outward DGY weights implying that systematically vulnerable banks are also the more
vulnerable recipients of systemic risk.
The natural step of the study at this point is to examine which component of the
network connectivity is more related to the betas. Table 5.9 shows the regression results
of Granger and DY outward and inward connectivities on BetaC and BetaJ . The
results show that it is the DY outward and inward weights which are related to the
betas and the relationships are positive. We do not find strong relationships of betas
with the Granger links. The coefficient of betas are significant with only outward
Granger links at 5% level in case of BetaC and 10% level in case of BetaD. Thus
the positive relationship between systematic risk or betas of banks with the network
connectivity is mainly transmitting through the DY weights rather than Granger links.
Overall our results show evidence in favour of our Hypothesis 4 that banks with higher
systematic risk are also more active participants in the networks.
5.3.4. Network based on volatility
Connectivity of a network can be formed by taking into consideration the volatility
of its nodes - the banks in our case. Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) note that volatility
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connectedness is particularly more useful during the crisis period. We have taken daily
realized variance (RV ) as a measure of volatility of the banks by applying the following
formula shown in Chapter 2
RV [0,T ] =
[T/∆n]∑
j=1
|∆nj p|2, (5.9)
where ∆nj p = pj−pj−1, j = 1, 2, . . . , [T/∆n] is the observed return series of log price, pj
for every ∆n interval. We have used 15 minute stock returns of the 40 sample banks in
computing daily RV s of these banking stocks as this interval is found optimal in Chapter
3 in minimizing the market micro-structure noise in Indian high frequency data.
The rolling window plots of the network variables, Granger, DY and GDY computed
based on volatility are shown in Figure 5.4. The Granger plot in panel a shows that we
can identify a larger number of links between the banks when we use volatility instead
of return in measuring Granger links between the banks. The average Granger link of
volatility based network of the Indian bank is 28.53 per bank whereas this number is
8.65 in return based network. The weight measure of the network, DY , shown in panel
b is slightly higher, 0.9087 than the return based network measure of 0.8642. Ultimately
the resulted complete measure of the network, GDY , shown in panel c is much higher
in RV based network than the return based network (0.7632 versus 0.1638). Thus using
volatility in developing the network may enable us to reveal the links between the nodes
of a network that may not be possible when we use other variables and may be more
useful in crisis periods.
Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2008) introduce the concept of realized semi-variances where
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RV is decomposed into upside and downside realized semi-variances
RV = RS+ +RS.− (5.10)
Here RS+ = ∑[T/∆n]j=1 |∆nj p|21{∆nj p = 0} and RS− = ∑[T/∆n]j=1 |∆nj p|21{∆nj p < 0}
where 1 is an indicator function. Thus RS+is measured by using only positive and zero
returns and RS−is computed by using only negative and zero returns.
These variances may reveal new source of information especially the asymmetry in any
variable from downside and upside volatilities. Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2008) shows that
negative returns are more associated with future volatility than the positive returns. We
also show in Chapter 4 that negative jumps have more intensive relationship with the
market condition than the positive jumps. Thus, network connectivity may exhibit
asymmetry as Baruník et al. (2016) find asymmetry in volatility spillover. The market
forces in India are not as efficient and active as we observe in developed economies. It
is more likely in such a market that firms as well as the investors will be more cautious
and exhibit herding behaviour and thus increase connectedness from the resulting panic
in the face of negative volatility than the positive volatility. By using negative and
positive realized semi-variance separately in developing the network connectivity meas-
ures of Indian banks, we examine this asymmetry in network connectivity, illustrated in
Figure 5.5. In panel a, the rolling window of total volatility based connectivity DGY
is presented. In panel b, DGY originating from bad and good volatility are presented
as two separate line. As it is clear from the graph that the two series are not coin-
cident, indicating asymmetry in network connectivity. The difference in both types of
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connectivity is highlighted in panel c. Here, the negative domain represents the periods
when connectivity from bad volatility dominates the connectivity from the good volat-
ility. We observe the dominance of negative domain from 2012 to the first half of 2015.
The positive domain is dominant only in the second half of 2015. Thus a striking dis-
parity in connectivity measure clearly indicates asymmetry in connectivity measures in
the Indian banking sector. The results support our 5th hypothesis that Indian banking
network connectivity is more related with the negative shocks than the positive ones.
5.4. Conclusion
We examine the systemic risk of the Indian banking sector through the network analysis
based on stock returns of 40 listed commercial banks of India for the period of 2011
to 2015. First we apply Granger causality tests to establish statistically significant
connections or edges between each pair of banks. We find that during the whole sample
period 346 bilateral relationship exist among the 40 banks or on average each bank has
8.65 connections with other banks.
To measure the strength of each of the links we measure the weights of the link by
applying the variance decomposition method applied by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). By
combining the weight matrix with the Granger connection matrix we derive the network
of banks where only the statistically significant links with their respective weights are
retained. According to this network matrix KBNK, SBNK and CRBK are the three
most systemically active banks. On the other hand, VJBK, DENA and IDBI are the
most vulnerable banks whose returns are affected by the change in other banks in the
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network.
We examine the change in network characteristics over time during our sample period
by computing the above measurements on a daily rolling window basis. We observe that
the number of significant edges shows an upward trend despite stable DY weights over
time. The combined measure - GDY weight also shows an overall upward trend as it is
dominated by the changes in Granger links.
We observe a shift in the network connectivity after the general election was held in
India in May, 2014. Therefore we divide our sample into pre-election and post-election
periods and find that connectivity in the post-election period increases substantially
mainly because of new Granger links added to the network.
Regression results suggest the Granger links of the network are affected by liquidity
changes in the market while the DY weights are more affected by the volatility changes.
Ultimately changes in GDY , the combined connectivity is related to the market liquidity
as the GDY in our sample is dominated by the Granger links.
A cross-sectional regression show that systematic risk is positively related to network
connectivity. Both of our decomposed systematic risk measures - continuous beta and
jump beta - of banks are used in the regressions and found statistically significant for both
outward and inward connectivity measures. However, the magnitude of the relations are
higher for the inward connectivities than for the outward connectivities.
We measure the network connectivity based on a volatility measure, realized variance,
RV . The volatility based network shows higher connectivity than the network based on
stock returns and may offer a better measure in crisis periods. By using positive and
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negative semi-variances we show that asymmetry exists in volatility based connectivity
in networks.
Our results are important for the financial sector regulators as they can apply the
method in judging the overall systemic risk of the banks and observe its changes over
time. The two aspects of the network strength - Granger links and DY weights are
affected by different variables. Hence it is important to determine which of these two
variables is more active in a given state of the banking network so that regulators can
pinpoint their focus in controlling the correct set of factors. This will increase the
effectiveness of the policies taken by the regulators in mitigating the systemic risk of the
financial system.
Further analysis can be done to explore the sources of networking measures that are
not used in this study. Examining network connectivity among different subgroups of the
banks may also generate findings with important policy implications. These banks are
likely to be affected by the interactions with the global financial system. One limitation
of this paper is not accounting this effect. A network analysis based on the flow of
assets/liabilities with local and foreign banks may render different aspects of the network
not captured in our market price based method.
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Table 5.1: List of Sample Banks
We take 40 Indian banks listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE). The first column shows
the Codes used in TRTH database to identify the banks.
Codes Banks Codes Banks
ADBK Andhra Bank JKBK Jammu and
Kashmir Bank
ALBK Allahabad Bank KARU Karur Vysya Bank
AXBK Axis Bank KBNK Karnataka Bank
BMBK Bank of
Maharashtra
KTKM Kotak Mahindra
Bank
BOB Bank of Baroda LVLS Lakshmi Vilas
Bank
BOI Bank of India ORBC Oriental Bank of
Commerce
CBI Central Bank of
India
PNBK Punjab National
Bank
CNBK Canara Bank PUNA Punjab & Sind
Bank
CRBK Corporation Bank SBI State Bank of India
CTBK City Union Bank SBKB State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur
DCBA Dev. Credit Bank SBKM State Bank of
Mysore
DENA Dena Bank SBKT State Bank of
Travancore
DNBK Dhanlaxmi Bank
Ltd
SBNK Syndicate Bank
FED Federal Bank SIBK South Indian Bank
HDBK HDFC Bank STNCy Standard
Chartered Bank
ICBK ICICI Bank UBOI United Bank of
India
IDBI IDBI Bank UCBK UCO Bank
INBA Indian Bank UNBK Union Bank of
India
INBK Indusind Bank
Limited
VJBK Vijaya Bank
IOBK Indian Overseas
Bank
YESB Yes Bank
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Table 5.2: Granger links among the Indian banks.
These measures are derived from the multivariate Granger causality tests between Indian banks
and expressed as count numbers
Banks Outward Inward Banks Outward Inward
ADBK 8 11 JKBK 10 0
ALBK 9 13 KARU 7 9
AXBK 9 1 KBNK 14 14
BMBK 8 7 KTKM 6 2
BOB 4 9 LVLS 9 17
BOI 11 9 ORBC 9 4
CBI 8 16 PNBK 9 0
CNBK 10 11 PUNA 10 10
CRBK 8 7 SBI 19 0
CTBK 7 9 SBKB 5 15
DCBA 6 5 SBKM 9 8
DENA 9 20 SBKT 8 8
DNBK 4 11 SBNK 14 8
FED 12 2 SIBK 6 8
HDBK 2 0 STNCy 11 5
ICBK 8 0 UBOI 8 4
IDBI 9 16 UCBK 8 6
INBA 8 9 UNBK 10 9
INBK 7 15 VJBK 10 22
IOBK 6 9 YESB 11 17
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Table 5.3: DY Weights of Indian banks derived from the network analysis.
The DY weights are calculated by applying the DY spillover analysis
Banks Outward Inward Banks Outward Inward
ADBK 0.9060 1.3170 JKBK 0.2769 0.0540
ALBK 0.9058 1.3260 KARU 0.7468 0.3883
AXBK 0.6735 0.2694 KBNK 0.8836 1.1016
BMBK 0.8521 0.7503 KTKM 0.7372 0.4393
BOB 0.7281 0.5561 LVLS 0.7804 0.5372
BOI 0.9032 1.2861 ORBC 0.9021 1.2753
CBI 0.8685 0.9205 PNBK 0.5918 0.1804
CNBK 0.9035 1.2890 PUNA 0.8712 0.8525
CRBK 0.6232 0.3279 SBI 0.4940 0.1258
CTBK 0.6867 0.2999 SBKB 0.8341 0.6664
DCBA 0.8599 0.8860 SBKM 0.8063 0.5910
DENA 0.9056 1.3189 SBKT 0.8164 0.6086
DNBK 0.8333 0.6803 SBNK 0.9073 1.3611
FED 0.6569 0.2512 SIBK 0.8369 0.7543
HDBK 0.3317 0.0716 STNCy 0.3653 0.0834
ICBK 0.5612 0.1898 UBOI 0.8664 0.8229
IDBI 0.9068 1.3569 UCBK 0.9113 1.4395
INBA 0.8678 0.8593 UNBK 0.9034 1.2781
INBK 0.8568 0.9178 VJBK 0.9031 1.3100
IOBK 0.8992 1.2248 YESB 0.8728 1.0686
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Table 5.4: GDY weights of Indian Banks derived from network analysis.
These measures are computed by combining the results of Granger causality tests and DY
spillover analysis.
Banks Outward Inward Banks Outward Inward
ADBK 0.2656 0.3524 JKBK 0.0878 -
ALBK 0.2824 0.3919 KARU 0.1797 0.0850
AXBK 0.2525 0.0076 KBNK 0.4144 0.4036
BMBK 0.2537 0.1192 KTKM 0.1549 0.0200
BOB 0.0693 0.3553 LVLS 0.2086 0.2844
BOI 0.2842 0.3219 ORBC 0.2877 0.1516
CBI 0.1949 0.4016 PNBK 0.1710 -
CNBK 0.2784 0.4020 PUNA 0.3002 0.2199
CRBK 0.3699 0.0213 SBI 0.2901 -
CTBK 0.1416 0.0601 SBKB 0.1247 0.2110
DCBA 0.1729 0.1169 SBKM 0.2299 0.1050
DENA 0.3067 0.7657 SBKT 0.1881 0.0957
DNBK 0.1151 0.2178 SBNK 0.3790 0.2902
FED 0.2402 0.0145 SIBK 0.1916 0.1499
HDBK 0.0138 - STNCy 0.1370 0.0100
ICBK 0.1212 - UBOI 0.1897 0.0700
IDBI 0.2769 0.5866 UCBK 0.2307 0.2259
INBA 0.2275 0.1740 UNBK 0.2702 0.3098
INBK 0.1808 0.3354 VJBK 0.2822 0.8146
IOBK 0.1551 0.2502 YESB 0.3306 0.5100
Table 5.5: Change in network connectivity
The table contains statistics used in the analysis of network structure. The average link strength
is computed from DY spillover calculations for each respective network. The number of links is
calculated derived using multivariate Granger causality tests between our sample banks.
Completeness is calculated via equation 5.7. Phase 1 refers to the pre-election period and phase
2 refers to the post election period of India.
Full sample Phase 1 Phase 2 Formed 1 to 2 Removed 1 to 2
Average Strength 0.0256 0.026 0.0251 0.0217 0.0261
No. of links 346 298 457 386 227
Completeness 0.2852 0.2263 0.3842 0.2805 0.1729
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Table 5.6: Network, liquidity and volatility
Here we report the results of time series regressions of network connectivity measures Granger,
DY and GDY on liquidity measure RESPD and volatility measure RV. We use the first
differences of the variables in the regression as the variables are non-stationary at level and
stationary at first difference. Number of observation is 993 for each of the regressions.
Variables D(Granger) D(DY) D(GDY)
Constant 0.0056 -7.20E-05 0.0002
(0.0066) (0.0001) (0.0002)
D(RESPD(-1)) -32.8218** 0.6553* -1.1114**
(14.8586) (0.386) (0.4405)
D(RV(-1)) 18.7053 3.4751** 0.7001
(11.6607) (1.6034) (0.9323)
Standard error values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks *, **,
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5.7: Systematic risk variables and network connectivity variables of Indian banks
The table shows average monthly continuous betas and jump betas of 40 Indian Banks along
with the GDY outward and inward connectivity measures.
Banks BetaC BetaD GDY_outward GDY_inward
ADBK 1.20 1.73 0.27 0.35
ALBK 1.39 1.99 0.28 0.39
AXBK 1.19 1.72 0.25 0.01
BMBK 0.44 1.11 0.25 0.12
BOB 1.16 1.95 0.07 0.36
BOI 1.46 2.12 0.28 0.32
CBI 0.82 1.57 0.19 0.40
CNBK 1.40 2.00 0.28 0.40
CRBK 0.34 1.06 0.37 0.02
CTBK 0.22 0.83 0.14 0.06
DCBA 1.00 1.83 0.17 0.12
DENA 1.23 1.78 0.31 0.77
DNBK 0.74 1.57 0.12 0.22
FED 0.86 1.53 0.24 0.01
HDBK 0.79 1.32 0.01 -
ICBK 1.13 1.72 0.12 -
IDBI 1.45 1.97 0.28 0.59
INBA 0.57 1.44 0.23 0.17
INBK 0.98 1.70 0.18 0.34
IOBK 1.12 1.65 0.16 0.25
JKBK 0.24 1.16 0.09 -
KARU 0.23 0.84 0.18 0.08
KBNK 1.33 2.12 0.41 0.40
KTKM 0.94 1.44 0.15 0.02
LVLS 0.39 1.20 0.21 0.28
ORBC 1.43 2.15 0.29 0.15
PNBK 1.20 1.97 0.17 -
PUNA 0.38 1.39 0.30 0.22
SBI 1.11 1.70 0.29 -
SBKB 0.25 1.08 0.12 0.21
SBKM 0.15 1.02 0.23 0.11
SBKT 0.19 0.95 0.19 0.10
SBNK 1.41 2.04 0.38 0.29
SIBK 0.59 1.27 0.19 0.15
STNCy 0.02 0.47 0.14 0.01
UBOI 0.54 1.41 0.19 0.07
UCBK 1.58 2.37 0.23 0.23
UNBK 1.43 2.10 0.27 0.31
VJBK 1.07 1.62 0.28 0.81
YESB 1.30 1.80 0.33 0.51
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Table 5.8: Regression results - systemic risk and systematic risk- DGY and beta
These are cross sectional regression results. We use Tobit regressions as the dependent variables
DY outward and inward weights as non-zero ratios. The number of observation is in each
regression is 40.
GDY outward GDY inward
1 2 1 2
Constant 0.1558*** 0.0983** 0.02115 -0.1206*
(0.0243) (0.0414) (0.0379) (0.0644)
BetaC 0.0742*** 0.212***
(0.0235) (0.0501)
BetaJ 0.0785*** 0.2096***
(0.0258) (0.047)
Standard error values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks *, **,
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 5.1: The network of Indian banks during the 2011-2014 period.
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Figure 5.3: Plots of higher moments of GDY
The variables are calculated on a daily rolling window basis. The rolling window is 20% of our
sample trading days of 1240.
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Figure 5.4: Plots of volatility based network variables
The network variables are computed by using daily realized variances (RV) on a rolling window basis.
The rolling window is 20% of our sample trading days of 1240.
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Figure 5.5: Asymmetry in network measurements
Panel a shows the network completeness measure GDY rolling window line with all RV s. In Panel b the
red GDY line is drawn based on negative RV s and the blue GDY line is drawn based on positive RV s.
Panel c shows the asymmetry in the network between positive and negative RV s.
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The idea that the separation of discontinuous jump components from the continuous
Brownian component of asset price processes is important for portfolio risk management
and asset allocation decisions has resulted in a flurry of jump studies on the U.S. and
other developed markets. As we do not know whether the results of those studies hold
for other markets such as emerging economies we extend the jump literature to the
Indian market which is fast emerging as one of the biggest economies of the world.
Four independent studies on Indian financial market especially the banking sector have
been incorporated in this thesis where the jump risk of this market, its characteristics,
implications, systematic risk and systemic risk are examined.
In the first paper we examine whether banking stocks have different sensitivities or
systematic risks against the jump movements from the continuous movements in the
market. Our paper confirms a similar finding for Indian banking stocks as reported in
the existing literature for the US in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) and Alexeev et al.
(2017). Using 5-minute stock price data for 41 listed Indian banks for 2004-2015 period
we establish evidence of jumps in the Indian equity markets. The proportion of jumps did
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not increase during the GFC, also consistent with the small existing literature concerning
jump behaviour during crisis periods. The estimates of separate continuous and jump
betas for the Indian banks show that the reaction of individual stocks to discontinuities
in the market indicator price is substantially higher than the reaction to continuous
movements.
The estimated continuous and jump betas are related to various firm characteristics.
More particularly, we show that systematic risk of banking stocks can be reduced by
increasing bank capital and decreasing leverage but the extent of the reduction in betas
that can be produced in this manner are quite small and may not be economically
meaningful.
In the second paper, we provide a comprehensive characterisation of the exposure
of financial stocks to the jump risk by focusing on the sub-sectoral differences between
banks and non-bank financial corporations (FIs). We examine the jump risks for banking
sector represented by 41 Indian banking stocks and the FI sector represented by 55 FIs
of India.
By applying alternative non-parametric jump detection methods on the Indian market
index, the banking index and the FI index, we observe a wide variation of reported jump
intensities across different jump methods, data frequencies and different significance
levels. Our volatility signature plot suggests that a 15-minute data may be optimal in
neutralising the market micro-structure noise.
Our test results show that the banking industry is associated with higher amount of
jump risk in comparison with the market while the result is opposite for the FI industry.
A probit regression indicates that presence of jumps in the market has significant effect
on the probability of jump occurrences in the banking industry and the FI industry.
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We do not find any such relationship between the banking and non-banking financial
corporations.
We also analyse the intra-day jump pattern of Indian financial stocks by testing jumps
in each of the return observations. The results indicate the existence of intra-day and
weekly seasonality in jump pattern contrasting the general description of jump occur-
rences as a Poisson distribution and thus reinforce the findings of Bormetti et al. (2015)
in this regard. Overall, our results confirm that investors in emerging markets need to
consider jump risks in portfolio and risk management decisions and academics applying
asset pricing models in this market need to choose jump robust models.
In the pursuit of the non-news related factors causing jumps in the stock price processes
our the third paper examines the relationship of liquidity with the jump movements using
ten of the largest Indian banking stocks. Using a jump test capable of detecting jumps
in every return observations we observe jumps in 1.58% to 1.73% of return data in those
stocks. We implemented an event study method as well as a parametric analysis to assess
the contribution of liquidity shocks in occurrence of jumps. We find notable variations
in the liquidity measures immediately before and after the jump intervals in the stocks.
Liquidity measures - market spread, trading quantity and immediacy, market liquidity
conditions do improve around jumps. The surge in volume can be attributed to the rise
in average trade size before the jump interval. The results conform to the literature that
the demand of immediacy of traders may cause jumps in stock returns.
We find evidence of both contemporaneous and lagged effects of liquidity factors on the
probability of jump occurrences. However, the explanatory power of contemporaneous
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liquidity variables is much higher than the lagged variables. The liquidity variables have
more explanatory power in determining the probability of negative than that of positive
jumps. Finally, although several liquidity variables are shown to contribute to price
discovery, the post jump price discovery process does not seem to be strongly related to
the liquidity variables.
After examining the systematic risks in the first paper we examine another risk which
is particularly relevant for the banking sector - systemic risk and try to relate these two
risks in our fourth paper. Systemic risk is analysed through the network analysis of stock
returns of 40 listed Indian banks for the period of 2011 to 2015. Granger causality tests
form edges between each pair of banks showing 8.65 connections for each of the banks
on the average. The strength of each of the links is measured by applying the variance
decomposition method developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). The network of banks
is formed by retaining variance decomposition weights of only the statistically significant
links. According to this network matrix we identify the more systemically active banks.
The network variables measured on a daily rolling window basis reveal an upward
trend in the number of significant edges despite a stable variance decomposition weights
over our sample time. The combined measure of the network also shows an overall
upward trend as it is dominated by the changes in number of links. We also observe
that connectivity in the banking stocks to increase after the general election of May 2014
increasing the risk of systemic nature.
Regression results suggest that the number of links of the network are affected by li-
quidity changes of the market while the variance decomposition weights are more affected
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by the volatility changes. Ultimately changes in the combined connectivity is related
to market liquidity. Cross-sectional regressions show that systematic risk is positively
related to network connectivity. Both of our decomposed systematic risk measures of
banks - continuous beta and jump beta - are found statistically significant for both
outward and inward connectivity measures.
Overall, we find evidence supporting the existence of jumps in the Indian market
and showing that we need to weight a jump diffusion asset price process in applying
financial models in these markets. Investors taking portfolio and asset pricing decisions
need to consider the concentration of jump occurrences especially at the beginning of
trading hours. The clustering behaviour of jumps also provides investors with some
hints as when to expect jumps in the price process. Liquidity conditions, beside news
announcements, may also indicate the arrival of jumps in a specific stock or the market.
Investors, especially those who are very active in trading, should also be aware of the
difference in pricing the systematic risk of stocks created from jump market movements
versus continuous market movements. The banking stocks in our study show higher
sensitivity towards the market jumps than the continuous movements of the market, but
the results may be different for different industries (e.g. Alexeev et al., 2017). Lastly,
the banks with higher systematic risk are also more active players in spreading systemic
shocks in the market and are thus more vulnerable at the time of extreme conditions.
In determining jumps we work with a number of jump methods but do not attempt
to ascertain which method fits best with the emerging market settings. While working
with real data it is difficult to determine the best method to fit into a particular dataset.
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We can solve this problem by running the alternative methods in simulated data which
we aspire to do in future. Another option can be using the common jumps detected
by a number of methods as proposed by Dumitru and Urga (2012). By taking the
intersections of different methods we may solve the underestimation or overestimation of
jumps detected by a single method. Choosing the optimal threshold level against which
jump is detected is another area where further research is needed to avoid detecting
spurious jumps. So far, there is no firm consensus among researchers on the ideal
threshold level that will fit into very high frequency data. The ideal threshold level
may vary based on liquidity of assets which can be studied in future researches.
We draw the network of banks by combining Granger causality and variance decom-
position methods. Utilizing co-jumps of banks can be an alternative way of determining
links among the banks. Examining changes of co-jump magnitude and nature during
the crisis period can provide useful information on contagion and systemic effects within
and across banking sectors (e.g. Aït-Sahalia et al., 2015 and Bormetti et al., 2015). Bor-
metti et al. (2015) describe the existence of large number of co-jumps across different
asset classes as systemic events. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2015) show that jumps in a country
which are influenced by jumps in another country can be a measurement of contagion
effect. Such cross exciting jumps and co-jumps can become important tools in measur-
ing systemic and contagion effects and further studies can improve our understanding in
this direction. Another extension of our research can be a sector wise analysis of jump
characteristics and an examination of co-jumps across these sectors. Sectors with higher
co-jumps may also be more systemically linked, and demand more attention during crisis
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periods. Lastly, a cross-country comparison of different emerging economies in terms of
jumps and banking networks may confirm whether we can generalize the India-based
research results to other emerging countries.
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